Al-Arabiya TV panellists discuss rationale behind, accuracy of terror warnings

["Panorama" programme, moderated by Muntaha al-Ramahi, discusses objective of warnings issued by intelligence agencies against possible Al-Qa'idah attacks - live]

Dubai-based, Saudi private capital-funded pan-Arab news channel Al-Arabiya TV on 3 August carries within its "Panorama" feature a 20-minute discussion of the objective behind warnings issued by Western intelligence agencies regarding possible Al-Qa'idah attacks. The discussion is moderated from Dubai by Muntaha al-Ramahi, who hosts Dr Mustafa al-Ani, director of the security and anti-terrorism programme at the Gulf Centre for Research, in the studio; and Tawfiq Mujayyid, writer and journalist, via satellite from Paris.

Al-Ramahi begins by saying: "The information published in the British newspaper, The Guardian, today on efforts by intelligence agencies in several European countries to investigate possible Al-Qa'idah threats to carry out terrorist operations in Europe raises many questions, especially in light of a series of warnings by Western countries to their nationals in several Arab countries, expecting attacks in these countries; the most recent of these warnings was issued two days ago to French nationals in Yemen." She adds that if one examines the series of warnings issued by Western intelligence services regarding possible attacks in Europe over the past five years, one realizes that most warnings were unnecessary. She notes that this raises questions about the sources of information according to which the intelligence agencies issue their warnings, and about their accuracy. She wonders if Al-Qa'idah can still "mislead intelligence agencies by leaking them wrong information on possible targets," and if the warnings are issued to serve other purposes.

The programme then airs a three-minute report by Khalid Uways. Against the background of video footage of the 11 September attacks in New York, Uways says that fear of similar attacks encourages Western intelligence services to issue warnings of possible attacks. He notes that the most recent warning was published by the British The Guardian newspaper citing Western intelligence agencies that believe Al-Qa'idah could dispatch female suicide bombers particularly from North Africa to carry out attacks in Europe. He adds that the intelligence services claim that they have monitored scores of women who support and provide logistical support for Al-Qa'idah. Uways notes that the first female suicide bomber in Iraq in 2005 was Belgian, and discusses Al-Qa'idah's recent use of female suicide bombers. He says that according to experts on terrorism, Al-Qa'idah leaks information to draw attention to a certain place, but attacks another. He adds that according to experts, intelligence agencies' warnings are usually based on accurate information and sometimes prevent attacks because they send a message to Al-Qa'idah that the intelligence agencies are aware of its activities. However, he says that the credibility of some agencies is dispelled when several warnings are issued but no attacks takes place. He notes Al-Qa'idah's attempts to exhaust intelligence services and distort their action. Concluding, Uways says that the work of Western intelligence services will become more difficult now that women have become involved in Al-Qa'idah activities.

Asked about the sources of intelligence information, Al-Ani begins by saying that "there are three levels of warnings in any intelligence agency." He notes that warnings are first issued to the members of the agency itself and then to the intelligence and diplomatic community, and that finally a general warning is issued. He stresses that before issuing a general warning, the intelligence service must have information from several sources. He says that in Britain and the United States, the approval of the foreign secretary or someone higher must be obtained before a warning is issued, because the issuance of a warning concerning a particular country could trigger a diplomatic crisis with that country.

Al-Ramahi asks why the warnings issued regarding possible attacks in certain areas were incorrect. She notes that France issued a warning to its nationals in Yemen, yet an operation took place in Algeria. Al-Ani says: "Any intelligence service acts on an international level, it has geographical branches and branches for the country, and Al-Qa'idah operates on the same principle. It is an international organization." He notes that Al-Qa'idah has carried out or tried to carry out operations throughout the world.

Asked if Al-Qa'idah changes the target of its operation once a warning is issued by an intelligence agency, Al-Ani says that the "main responsibility of the disinformation department in any intelligence service is to squander the efforts of the other party." He adds: "When Al-Qa'idah signals that it will attack a European country when it is planning [for an operation] in an African nation, the intelligence agency will focus most of its efforts on that European country, thus leaving the real target [unattended]." He stresses that the intelligence agencies of the advanced countries are constitutionally obliged to protect their nationals wherever they may be.

Al-Ramahi says that when a particular embassy issues a warning to its nationals in a particular country, all people become afraid to visit that country. Al-Ani says that intelligence services face a dilemma because they are legally and constitutionally obliged to protect their nationals once they obtain information, and when no attack takes place, they lose credibility.

Once again, Al-Ramahi notes that France issued a warning to its nationals in Yemen, but an operation took place in Algeria. She asks if Al-Qa'idah leaks wrong information in order to ensure the easy execution of an operation in another country. Mujayyid says that deception is likely. With regard to Yemen, he notes that there were reports that a group of Zaydiyyin moved to Sanaa and formed an alliance with some tribes around the capital, which raises concern in light of the summer vacation season.

Asked about Al-Qa'idah's ability to mislead, Mujayyid says that Al-Qa'idah pursues the same approach as the intelligence agencies. He stresses that Al-Qa'idah seeks to mislead intelligence agencies and to have several organizations such as the Libyan, Moroccan, and Tunisian groups. However, he says: "I do not believe the Al-Qa'idah Organization is capable today of inflicting harm as was the case in the past." He stresses that Al-Qa'idah's "first weapon" at present is the "media weapon," and notes that the more we talk about the Al-Qa'idah Organization the stronger it becomes. Mujayyid says that Al-Qa'idah is wagering on the upcoming US presidential elections, and notes claims that it is wagering on John McCain's victory because Barack Obama calls for dialogue between Islam and the West and wants to open dialogue with Iran and Syria. He stresses that Al-Qa'idah is "a political organization before anything else." He says that the Western judiciary and security agencies have sought to dismantle Al-Qa'idah's dormant cells in European countries.

Asked about Al-Qa'idah's use of the media as a weapon, Al-Ani says that the Al-Qa'idah Organization "is not a political party," and thus Al-Qa'idah carries out operations to prove its existence, which is important to ensure funding and recruit elements. He stresses that if an organization does not carry out operations for a long time, its existence will be undermined. Hence, he says that if an organization cannot carry out operations it tries to draw media attention through such warnings. He adds that warnings are issued based on information obtained from individuals or on electronic information, and that intelligence agencies share information. Al-Ani says that before the 11 September attacks and the London attacks, the concerned intelligence services had information about possible attacks but did not issue general warnings; therefore, they were held accountable. Hence, he argues that intelligence agencies now "try to protect themselves against legal and political blame." He adds that when an intelligence agency obtains information it reveals it, because if an attack takes place, it will have done its job, and if no attack takes place it can say that the information was correct but that the involved party refrained from carrying out the attack after the warning was issued.

Asked about Al-Qa'idah's use of booby-trapped cars and the targeting of embassies and police stations, Mujayyid says that targets are usually chosen carefully, noting that Al-Qa'idah focuses on embassies and sensitive places. He says that it seems that Al-Qa'idah has its own strong intelligence agency, one that is capable of providing it with information. Mujayyid says that there is fear of tribal solidarity with the Al-Qa'idah Organization.

Asked if European intelligence agencies fear Al-Qa'idah's use of female suicide bombers in Europe, Mujayyid agrees and says that policemen usually hesitate to search women. He discusses the financial situation of the suicide bombers, money temptations, and attempts to play with their emotions.

Al-Ramahi concludes the episode by thanking her guests.

Source: Al-Arabiya TV, Dubai, in Arabic 1936 gmt 3 Aug 08