Lebanon tries once more to fight its sectarian demons

It is election season in Lebanon, and as usual it is a time of petty electoral politics, back-room deals, oversized egos, shameless sectarian agitation, political manipulation, imaginative (and sometimes disgraceful) campaign advertising, outright vote buying and, sadly, foolish violence. And this deplorable if all too predictable state of affairs is the backdrop to a fierce battle for Lebanon’s future.

@body arnhem:The June 7 elections will reflect a new balance of power rather than deal a deadly blow to either camp: Lebanese politics never delivers complete victory or defeat, just unsatisfying accommodations after violent showdowns. These elections, though, may set the country on a new if hesitant trajectory.

Can the pro-independence March 14 movement emerge victorious against the March 8 coalition dominated by the Syrian and Iranian-backed Hizbollah? Will the outcome of the elections be determined by a conscious choice between the merits of the Hong Kong model versus those of the Hanoi model? Or will petty concerns supplant the contest between the arguably tenuous hope of a liberal society and the suicidal entrenchment of a culture of resistance?

Since the withdrawal of the Syrian forces in 2005 Lebanon has teetered on the brink of disaster. Though the March 14 movement won the 2005 elections, the lack of domestic consensus, expressed through occasional violence, and a campaign of intimidation and assassination that targeted its cadre have tested the country’s resilience. The resulting political paralysis has shattered the two clashing myths of Hizbollah’s muqawama and the parliamentarian majority’s Cedar Revolution.

To be sure, the March 14 movement has failed to demonstrate either competence or creativity. Busy with political intrigue and physical survival, its former warlords and feudal leaders have failed to articulate an agenda of modern governance, losing many moderates in the process. The best illustration of this disappointment is the withdrawal of Nassib Lahoud from a hotly contested race. Though no electoral heavyweight, the former MP and vehement critic of Syrian rule had become March 14’s liberal conscience. Instead, these leaders, in particular the Christian ones, have imposed flavourless if obedient candidates at the expense of better qualified but less partisan ones.

The divisions within the March 14 alliance have also accentuated in recent times. The firebrand Druze leader Walid Jumblatt was recently recorded disparaging his Sunni and Christian allies, causing considerable damage and distrust within the coalition. The spirit of the Independence Intifada is not dead, though. The memory of Syrian occupation and the unwillingness to be held hostage to regional interests still motivate huge segments of the population. For them, the Hizbollah alternative has little attraction when it clashes so evidently with their cosmopolitan if chaotic outlook.

For their part, Hizbollah and its allies, who dragged the country into a war in 2006 and a mini-civil war in 2008, boast of being on the right side of history, with the announced if delusional triumph of Iran and Syria. Their hope is that shifting regional dynamics, declining western support for March 14 and an aggressive presence on the ground will stir the electorate their way.

Hizbollah has certainly become a powerful player, with a skilled leadership, outstanding organisation and a carefully crafted image as a modern party. It was once fashionable to argue that its political involvement would eventually moderate its positions and shift its focus internally. This fallacy, propagated by naive academics, is exposed by Naim Qassem, the party’s second-in-command. “Hizbollah’s path,” he says, “goes beyond the electoral battle, and it crosses domestic boundaries to regional ones. Our enemy [Israel] understands one language, which is the language of resistance.”

So much for a peaceful settlement with Israel that would allow Lebanon to deal with its more pressing domestic troubles. For Hizbollah, these elections are primarily an opportunity to demonstrate its strength, gain a political cover for the muqawama and secure the power to make unilateral decisions of war and peace, not to initiate a proper takeover of Lebanon’s institutions.

Indeed, Hizbollah’s clout won’t dramatically expand through these elections, but it certainly hopes that its Christian allies, especially the former warlord Michel Aoun, will gain enough seats to secure a parliamentarian majority. One tactic is to spread an insidious sectarian message: only an alliance of minorities can fend off the looming (if vastly and deliberately inflated) fundamentalist Sunni threat, Aoun and Hizbollah claim. The more this theory gains ground, the worse off Lebanon will be.

This battle promises to be frighteningly exciting. Both sides are already predicting overwhelming victory, but the winning margin this time will be no more than four to five seats out of 128. With the Sunni, Shiite and Druze communities solidly mobilised behind their leaders, there will be few surprises. Once again, with the battleground districts all situated in Christian-dominated regions, the notoriously fragmented Christian community will be the ultimate decider. Much will depend on Aoun’s fortunes. He rode high in 2005, but his alliance with Hizbollah, which gave the Shiite movement cross-confessional cover, and his dictatorial manner may come at a price. Aoun’s expected downfall, however, may not occur should sectarian passions capture the hearts of the Christian community.

There is no glory in this fight, but nor is there moral or political equivalence. Granted, there is an equal amount of confessionalism, corruption and nepotism on both sides. But one criteria sets the March 8 camp apart: the possession of weapons and the willingness to use violence for political purposes. Can Lebanon ever escape its sectarian demons and decide on the future it wants?




Emile Hokayem’s father, Nabil Hokayem, is an independent candidate running for the Maronite seat in the district of Batroun