Al-Arabiya TV discusses assassination of top Syrian "security adviser"

At 1905 gmt on 4 August, Al-Arabiya Television dedicates the first 30-minute segment of its "Panorama" talk show, moderated by Muntaha al-Ramahi, to recent reports of the assassination in Syria of Brig-Gen Muhammad Sulayman, security adviser and close aide of Syrian President Bashar al-Asad's. The show hosts Ilyas Hanna, a retired Lebanese brigadier-general and military expert, and Dr Muhammad Mujahid al-Zayyat, deputy director of the National Centre for Middle Eastern Studies in Cairo.

Al-Ramahi notes that Al-Arabiya was "unable to contact any Syrian analysts or officials to comment on the matter."

Al-Ramahi opens by saying: "The only accurate information available on this mysterious brigadier general is that he is the president's security adviser, and as for the duties entrusted to him, the stories vary. One account says that he was the right-hand man of Basil al-Asad, Bashar's brother, until Basil's death in 1994, at which time he became Bashar al-Asad's right-hand man. Another version places him in charge of all of Syria's arms deals and suggests a long list of enemies in the form of opportunists within the regime, noting deep differences between the man and President Al-Asad's brother-in-law, Asif Shawkat. A third story portrays Sulayman as the liaison officer with Hezbollah and the man responsible for transporting Iranian weapons to it, but this was denied by a senior source in Hezbollah."

Ramahi asks: "So who was it that assassinated Sulayman? The mafia? Israel? Or were scores being settled in the regime? And what truth is there to reports that he held sensitive information on the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri?"

Sulayman has also been tied to Syria's nuclear ambitions, supposedly coordinating with the Koreans and Iranians on the construction of Syria's alleged nuclear reactor, and to Imad Mughniyah, the Hezbollah military commander who was assassinated in Damascus in February 2008.

On the most likely reasons for the assassination, Hanna says: "In matters as complex and secretive as this, you cannot limit yourself to a single scenario, and in the absence of accurate information, the matter remains open to different analyses and theories. As your report mentioned, there is the issue of the timing of the assassination in terms of President Al-Asad's absence on a visit to Iran and then briefly to Turkey, as well as the history of assassinations [in Syria]. However, for us to credit a single Army officer with all these tasks would be going too far - for instance, when we talk about the nuclear programme, liaisons with Hezbollah and North Korea, and arms deals [rephrases] if any country in this world relied on one person to oversee all these files, then it must certainly suffer from a lack of elite individuals in these areas."

Hanna adds: "It all depends on your perspective: if you see the man as responsible for Al-Hariri's assassination, then you will approach this matter from a certain perspective, but if you focus on his relationship with Hezbollah leader Imad Mughniyah, then you would have a different matter on your hands, and the same applies if you associate the man with the nuclear file. It all boils down to the issues you associate with this key figure and which will guide your analysis, especially in the apparent lack of any information."

He speaks of "crucial changes in the decision-making process in Syria" in light of its recent Turkish-brokered peace talks with Israel and the "alleviation of international pressures" on Syria, and suggests that "individuals who functioned well in previous eras might not be best suited for current times."

As for whether the method of assassination - a sniper firing from a boat out at sea - indicates a security breach in Syria, Hanna says: "If we compare the assassination of an important Hezbollah leader [Mughniyah] to this operation and limit ourselves to high-value targets who play central roles in the systems they function within, well, such operations require a thorough and accurate information-gathering process, several accomplices, round-the-clock surveillance of the target, as well as experience and a fast method of execution. This operation's complexity lies in the significance of its target - the more prominent the target, the more complex the operation. As for the leaked reports of sniper fire, I would say that a method requiring such precision is not plausible given this person's importance; this is a complex operation."

He adds: "Take for example the Iranian nuclear programme; we are now hearing about the abduction of important figures in the IRGC and the programme, and this might later turn out to be the work of the United States in cooperation with Israel, but I am not accusing anyone here. The point is, with important projects, the most important people in the formula are not replaceable, unlike equipment. If Brigadier General Sulayman was in fact an official in the nuclear programme - provided there is a Syrian nuclear programme - then his elimination would be significant because people are not replaceable, and his assassination may therefore be seen as a foreign operation."

Profiling Sulayman, Dr Al-Zayyat says: "Brigadier General Sulayman should not be measured by his military rank, because in the Syrian structure, a person's prominence is determined by the files they are in charge of, not their military ranks. Brigadier General Sulayman was the equivalent of the national security adviser to the Syrian presidential establishment, and was hence the link between the president and all military and security institutions. His extensive involvement, since the days of Basil al-Asad, and prolonged service in this position meant that he enjoyed a certain amount of prominence and influence, in addition to the uniqueness that came with his access to the sort of documents he shared with the president and these institutions. I believe that his growing influence in the recent period was seen by some in the regime as preventing them from influencing or playing a role in the state structure. It is obvious there he faced some competition within the regime."

Al-Zayyat argues that Sulayman's role was that of "personal secretary to the president, informing him of important documents, relaying his orders, and overseeing files that were confidential to some extent," and dismisses the notion that he oversaw the nuclear file, cooperation with Hezbollah, and arms deals.

Commenting on the proposed scenarios, Al-Zayyat says: "Is Brigadier General Sulayman's assassination tied to a certain position from Hezbollah? I doubt it, because cooperation between Syria and Hezbollah in the recent period has been of great significance and a source of discomfort for Israel. Is the assassination an inside job linked to the regime's involvement in the Al-Hariri assassination? I believe that Major General Mahir al-Asad's attendance of Sulayman's funeral means that no centralized decision was taken to assassinate him. His assassination might be the culmination of competition with regime figures wanting as big a role as he had in the presidency."

Al-Zayyat dismisses the sniper scenario as "more cinematic than real" given the security measures surrounding a man of Sulayman's prominence and the fact that "the sources that said he was shot by a sniper anchored out at sea did not mention any Syrian naval countermeasures against this sniper." He suggests that Sulayman was shot inside his villa.

Hanna argues that "Israel is somewhat troubled by recent Syrian-Israeli and US-Iranian rapprochements, especially now with the diminishing possibility of any military action in the region," and suggests that Sulayman's assassination "is a foreign operation designed to eliminate an important figure in the Syrian hierarchy, in this case the coordinator of the decision-making process at the level of Syrian national security, in a bid to sabotage these developments."

Hanna says that indicators of a power struggle in Syria, such as security reshuffle, might surface in the future that could suggest links between the Sulayman assassination and previous assassinations, like those of Imad Mughniyah and Rafiq al-Hariri.

Hanna argues that the recent French-Syrian presidential visits, together with the political paralyses in the region, the United States, and Israel, "have alleviated the direct military pressures on both Iran and Syria, which in turn translates, as you have said, into assassinations and covert operations in Syria." He says that even if Syria was involved in the Al-Hariri assassination, "we have already made the move to the post-Al-Hariri-assassination era, especially now that the special tribunal has been formed and that the indictment list is to be issued later, meaning that pressures on the Syrian regime have eased significantly."

On whether the Syrian regime's future reactions might expose the assassins and their motives, Al-Zayyat says that "there is no such thing as a power circle in the Syrian presidency that the president cannot dispose of," and suggests that "this was not as much a struggle between trends in the regime as it was a struggle between individuals in the regime looking for influence." He argues that if the assassination is indeed the work of foreign parties, it could be intended to send the message that the Syrian regime, "which is trying to rehabilitate itself internationally and regionally," is not as in control as it seems and suffers from internal power struggles.

The segment ends at 1935 gmt.

Source: Al-Arabiya TV, Dubai, in Arabic 1906 gmt 4 Aug 08