What Does Ahmedinejad Fear...Why Is Nasrallah Anxious?

The good news for the nations of "defiance" in the region is that the Russian bear has finally awaken from his slumber while the godfather of the Kremlin or the Supreme Leader of the new era, Vladimir Putin, rejoices at the success of Medvedev in passing his first test in the project of reviving the military ideology that Putin had promised the Russian nation.

In the Caucasus, the US has been dealt a resounding blow; President Bush is not leaving the White House in peace...Every time the image and power of the US suffer a blow anywhere, the "defiance" camp celebrates. However...

If it is true that the Russian-Georgian war and its repercussions are an inverse reflection of the Bay of Pigs crisis (1961) and that the American missile shield in the Russian backyard is an historical revenge over Krutchev's missiles in Cuba, then it is also true that the huge errors in addressing regional and international crises have heightened with Bush's stupid approach to managing conflicts and hot spots with threats and sticks.

Georgia erred by provoking the Kremlin, offering it the golden opportunity it had long awaited to deliver a tough message to Washington in response to its treacherous missile shield. Following its "partnership" with Russia under Putin, the US assumed that it could put the bear to sleep for good or that it could turn it into a cat in the care of the West that "saved" it from bankruptcy and complete economic collapse. The treachery was evident in the gradual encroachment to engulf the former superpower with American military bases and intelligence centers, and undermining then penetrating the Russian military establishment to turn Moscow into nothing more than a NATO satellite.

This perhaps sums up the perception of Putin, "the Supreme Leader," of the legitimate excuses to retrieve the "glory" of "Soviet" power, at least to halt the "Atlantic tide" at the Russian borders and once again stir trouble for the Americans in traditionally hotbeds of international conflicts, especially in the Middle East and the Gulf, by reviving the policy of axes and alliances that predominated during the Cold War (wars by proxy).

President George Bush who has scored - by American admission - the highest rate of failures in foreign policy, will not enjoy a calm departure. He started his term with two wars, only to end his reign with the blow of the war in the Caucasus, and to stand helpless in his efforts to rally his NATO allies behind his desire to teach the "renegade" bear.

Evidently, it is too early to speak about an imminent end to the repercussions of Georgia's fatal mistake in assessing the Russian transformations following the unrest of Supreme Leader Putin in the last year of his presidential term and the Kremlin's playing the tune of the US "humiliation" of Russia. The dilemma that concerns the Americans, Europeans and the conflict belt in the Middle East is that the more the disappointments and upsets Bush face, the more the Russians rejoice in exercising their muscles after their long slumber, amidst applause in the region as a result of the American oppression, the higher the costs of miscalculations.

Other battlefields await testing and settling scores. Isn't the conflict with Iran over its nuclear program, regional ambitions and attempts to snatch a role in controlling the vital energy pipelines one of them? Similarly, doesn't this also apply to the Israeli desire to avenge its July 2006 defeat? This is not to mention the Israeli desire to settle scores with the Iranian nuclear program which deprives the Jewish state of its monopoly of nuclear deterrence in the region.

Once again, Iran applauds its Russian ally which has repeatedly eased the international pressures and sanctions it came under to prevent another Iraqi scenario in which the Americans and their Atlantic allies besiege Russia at its southern border. Damascus, meanwhile, makes no attempt to hide its mockery at Washington, especially since the Kremlin has grown stronger after flexing its muscles in the Caucasus and standing its ground in the face of the missile shield hoax.

Despite all this, who has an interest in searching for the relationship between the Russian revenge of the American deception and the sudden Israeli interest in avenging the July war and preparing for street wars while Olmert packs his bags to leave?

Why is Ahmedinejad "suddenly" wary of an Israeli or American war scenario at the last hour of the term of the president who never listened to his advice on managing the world? Did this anxiety not accompany the Iranian president during his Istanbul visit?

Why is Hezbollah's Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah anxious about the hurricanes that would hit the world and the region? Why does he favor dialogue and cooperation with all sides to guarantee Lebanon's survival?

How did the severe blow in the Caucasus open the wounds of the July war? As far as repercussions are concerned, the calculations of Bush's loud departure are open to all kinds of fatal errors.