Fatima Gailani was 27 years old when she was thrust into the limelight as a spokesperson for the Afghan mujahideen during their 'jihad' against the 1979-1989 Soviet occupation.
Beautiful and articulate, the Afghan aristocrat played a vital role in drawing the world's attention to the events taking place in her country.
This was, of course, long before the Taliban usurped the rights of women and relegated them to life in obscurity.
Gailani's father, Pir Sayed Ahmed Gailani, was the founder of the Mahaz-i-Milli Islami (National Islamic Front) party, and one of the leaders of the 'holy war' against the Soviets.
She says that it was her father who urged her to get involved: "He told me that the door for women would soon close and it would need a strong foot to keep it ajar."
As the only Afghan woman at the time to assume a very visible political role, Gailani was vilified by some conservative elements in society, but nothing would dissuade her from supporting Afghan liberation and serving as an example to fellow Afghan women.
Clock 'turned backward'
Following the defeat of the Soviets, civil war broke out among the mujahideen, paving the way for a takeover by the Taliban movement.
During 20 years of exile in London, Gailani watched from afar as decades of homespun social progress unraveled in her home country.
"During the reign of Zahir Shah [the former king], it didn't occur to me that I should be aware of my gender at all," recalls Gailani, sitting in the garden of her home in a well-guarded residential area of Kabul.
"I knew that in the villages and other provinces it wasn't the same, but in Kabul, whether you were a man or a woman, if you achieved well in your education, there was a place for you in government. It was during the war that I became aware of gender disparities."
Helena Malikyar, an Afghan historian and an expert on Afghan state-building, points out that the downturn in the fate of Afghan women did not begin with the advent of the Taliban and claims that it was certain extremist groups among the mujahideen who "systematically turned the clock backward on the women of Afghanistan".
"In Bonn [where the post US-led invasion government was formed in 2001] and through subsequent political formulations sponsored by the UN and the US, the same groups and leaders became part of the power structure. So, how could one hope for the pro-women rhetoric to become visible in practice?" she asks.
While post-Taliban Afghanistan did bring some improvements to the lot of women, these changes may not have taken root in Afghan society.
Gailani concedes that there are "lots of women in parliament and the ministries", but wonders whether this is a genuine mark of progress or simply a condition of the government that was formed in Bonn.
'Imported' values
"As much as it was the will of the women within Afghanistan, these changes also came from our donors. It was a condition," explains Gailani, who holds a masters degree in Islamic Jurisprudence from London's Muslim College.
"That's why we must now reconcile these two eras and help the women bring these changes in an Afghan way rather than an imported way."
Hossan Banu Ghazanfar, Afghanistan's fourth minister for women's affairs since the fall of the Taliban, agrees that change must begin "at the cultural level".
According to the ministry's own statistics, the average Afghan woman has a lifespan of 44 years, which is 20 years short of the global average.
Their low life expectancy is attributed to the high rate of underage marriages and frequent births, which contribute to an extremely high incidence of maternal mortality.
There is also widespread violence against women, notably so-called 'honor killings', an issue that is not properly addressed mainly because it is viewed by some as an aspect of Afghan 'tradition'.
Ghazanfar, who holds a PhD in linguistics and served as dean of the literature faculty at Kabul University, cites two main reasons for violence against women in Afghanistan.
"First, the [poor] economic condition of the family. Second, some cultural and traditional [customs] that are neither legal nor religious but people practice it," she says.
Source: Al Jazeera, 'Imported values' fail Afghan women
By Tanya Goudsouzian and Fatima Rabbani in Kabul
Showing posts with label Afghanistan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Afghanistan. Show all posts
Monday, 21 September 2009
Thursday, 5 March 2009
The Bookseller of Kabul responds
Shah Muhammad Rais was depicted in “The Bookseller of Kabul” as Sultan Khan, a liberal intellectual in public but a tyrant in his own home. Rais’ anger and bewilderment at that portrayal are apparent in his literary rebuttal, published in Afghanistan in 2007.
An Afghan bookstore owner displeased with his portrayal in a bestseller based on him and his family has written his own book telling his angry, bewildered side of the story.
That would be the Bookseller's. The epic literary feud that erupted with the book's publication more than five years ago still endures -- at least from the perspective of Shah Muhammad Rais, who hated his depiction as Sultan Khan, a liberal intellectual in public but a tyrant in his own home.
The author is Asne Seierstad, a young Norwegian journalist who had come to Afghanistan in late 2001 to cover the fall of the Taliban government. On arriving here in the capital, she encountered Rais, the erudite, English-speaking proprietor of the battered city's best bookshop, which then had a branch in a half-ruined hotel where many journalists stayed.
Seierstad asked if she could live for a time with Rais and his family to document their domestic life as the country and its people emerged from five years of harsh Taliban rule. Without hesitation, he agreed.
The result: a memorable portrait of a man who had fought for freedom of expression in Afghanistan but oppressed and repressed the women of his own family. "The Bookseller" became a runaway bestseller, a book club favorite that was translated into more than 30 languages.
Rais says that Seierstad willfully misinterpreted almost everything she witnessed, failing to take into account deep-seated social customs and the traditional roles of men and women in Afghan society. Seierstad, for her part, has said in interviews over the years that she stands by everything she wrote, and that she could not have ignored the intimate cruelties that transpired before her eyes.
Her book opens with a searing account of the suffering of the bookseller's wife of 16 years when he brings home a second bride, a comely teenager: "Sharifa cried for 20 days. 'What have I done? Why are you dissatisfied with me?' . . . Sultan told her to pull herself together."
As "The Bookseller" became an international sensation, Rais -- a figure readily recognizable in Kabul, despite the name change in the book -- became increasingly furious. He prowled the city's bookstalls, buying and destroying any copy he could find. He pursued Seierstad to her homeland, threatening legal action and demanding retractions and apologies.
The vehemence of his accusations so unsettled the author, now in her late 30s, that she agreed to meet him only with her own father present, on the theory that he would demonstrate more respect for a man older than himself than he would for her alone.
More recently, Rais has come out with a literary riposte: a slim English-language volume that tells his side of the story. Stacks of the book, titled "Once Upon a Time There Was a Bookseller in Kabul," are displayed front and center in his downtown bookshop, which is crammed to the rafters with tomes on Sufi poetry and Mughal architecture.
"It is the only way I have to reply to all the things she said about me," said Rais, a soft-spoken, portly man who was nursing a toothache on a chilly day in January. The sound of clamorous Kabul traffic leached through the sleet-streaked windows.
Rais' book, published in Kabul in 2007 under the imprint of his Shah M. Book Co., is unlikely to garner the accolades of the original. In his telling, a pair of Norwegian trolls with magical powers appear to him and agree to hear his pleas for redress.
Despite the awkwardness of the conceit, the author's still-vivid anger and bewilderment give a sense of the powerful cultural dislocation that ensued when he met Seierstad.
He rails at what he considers her abuse of his hospitality, a sacred tenet in Afghan society. He insists that she misread the dynamics of Afghan family life, with its web of obligations and subsuming of individual happiness. He still chokes on a graphic description of his aged mother in a public bath -- a shaming violation of her womanhood, he said.
Seierstad has long since moved on. After leaving Afghanistan, she covered the war in Iraq and wrote another memoir, "A Hundred and One Days: A Baghdad Journal." Though critically well-received, it did not approach the blockbuster status of "The Bookseller of Kabul."
Rais, too, has embarked on a new chapter. His family is widely scattered now, his first wife and three children in Canada, the second wife and two other children in Oslo. Two grown sons help Rais run the business. "It's not a happy life," he said.
Although his demeanor is calm, the bitterness Rais feels toward Seierstad is echoed by his disillusionment with what he sees as scant progress in Afghanistan since the U.S.-led invasion that toppled the Taliban. After years of hardship that included jail, beatings and death threats during the Taliban era, the bookseller believes that the Western powers have squandered a chance to rebuild Afghan society.
"It's like when the computer freezes up," he said. "There is nothing to do now but reboot."
A suicide bombing nearby had shaken the building a few days earlier, but by Afghan standards, the bookshop appeared to be flourishing. Big price tags on high-end books in English, aimed mainly at a foreign audience, help subsidize schoolbooks for hundreds of students, Rais said. He sends a bookmobile to make the rounds of the many Afghan cities and towns that have no bookstore. Customers can order books on the website, which has been up and running for more than a year.
Rais acknowledged that "The Bookseller" brought him a measure of fame he would never have otherwise achieved. People who haven't read the book -- and occasionally, some who have -- will turn up with a copy for him to autograph. He always refuses.
"What happened was that she came to this country with a picture already in her mind, and put me and my family in the frame," he said of Seierstad. "It's like so much else that has happened here in Afghanistan. People from outside come here and think they understand things. But they don't."
Saturday, 15 November 2008
Robert Fisk's World: There is no end to the centuries of savagery in Afghanistan
Back in Afghanistan, the mind turns to the small matter of savagery. Not the routine cruelty of war but the deliberate inhumanity with which we behave. The torture and killing of prisoners in this pitiful place – the American variety in Bagram and the Taliban variety in Helmand – is a kind of routine of history. Even execution has to be made more painful. A knife is more terrible than a bullet. The cult of the suicide bomber in the Middle East began its life in Lebanon, moved to "Palestine", arrived in Iraq, leached over the border here to Afghanistan and passed effortlessly through the Khyber Pass into Pakistan. And New York. And Washington. And London...
Are human beings at war – any kind of war – by definition bound to commit atrocities? The International Committee of the Red Cross tried to answer this question in a report four years ago. Were combatants unaware of international humanitarian law? Unlikely, I would think. They just don't care. The Red Cross enquiry interviewed hundreds of fighters in Colombia, Bosnia, Georgia – a bit of real prescience, there, on the part of the ICRC – and the Congo, and suggested that those who commit reprehensible acts see themselves as victims, that this then gives them the right to act savagely against their opponents. Certainly, this might apply to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, very definitely to the Serbs of Bosnia – I'm not so sure about Georgia – and quite definitely to the Taliban (not least when we've been bombing more wedding parties).
Such cruelty is abetted with a bodyguard of clichés – "police operations", "clean up", "mop up", "surgical strikes" – where you can kill by remote control, "especially when the media are not present to show the realities of a conflict". This is most certainly the case today, for what journalist will now dare to wander the village streets of Helmand or the city of Baquba in Iraq or, for that matter, the border towns of Pakistan? War has never, it seems, been so underreported. And both the good guys and the bad guys like it that way; they prefer to indulge in savagery unseen.
There is nothing new in all this. At the Battle of Omdurman – where the British executed all the Arab wounded – the young Winston Churchill wrote of a sight which is familiar today in a land which was then called Mesopotamia and in another which was already called Afghanistan. He described "grisly apparitions", of "horses spouting blood, struggling on three legs, men staggering on foot, men bleeding from terrible wounds, fish-hook spears stuck right through them, arms and faces cut to pieces, bowels protruding, men gasping, crying, collapsing, expiring...". To the men can now – this very week – be added the suicide-bombed schoolgirls of Baghdad.
In his earlier military campaign on the North West Frontier, Churchill saw how some of the Taliban's ancestors dealt with a wounded British officer: the leader of "half a dozen Pathan swordsmen ... rushed upon the prostrate figure and slashed it three or four times with his sword. I forgot everything else at this moment except a desire to kill this man. I wore my long cavalry sword well sharpened... The savage saw me coming...". Well there's something for the ICRC to think about.
Yet it pays to remember that Afghan wars have always been dreadful. Sir Mortimer Durand – he who created the Durand line which masquerades as the Afghan-Pakistani border, crossed with such impunity today by Americans and Taliban warriors in order to kill each other – witnessed the cruelty of the Afghan war at first hand. "During the action in the Chardeh valley on the 12th of Dec 1879," he wrote, "two squadrons of the 9th Lancers were ordered to charge a large force of Afghans in the hope of saving our guns. The charge failed, and some of our dead were afterwards found dreadfully mutilated by Afghan knives... I saw it all..."
Yet Durand himself objected profoundly to a statement from General Frederick Roberts – he of Kandahar fame – after the murder of the British mission diplomats in Kabul. The killings had been "a treacherous and cowardly crime, which has brought indelible disgrace upon the Afghan people... all persons convicted of playing a part in (the murders) will be dealt with according to their deserts". Durand confronted Roberts over this Victorian version of the message that George Bush would give to the Afghans 122 years later.
"It seemed to me so utterly wrong in tone and in matter," Durand would later write, "that I determined to do my utmost to overthrow it... the stilted language, and the absurd affectation of preaching historical morality to the Afghans, all our troubles with whom began by our own abominable injustice, made the paper to my mind most dangerous for the General's reputation."
Of course, it did Roberts no harm at all. In the age of "shock and awe" – when a Canadian general can call his Taliban opponents "scumbags" – it still doesn't seem to worry Nato officers. They should know better. Montgomery never cursed Rommel; he kept a photograph of the Afrika Korps commander in his caravan to remind him of the man he was fighting. But then again, didn't Montgomery fight in the age of the Holocaust, of industrial killing, of the Hamburg and Dresden firestorms? Indeed, the very Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 were supposed to end the mass destruction of human life. And President Bush has torn them up.
I know it's easy to ridicule the Red Cross. There's something very preachy about the post-war conventions. But apart from the precedents of international law, it's all we've got. Maybe a million Pushtu-language editions should be handed out to the Taliban and their followers as well as to the Nato combatants whom Barack Obama absurdly believes will win the Afghan war. But I doubt it would do much good. Victimhood sits easily on all our shoulders. If Osama bin Laden had a conscience, it would be quickly eased by the destruction of the last Caliphate, the colonial occupation of the Muslim world, the deaths of millions of Arabs. And if we have a conscience, what do we say? Remember 9/11. And so on we go.
Are human beings at war – any kind of war – by definition bound to commit atrocities? The International Committee of the Red Cross tried to answer this question in a report four years ago. Were combatants unaware of international humanitarian law? Unlikely, I would think. They just don't care. The Red Cross enquiry interviewed hundreds of fighters in Colombia, Bosnia, Georgia – a bit of real prescience, there, on the part of the ICRC – and the Congo, and suggested that those who commit reprehensible acts see themselves as victims, that this then gives them the right to act savagely against their opponents. Certainly, this might apply to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, very definitely to the Serbs of Bosnia – I'm not so sure about Georgia – and quite definitely to the Taliban (not least when we've been bombing more wedding parties).
Such cruelty is abetted with a bodyguard of clichés – "police operations", "clean up", "mop up", "surgical strikes" – where you can kill by remote control, "especially when the media are not present to show the realities of a conflict". This is most certainly the case today, for what journalist will now dare to wander the village streets of Helmand or the city of Baquba in Iraq or, for that matter, the border towns of Pakistan? War has never, it seems, been so underreported. And both the good guys and the bad guys like it that way; they prefer to indulge in savagery unseen.
There is nothing new in all this. At the Battle of Omdurman – where the British executed all the Arab wounded – the young Winston Churchill wrote of a sight which is familiar today in a land which was then called Mesopotamia and in another which was already called Afghanistan. He described "grisly apparitions", of "horses spouting blood, struggling on three legs, men staggering on foot, men bleeding from terrible wounds, fish-hook spears stuck right through them, arms and faces cut to pieces, bowels protruding, men gasping, crying, collapsing, expiring...". To the men can now – this very week – be added the suicide-bombed schoolgirls of Baghdad.
In his earlier military campaign on the North West Frontier, Churchill saw how some of the Taliban's ancestors dealt with a wounded British officer: the leader of "half a dozen Pathan swordsmen ... rushed upon the prostrate figure and slashed it three or four times with his sword. I forgot everything else at this moment except a desire to kill this man. I wore my long cavalry sword well sharpened... The savage saw me coming...". Well there's something for the ICRC to think about.
Yet it pays to remember that Afghan wars have always been dreadful. Sir Mortimer Durand – he who created the Durand line which masquerades as the Afghan-Pakistani border, crossed with such impunity today by Americans and Taliban warriors in order to kill each other – witnessed the cruelty of the Afghan war at first hand. "During the action in the Chardeh valley on the 12th of Dec 1879," he wrote, "two squadrons of the 9th Lancers were ordered to charge a large force of Afghans in the hope of saving our guns. The charge failed, and some of our dead were afterwards found dreadfully mutilated by Afghan knives... I saw it all..."
Yet Durand himself objected profoundly to a statement from General Frederick Roberts – he of Kandahar fame – after the murder of the British mission diplomats in Kabul. The killings had been "a treacherous and cowardly crime, which has brought indelible disgrace upon the Afghan people... all persons convicted of playing a part in (the murders) will be dealt with according to their deserts". Durand confronted Roberts over this Victorian version of the message that George Bush would give to the Afghans 122 years later.
"It seemed to me so utterly wrong in tone and in matter," Durand would later write, "that I determined to do my utmost to overthrow it... the stilted language, and the absurd affectation of preaching historical morality to the Afghans, all our troubles with whom began by our own abominable injustice, made the paper to my mind most dangerous for the General's reputation."
Of course, it did Roberts no harm at all. In the age of "shock and awe" – when a Canadian general can call his Taliban opponents "scumbags" – it still doesn't seem to worry Nato officers. They should know better. Montgomery never cursed Rommel; he kept a photograph of the Afrika Korps commander in his caravan to remind him of the man he was fighting. But then again, didn't Montgomery fight in the age of the Holocaust, of industrial killing, of the Hamburg and Dresden firestorms? Indeed, the very Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 were supposed to end the mass destruction of human life. And President Bush has torn them up.
I know it's easy to ridicule the Red Cross. There's something very preachy about the post-war conventions. But apart from the precedents of international law, it's all we've got. Maybe a million Pushtu-language editions should be handed out to the Taliban and their followers as well as to the Nato combatants whom Barack Obama absurdly believes will win the Afghan war. But I doubt it would do much good. Victimhood sits easily on all our shoulders. If Osama bin Laden had a conscience, it would be quickly eased by the destruction of the last Caliphate, the colonial occupation of the Muslim world, the deaths of millions of Arabs. And if we have a conscience, what do we say? Remember 9/11. And so on we go.
Thursday, 13 November 2008
A Journey to the Afghan Province of Nuristan Hope and Skepticism in the Valley of Light
People in the West generally perceive eastern Afghanistan as a war zone. True, the terrain is hotly contested, both politically and militarily. But we hear very little about the progress made in these remote regions. Martin Gerner reports from the area
| Bild: photo: Martin Gerner
Bild vergrössern Nuristan lies in the far northeast of Afghanistan and is regarded as one of the country's poorest and remotest regions. The photos shows the village of Sutan Lam in the Dare-Noor Valley with its typical terraced fields | For their own safety, travelers to the border region of Nuristan are well advised to take along someone who knows his way around. Our guide's name is Basir. In the early 1990s, his family emigrated to Erlangen, Germany. He returned to his homeland in 2005, a decision that he has never regretted. "Look at the energy that these people have," he says as he points to the bustling streets at sunrise, "this is extremely encouraging."
Our destination is the valley of Dare Noor, near the remote Nuristan province. This is a wild and mountainous region where violent incidents occur on a regular basis. Travelers from the outside are a rarity. On UN maps, the area is shaded in as a danger zone. NGOs have categorized this as an area of "permanent Taliban presence." We have come here to visit an aid project.
Poppy fields, sheep from Germany and carpets
As we leave Jalalabad, the capital of Nangahar province, the paved highway soon turns into a gravel road. At the side of the road are billboards that condemn growing poppies as the work of the devil. The poppy fields are not yet in bloom and cannot be readily recognized as we drive by. Government representatives maintain poppy cultivation has already been eliminated from half of Afghanistan's provinces – a statement that should be viewed with skepticism. In actual fact, no one has reliable statistics.
The road winds up switchbacks to an altitude of 2,000 meters, to the village of Sutan Lam. Instead of the ubiquitous brownish-green fields of rock, the landscape is dominated by verdant terraces for growing crops. Men stand barefoot on a wooden plow that is pulled by oxen. And there is a real surprise in store for us at our destination: "There is no fighting here," explains Haji Mahboob, the village elder, as he greets us.
| Bild: photo: Martin Gerner
Bild vergrössern Guest room in a corner of the Dare Noor Valley, also used as a mosque. In the background the typical woven baskets that are used for harvesting and agricultural purposes, as well as for transporting the sick in an emergency | Basir has come here to mark the opening of a carpet-making workshop that has been established with funds from the GTZ, a German organization that promotes sustainable development worldwide. The German-Afghan is at home here, and without his help, German aid workers would have had a hard time getting established here. The GTZ has given the village over 50 snowy white sheep. Wool from these animals will be used in the looms that will produce the carpets. It took a great deal of effort and expense to drive the bulky looms by truck from the valley down below. The first carpets are due to be sold in the beginning of the coming year, and this should improve conditions in the village.
"Eight out of ten men here are without regular work," says the village elder, "and we hope that the business with the carpets will improve our situation." The farmers speak very openly. Earlier they would have planted poppies. But they say that the governor announced a ban on cultivating the flowers, which they gradually complied with. However, the promised compensatory payments were never made.
From the land of "infidels" to the land of light
For two months, a hundred women were trained to work the looms. "This was hard to swallow for some of the men," says Basir, "because they live in a traditional society that eyes such things with suspicion." Although women also work in the fields, none of them are present during the ceremony to mark the opening of the carpet workshop.
The lives of men and women were not always so starkly separated. The people in Dare Noor have cultural ties with the nearby province of Nuristan. It wasn't until the late 19th century that the region was Islamisized. At the time, local inhabitants believed in more than one god, and the region was called Kafiristan, land of the infidels. After Islam came to the region, it was given the name Nuristan, land of light.
| Bild: photo: Martin Gerner
Bild vergrössern Haji Mahboob points his stick toward the adjacent province of Kunar, where the Taliban, government troops and the US military often clash | Jet fighters can be heard overhead. "Amerikai" – Americans, says Mahboob, and points to the mountainous ridge on the other side of the valley. "Over there begins Kunar province. In some villages there are Taliban and a few members of Al Qaida," he says, indicating an area that is only about 10 kilometers (6 miles) away as the crow flies. And is his village threatened by the air strikes?
Language as a protective barrier
On the other side of the valley in Kunar the people speak Pashto, on this side the language is the local dialect of Pashayi. The linguistic barrier acts as an invisible protective wall, explains Mahboob.
Basir recalls one encounter he had with Islamists. "Recently, two mullahs came to the village. They were from the area, but they had received their religious training in Koran schools in the Pakistani border area. They wanted to teach us about political Islam. We had a heated debate. I based my arguments on the advantages of economic development. That convinced the members of the village. Things have been calm since then," he says with relief.
Civilian casualties
The next morning there are reports on the radio about a new attack in Kabul and the mistaken shelling of a wedding by the US Air Force in Nangarhar province. The bearded men sitting around me shake their heads.
They are unsure exactly what military strategy the US military and ISAF is pursuing. None of those whom I spoke with favors an additional deployment of foreign troops. Instead, they are growing increasingly skeptical with each incident involving civilian casualties. In one of the most recent air strikes in the province of Heart, western military forces even had to admit that they had grossly underestimated the number of victims, including many women and children.
Strange researchers from Germany
| Bild: photo: Martin Gerner
Bild vergrössern Inhabitants of the Dare Noor Valley listen to the radio in the morning as news spreads of a new terrorist attack in Kabul and on civilians in Nangarhar | A village square in Dare Noor has been graded. "On two occasions the villagers have been promised a school for their children, says Basir's brother Ali, "but the provincial government has not kept its promise." The air of discontent is very palpable. If the development is so sluggish, says one man, then they will have to resort to civil protest and block the access roads to the village. He says that there is simply no excuse for sending the bulk of financial aid to those regions where there is heavy fighting. There are no statistics to back this up, but people are clearly disappointed.
The people in Dare Noor trust the Germans. But the most recent visit to the village has puzzled them. Two German university departments have sent an observer to take soil samples and bring back flora and fauna from the mountains. The residents of Sutan Lam were slightly taken aback as they observed this strange spectacle. German scientists suspect that endangered species live here. There is even talk of establishing a natural park under UN supervision. But doesn't Sutan Lam have more urgent problems?
The German guest makes a dismissive gesture. He says that more attention for Dare Noor will result in a brighter future for the people in the village. Those standing nearby listen attentively, but don't say a word. All they can do is hope that at least this scenario will come true.
Martin Gerner
| Bild: photo: Martin Gerner
Bild vergrössern Nuristan lies in the far northeast of Afghanistan and is regarded as one of the country's poorest and remotest regions. The photos shows the village of Sutan Lam in the Dare-Noor Valley with its typical terraced fields | For their own safety, travelers to the border region of Nuristan are well advised to take along someone who knows his way around. Our guide's name is Basir. In the early 1990s, his family emigrated to Erlangen, Germany. He returned to his homeland in 2005, a decision that he has never regretted. "Look at the energy that these people have," he says as he points to the bustling streets at sunrise, "this is extremely encouraging."
Our destination is the valley of Dare Noor, near the remote Nuristan province. This is a wild and mountainous region where violent incidents occur on a regular basis. Travelers from the outside are a rarity. On UN maps, the area is shaded in as a danger zone. NGOs have categorized this as an area of "permanent Taliban presence." We have come here to visit an aid project.
Poppy fields, sheep from Germany and carpets
As we leave Jalalabad, the capital of Nangahar province, the paved highway soon turns into a gravel road. At the side of the road are billboards that condemn growing poppies as the work of the devil. The poppy fields are not yet in bloom and cannot be readily recognized as we drive by. Government representatives maintain poppy cultivation has already been eliminated from half of Afghanistan's provinces – a statement that should be viewed with skepticism. In actual fact, no one has reliable statistics.
The road winds up switchbacks to an altitude of 2,000 meters, to the village of Sutan Lam. Instead of the ubiquitous brownish-green fields of rock, the landscape is dominated by verdant terraces for growing crops. Men stand barefoot on a wooden plow that is pulled by oxen. And there is a real surprise in store for us at our destination: "There is no fighting here," explains Haji Mahboob, the village elder, as he greets us.
| Bild: photo: Martin Gerner
Bild vergrössern Guest room in a corner of the Dare Noor Valley, also used as a mosque. In the background the typical woven baskets that are used for harvesting and agricultural purposes, as well as for transporting the sick in an emergency | Basir has come here to mark the opening of a carpet-making workshop that has been established with funds from the GTZ, a German organization that promotes sustainable development worldwide. The German-Afghan is at home here, and without his help, German aid workers would have had a hard time getting established here. The GTZ has given the village over 50 snowy white sheep. Wool from these animals will be used in the looms that will produce the carpets. It took a great deal of effort and expense to drive the bulky looms by truck from the valley down below. The first carpets are due to be sold in the beginning of the coming year, and this should improve conditions in the village.
"Eight out of ten men here are without regular work," says the village elder, "and we hope that the business with the carpets will improve our situation." The farmers speak very openly. Earlier they would have planted poppies. But they say that the governor announced a ban on cultivating the flowers, which they gradually complied with. However, the promised compensatory payments were never made.
From the land of "infidels" to the land of light
For two months, a hundred women were trained to work the looms. "This was hard to swallow for some of the men," says Basir, "because they live in a traditional society that eyes such things with suspicion." Although women also work in the fields, none of them are present during the ceremony to mark the opening of the carpet workshop.
The lives of men and women were not always so starkly separated. The people in Dare Noor have cultural ties with the nearby province of Nuristan. It wasn't until the late 19th century that the region was Islamisized. At the time, local inhabitants believed in more than one god, and the region was called Kafiristan, land of the infidels. After Islam came to the region, it was given the name Nuristan, land of light.
| Bild: photo: Martin Gerner
Bild vergrössern Haji Mahboob points his stick toward the adjacent province of Kunar, where the Taliban, government troops and the US military often clash | Jet fighters can be heard overhead. "Amerikai" – Americans, says Mahboob, and points to the mountainous ridge on the other side of the valley. "Over there begins Kunar province. In some villages there are Taliban and a few members of Al Qaida," he says, indicating an area that is only about 10 kilometers (6 miles) away as the crow flies. And is his village threatened by the air strikes?
Language as a protective barrier
On the other side of the valley in Kunar the people speak Pashto, on this side the language is the local dialect of Pashayi. The linguistic barrier acts as an invisible protective wall, explains Mahboob.
Basir recalls one encounter he had with Islamists. "Recently, two mullahs came to the village. They were from the area, but they had received their religious training in Koran schools in the Pakistani border area. They wanted to teach us about political Islam. We had a heated debate. I based my arguments on the advantages of economic development. That convinced the members of the village. Things have been calm since then," he says with relief.
Civilian casualties
The next morning there are reports on the radio about a new attack in Kabul and the mistaken shelling of a wedding by the US Air Force in Nangarhar province. The bearded men sitting around me shake their heads.
They are unsure exactly what military strategy the US military and ISAF is pursuing. None of those whom I spoke with favors an additional deployment of foreign troops. Instead, they are growing increasingly skeptical with each incident involving civilian casualties. In one of the most recent air strikes in the province of Heart, western military forces even had to admit that they had grossly underestimated the number of victims, including many women and children.
Strange researchers from Germany
| Bild: photo: Martin Gerner
Bild vergrössern Inhabitants of the Dare Noor Valley listen to the radio in the morning as news spreads of a new terrorist attack in Kabul and on civilians in Nangarhar | A village square in Dare Noor has been graded. "On two occasions the villagers have been promised a school for their children, says Basir's brother Ali, "but the provincial government has not kept its promise." The air of discontent is very palpable. If the development is so sluggish, says one man, then they will have to resort to civil protest and block the access roads to the village. He says that there is simply no excuse for sending the bulk of financial aid to those regions where there is heavy fighting. There are no statistics to back this up, but people are clearly disappointed.
The people in Dare Noor trust the Germans. But the most recent visit to the village has puzzled them. Two German university departments have sent an observer to take soil samples and bring back flora and fauna from the mountains. The residents of Sutan Lam were slightly taken aback as they observed this strange spectacle. German scientists suspect that endangered species live here. There is even talk of establishing a natural park under UN supervision. But doesn't Sutan Lam have more urgent problems?
The German guest makes a dismissive gesture. He says that more attention for Dare Noor will result in a brighter future for the people in the village. Those standing nearby listen attentively, but don't say a word. All they can do is hope that at least this scenario will come true.
Martin Gerner
Saturday, 25 October 2008
US' Afghan market dreams faltering
Afghans still rely on imported goods [GALLO/GETTY]
A dormant industrial park cordoned off by a wall stands on the main highway outside the northern Afghan city of Mazar e Sharif.
Funded by USAID, the US government's development aid arm, the park was the representation of hopes for a flourishing market-led economy in Afghanistan, an economic policy that was supposed to put the war-torn country back on its feet. But it lies strangely silent, lacking the hum of machinery and noise of human activity. A non-starter in the absence of basic requirements such as power and water.
In a reconstruction effort led by Western countries and dominated by the US through its sheer political clout and large financial contribution, Afghanistan adopted the free-market approach with little debate, less research and none of the existing conditions that have presaged a shift to such an economy in western countries.
The ideology was enshrined within the 2002 National Development Framework, but there were "no discussions with civil society or political parties" says Mudasser Hussain Siddiqui, a policy research manager with Action Aid in Afghanistan. "It was formulated by citizens or Afghans residing in the US and led by the World Bank," he says.
More recently, the approach was enshrined as one of the defining tenets of the vision for Afghanistan as "a society of hope and prosperity based on a strong private sector-led market economy" in what is known as Afghanistan's National Development Strategy (ANDS), finalised and adopted at the Paris Conference in June 2008.
Four months later, despite the spectacular collapse of the market in Western countries and an ongoing debate over the pros and cons of the value of the market-led economy in those nations, there is little discussion here in Afghanistan about the approach and what it has delivered.
Endorsing ANDS, Michael Yates, the Afghanistan mission director of USAID, said: "The US government and the broader donor community are committed to helping Afghanistan achieve this important vision."
Reform 'laboratory'
But Bahman Hares, an Afghan working with Action Aid, laments the fact his country has become "a laboratory" for different policies from other countries.
And Haroun Mir and Idrees Rahmani, researchers for the Afghanistan Centre for Research and Policy Studies, argue that ambitious economic reforms were launched without adequate thought and planning.
"International institutions have brought policies studied by foreign experts and imposed them on the government for implementation," they say.
Afghanistan has had to follow these policies in order to get debt relief and access to financial and technical assistance from these institutions.
Yates argues that the telecom sector is a good example of the private-sector model.Afghanistan's four mobile companies recently surpassed $100 million in combined quarterly revenue and have invested more than $1.3 billion in the economy. The beneficiaries of this 100 per cent, private-sector led, market-oriented achievement are Afghans, he says. The investments stay in Afghanistan, the jobs go to Afghans, the taxes paid by the telecoms companies go to the Afghan government – allowing the government to offer greater public services to its people. The success of Afghanistan's telecoms sector serves as a model to the rest of the economy, and to the world, of what can be achieved with the right policies, he says.
But is the telecom sector a model or an exception?
Deregulation has not automatically translated into growth and the industries to supply even basic goods is almost non-existent.
Lack of competition
Afghan reconstruction has been at a
slow pace.A walk around Kabul, one of the most economically active areas of the country, tells its own tale.Mushrooming houses, shops stocked with goods, the chaos of traffic and throngs of people suggest the hustle and bustle of economic activity.A second look however reveals a different story.Walk into the shops stocked with goods and a look at the manufacturer's origin will reveal that the goods are imported.Food items are largely sourced from Pakistan and Iran while household goods are largely Chinese.While few countries in the world are exempt from the threat of cheap imports, Afghanistan's tragedy is that here there are no indigenous competitors, no local industry that can even provide an alternate source of goods and services beyond the subsistence agricultural economy that has always existed.
Despite this, the Afghan government and its international backers follow a low-tariff regime in the name of a free-market economy, even while countries exporting a massive amount of goods into Afghanistan continue to follow protectionist policies and impose tariffs on Afghan carpets, raw hides and plants.
Six years into reconstruction, the promise of a better economic future, stable environment and improved security still remain elusive.Despite growth figures that are quoted frequently in a bid to prove signs of economic recovery, the benefits of economic growth remain skewed and despite a high rate of growth (13.5 per cent in 2007), food insecurity has increased with 4.5 million people facing severe food shortages, according to the World Food Programme.
According to the WFP, more than half the population, estimated at 24.9 million, live below the poverty line and the 2005 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment found that around 6.6 million Afghans do not meet their minimum food requirements.
Targeting the poor
Are free-market policies benefitting
Afghanistan's poor?
Opinion is divided on the reasons for the lack of economic development.In a recent paper, ACBAR, the umbrella organisation for more than 10 non-governmental organisations, argued that a pilot participatory survey had revealed an urgent need for pro-poor targeted schemes rather than the "trickle down" theory of the market place.The government, it said, must develop policies and programming that "explicitly contain components and programmes that directly included the poor in targeted initiatives".For an effective trajectory of poverty reduction, the poor cannot be an add-on category, it said.Yates, however, argues a strong free-market economy "attracts new businesses, creates jobs and ensures higher demand is met by higher productivity, not higher prices".
Freddy Bob-Jones from the British government's aid arm, DFID, in Afghanistan, also argues in favour of the free-market approach, saying "recent evidence shows the failure of the market economy has been caused primarily by state failure through corruption, lack of policy clarity and good infrastructure".
"The state is standing in the way of the growth of the private sector. Growth in the telecom sector shows the potential for commercial success - the government has deregulated in that area and the sector has grown massively."
But some economic analysts feel that the free-market policy does not take into account the very real absence of power, water and roads, which continue to present the biggest stumbling blocks to the growth of indigenous industry, along with the prevailing insecurity.
Power failures
"Unfortunately the debate is among experts from donor countries and international multilateral organisations and does not include Afghan voices." Haroun Mir and Idrees Rahmani, researchers for Afghanistan Centre for Research and Policy Studies
According to current government statistics, only 20 per cent of the population have access to public power (grid-supplied) "on certain days for a limited number of hours".On a per capita basis, the electricity generating capacity is "well below what it was in 1978", while on water resources the national development strategy refers to the current "unclear delineation of responsibilities between ministries with regards to the water strategy" adding "co-ordination between water-related institutions remains weak".While a considerable amount of roads have been built or repaired, they are highly unstable due to the increasing insecurity.Rahmani and Mir say Afghanistan is far away from meeting other basic free-market prerequisite conditions as well."A market-led economy without basic requirements like power, water and roads leaves investors with no incentive to invest," says Action Aid's Siddiqui.
Siddiqui feels some form of protectionism is required to allow the domestic industry to grow as, without that, it is more cost-effective for businessmen to import cheap goods than produce them in Afghanistan.Jones agrees that "there could be some protection in a neutral way, by creating infrastructure, some limited protection in areas like value-added agriculture" but insists that this has to be limited.An earlier assessment of the free-market policy by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit had, however, argued for more, rather than less, state intervention, saying the market on its own would not deliver the wider benefits expected of it.Asked whether the market-led approach could work in Afghanistan if privatisation was on track and in the absence of corruption, Jones states: "I cannot give a definite answer to this. It needs more analysis." Both Mir and Rahmani, however, feel the debate has never included Afghans.
"Unfortunately the debate is among experts from donor countries and international multilateral organisations and it does not include Afghan voices from civil society and the business community," they say.
Both, it seems, would seem to have some grounds for their critique.
A dormant industrial park cordoned off by a wall stands on the main highway outside the northern Afghan city of Mazar e Sharif.
Funded by USAID, the US government's development aid arm, the park was the representation of hopes for a flourishing market-led economy in Afghanistan, an economic policy that was supposed to put the war-torn country back on its feet. But it lies strangely silent, lacking the hum of machinery and noise of human activity. A non-starter in the absence of basic requirements such as power and water.
In a reconstruction effort led by Western countries and dominated by the US through its sheer political clout and large financial contribution, Afghanistan adopted the free-market approach with little debate, less research and none of the existing conditions that have presaged a shift to such an economy in western countries.
The ideology was enshrined within the 2002 National Development Framework, but there were "no discussions with civil society or political parties" says Mudasser Hussain Siddiqui, a policy research manager with Action Aid in Afghanistan. "It was formulated by citizens or Afghans residing in the US and led by the World Bank," he says.
More recently, the approach was enshrined as one of the defining tenets of the vision for Afghanistan as "a society of hope and prosperity based on a strong private sector-led market economy" in what is known as Afghanistan's National Development Strategy (ANDS), finalised and adopted at the Paris Conference in June 2008.
Four months later, despite the spectacular collapse of the market in Western countries and an ongoing debate over the pros and cons of the value of the market-led economy in those nations, there is little discussion here in Afghanistan about the approach and what it has delivered.
Endorsing ANDS, Michael Yates, the Afghanistan mission director of USAID, said: "The US government and the broader donor community are committed to helping Afghanistan achieve this important vision."
Reform 'laboratory'
But Bahman Hares, an Afghan working with Action Aid, laments the fact his country has become "a laboratory" for different policies from other countries.
And Haroun Mir and Idrees Rahmani, researchers for the Afghanistan Centre for Research and Policy Studies, argue that ambitious economic reforms were launched without adequate thought and planning.
"International institutions have brought policies studied by foreign experts and imposed them on the government for implementation," they say.
Afghanistan has had to follow these policies in order to get debt relief and access to financial and technical assistance from these institutions.
Yates argues that the telecom sector is a good example of the private-sector model.Afghanistan's four mobile companies recently surpassed $100 million in combined quarterly revenue and have invested more than $1.3 billion in the economy. The beneficiaries of this 100 per cent, private-sector led, market-oriented achievement are Afghans, he says. The investments stay in Afghanistan, the jobs go to Afghans, the taxes paid by the telecoms companies go to the Afghan government – allowing the government to offer greater public services to its people. The success of Afghanistan's telecoms sector serves as a model to the rest of the economy, and to the world, of what can be achieved with the right policies, he says.
But is the telecom sector a model or an exception?
Deregulation has not automatically translated into growth and the industries to supply even basic goods is almost non-existent.
Lack of competition
Afghan reconstruction has been at a
slow pace.A walk around Kabul, one of the most economically active areas of the country, tells its own tale.Mushrooming houses, shops stocked with goods, the chaos of traffic and throngs of people suggest the hustle and bustle of economic activity.A second look however reveals a different story.Walk into the shops stocked with goods and a look at the manufacturer's origin will reveal that the goods are imported.Food items are largely sourced from Pakistan and Iran while household goods are largely Chinese.While few countries in the world are exempt from the threat of cheap imports, Afghanistan's tragedy is that here there are no indigenous competitors, no local industry that can even provide an alternate source of goods and services beyond the subsistence agricultural economy that has always existed.
Despite this, the Afghan government and its international backers follow a low-tariff regime in the name of a free-market economy, even while countries exporting a massive amount of goods into Afghanistan continue to follow protectionist policies and impose tariffs on Afghan carpets, raw hides and plants.
Six years into reconstruction, the promise of a better economic future, stable environment and improved security still remain elusive.Despite growth figures that are quoted frequently in a bid to prove signs of economic recovery, the benefits of economic growth remain skewed and despite a high rate of growth (13.5 per cent in 2007), food insecurity has increased with 4.5 million people facing severe food shortages, according to the World Food Programme.
According to the WFP, more than half the population, estimated at 24.9 million, live below the poverty line and the 2005 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment found that around 6.6 million Afghans do not meet their minimum food requirements.
Targeting the poor
Are free-market policies benefitting
Afghanistan's poor?
Opinion is divided on the reasons for the lack of economic development.In a recent paper, ACBAR, the umbrella organisation for more than 10 non-governmental organisations, argued that a pilot participatory survey had revealed an urgent need for pro-poor targeted schemes rather than the "trickle down" theory of the market place.The government, it said, must develop policies and programming that "explicitly contain components and programmes that directly included the poor in targeted initiatives".For an effective trajectory of poverty reduction, the poor cannot be an add-on category, it said.Yates, however, argues a strong free-market economy "attracts new businesses, creates jobs and ensures higher demand is met by higher productivity, not higher prices".
Freddy Bob-Jones from the British government's aid arm, DFID, in Afghanistan, also argues in favour of the free-market approach, saying "recent evidence shows the failure of the market economy has been caused primarily by state failure through corruption, lack of policy clarity and good infrastructure".
"The state is standing in the way of the growth of the private sector. Growth in the telecom sector shows the potential for commercial success - the government has deregulated in that area and the sector has grown massively."
But some economic analysts feel that the free-market policy does not take into account the very real absence of power, water and roads, which continue to present the biggest stumbling blocks to the growth of indigenous industry, along with the prevailing insecurity.
Power failures
"Unfortunately the debate is among experts from donor countries and international multilateral organisations and does not include Afghan voices." Haroun Mir and Idrees Rahmani, researchers for Afghanistan Centre for Research and Policy Studies
According to current government statistics, only 20 per cent of the population have access to public power (grid-supplied) "on certain days for a limited number of hours".On a per capita basis, the electricity generating capacity is "well below what it was in 1978", while on water resources the national development strategy refers to the current "unclear delineation of responsibilities between ministries with regards to the water strategy" adding "co-ordination between water-related institutions remains weak".While a considerable amount of roads have been built or repaired, they are highly unstable due to the increasing insecurity.Rahmani and Mir say Afghanistan is far away from meeting other basic free-market prerequisite conditions as well."A market-led economy without basic requirements like power, water and roads leaves investors with no incentive to invest," says Action Aid's Siddiqui.
Siddiqui feels some form of protectionism is required to allow the domestic industry to grow as, without that, it is more cost-effective for businessmen to import cheap goods than produce them in Afghanistan.Jones agrees that "there could be some protection in a neutral way, by creating infrastructure, some limited protection in areas like value-added agriculture" but insists that this has to be limited.An earlier assessment of the free-market policy by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit had, however, argued for more, rather than less, state intervention, saying the market on its own would not deliver the wider benefits expected of it.Asked whether the market-led approach could work in Afghanistan if privatisation was on track and in the absence of corruption, Jones states: "I cannot give a definite answer to this. It needs more analysis." Both Mir and Rahmani, however, feel the debate has never included Afghans.
"Unfortunately the debate is among experts from donor countries and international multilateral organisations and it does not include Afghan voices from civil society and the business community," they say.
Both, it seems, would seem to have some grounds for their critique.
Sunday, 14 September 2008
Borderline state
Afghanistan, which served for so many years as a buffer between warring nations, is today riven by conflicts imported from abroad. Barnett R Rubin weighs the obstacles to restoring stability.
The past 35 years in Afghanistan have seen the end of the country’s status as an isolated buffer state. In the past, agreement among neighbours and great powers not to intervene in Afghanistan meant that the state served to limit the spread of conflicts; but today virtually the entire international community is involved in Afghanistan, and all the conflicts and disputes among its member states and organisations are playing out within its borders.
Ten years ago Afghanistan was home to a low-intensity conflict between the Taliban and Northern Alliance, but it was also the scene of Indo-Pakistan and Sunni-Shia conflicts and, to a certain extent, US-Iranian-Russian competition over pipeline routes. These conflicts have become more intense at the same time that Afghanistan has become the theatre for the War on Terror, the ill-defined confrontation of the US and global Islamist movements; the conflict between Nato and Russia; the confrontation between the US and Iran; the struggle within Pakistan over that country’s future; and a key theatre of a transnational insurgency spanning Afghanistan and Pakistan and linked to al Qa’eda. All of this alongside an intensification of the ethnic, tribal, regional and sectarian cleavages that have always marked Afghan politics.
If it seems unlikely that Afghanistan can return to its days of isolation, that is because all of the elements that enabled it to survive in relative stability for nearly a century have disappeared: a population largely isolated in remote valleys with few links to the outside world, some small arms and no organisation above the local level; a government subsidised by great powers and accepted as legitimate by all its neighbours; and an economy largely based on subsistence farming, pastoralism, limited pockets of commercial agriculture and trade.
The territory of today’s Afghanistan has never sustained a state without international aid to its security forces, and it has repeatedly collapsed in the face of invasion or contestation. The stability of such a state would require a level of income and legitimacy sufficient to recruit and maintain security forces adequate to defend against any threats to the state; in the current environment, that is a tall order indeed.
Three key elements ensured Afghanistan’s stability after it was first demarcated as a buffer between the British and Russian empires in the 19th century. First and foremost, the great powers themselves agreed not to interfere inside Afghanistan or use Afghanistan’s weakness against each other, ensuring few international challenges to the Afghan state and the separation of rival powers by a neutralised Afghanistan. Second, the population remained disarmed, demobilised and isolated, without political organisation and largely engaged in subsistence activities, resulting in few domestic demands on the state or challenges to its legitimacy. And third, international subsidies to the state enabled it to finance security forces adequate to the low-threat environment.
The events of September 11 made it clear that the Afghan state was weak and no longer integrated into the global community, and that its territory was home to the leadership of a highly organised global network of political violence. The American response was to destroy the weak government of the Taliban and call on the UN to try to rebuild the Afghan state. But resurrecting the previous Afghan state under current conditions may be doomed to failure.
Afghanistan’s relationship to the international system has changed decisively. Virtually every major international organisation and influential state has become involved there. But the result has been to import innumerable other conflicts into the country. First, of course, is the War on Terror, which as defined by the Bush administration includes not only the destruction of al Qa’eda, but also the destruction of organisations or states that harbour or support “terrorists”. Second, the conflict between India and Pakistan; Pakistan seeks to exclude Indian influence from Afghanistan, which it considers part of its security perimeter; India considers a presence in Afghanistan important to gain a back window into Pakistan. Third, a Sunni-Shia conflict, since Saudi Arabia and Iran, which still compete for the leadership of the Islamic world, both have proxies in Afghanistan. The situation in Afghanistan is also straining American relations with its Nato allies – who, though they opposed the war in Iraq, agreed to deploy troops to Afghanistan – and increasing already high tensions between America and Russia, which supports the war and sanctions against the Taliban, but does not want a permanent Nato deployment in its backyard. Finally there is the conflict between the US and Iran; the two countries worked together to overthrow the Taliban and bring the current Afghan government to power, but the Bush administration rebuffed Iran’s overtures. Iran has furnished support to insurgents as a warning of the consequences that might follow an American attack. In short, the number of stakeholders is now prohibitively high to secure agreement on who will hold power.
The Afghan population is no longer isolated and quiescent. Every group has been mobilised militarily and politically and enjoys some patronage from foreign powers or movements. Afghans have been heavily politicised and listen incessantly to international news. At least half of Afghans have suffered war displacement and perhaps a third travelled abroad (largely as refugees). The subsistence economy has been largely destroyed, and Afghanistan relies on imports of food and exports of a cash crop – narcotics. Afghans are participating in global labour, commodity and capital markets and in global politics and warfare. The expansion of cash transactions has empowered ideological groups, including the ulama and Islamists, that do not own or control physical assets, but can assert rights to their share of this income. Without a cash economy, the Taliban regime would not have been possible.
As community coping mechanisms have become less reliable, families and communities increasingly look to the state for income and services. Afghanistan has become the most rapidly urbanising society in Asia, and demands for public services and political participation have risen accordingly. The demands placed on the state are far greater and the task of legitimation far more difficult than at any time in the past. Hence the type of weak state that functioned with a quiescent Afghan society is no longer feasible or effective; yet the state is still structured and resourced to maintain control, not provide services.
Under these conditions stability would require a state and security forces with substantially more resources and capabilities than at any time in the past. Currently the Afghan government extracts about seven per cent of licit GDP in revenues. The entire defence and development budget is paid for by foreign assistance; an even greater amount is spent by donors outside of the government budget. The size of the armed forces and police that Afghanistan needs to maintain its own security continues to rise, and there is no scenario under which the country would be able to finance such costs. Hence the Afghan state is now on an unsustainable trajectory.
Of the three trends outlined above, the increase in mobilisation, politicisation, education and urbanisation of the Afghan population is least likely to be reversed. It is difficult but not impossible to imagine the mounting external tensions becoming less threatening: if the top leadership of al Qa’eda in Pakistan is neutralised, a political settlement with insurgents might become more feasible. US-Iran relations might warm slightly. If an elected government led by civilians with a primarily economic program remains in power in Pakistan, we might see a shift in in Pakistan-India relations from confrontation to competition and even economic co-operation. The reduction of the level of threat would also favour investment and economic activity. Such growth might make it possible to increase the tax base as well as the government’s share of GDP to pay for public services.
These do not, however, seem to be the most likely trends. While the next US administration is likely to seek less confrontational and militaristic ways of coping with global challenges, the persistence of al Qa’eda in Pakistan could create pressure for broader intervention there, destabilising that country and its neighbour further. Any number of unpredictable events – another major al Qa’eda attack in the US leading to reprisals in Pakistan; a riot in Kabul or another Afghan city; the collapse of a regional centre (most likely Kandahar) under Taliban assault – could precipitate a rapid crisis.
There are several policy approaches that might begin to address these threats, including a renewal of regional diplomacy and economic co-operation to lower present tensions; the development of a plan to properly finance the Afghan security forces; phasing out the most intrusive aspects of the counter-terrorism campaign in the country; expanding Afghan higher education and employment to provide opportunities to educated young people; and strengthening the legitimacy of the central government by taking strong action against corruption.
But there is still no foreseeable trajectory under which the Afghan state will become a self-sustaining member of the international community at peace with its neighbours in the coming decade. It might be possible, however, to approach rather than recede from that goal.
Barnett R Rubin, Director of Studies at the Center on International Cooperation at NYU, is the author of The Fragmentation of Afghanistan.
The past 35 years in Afghanistan have seen the end of the country’s status as an isolated buffer state. In the past, agreement among neighbours and great powers not to intervene in Afghanistan meant that the state served to limit the spread of conflicts; but today virtually the entire international community is involved in Afghanistan, and all the conflicts and disputes among its member states and organisations are playing out within its borders.
Ten years ago Afghanistan was home to a low-intensity conflict between the Taliban and Northern Alliance, but it was also the scene of Indo-Pakistan and Sunni-Shia conflicts and, to a certain extent, US-Iranian-Russian competition over pipeline routes. These conflicts have become more intense at the same time that Afghanistan has become the theatre for the War on Terror, the ill-defined confrontation of the US and global Islamist movements; the conflict between Nato and Russia; the confrontation between the US and Iran; the struggle within Pakistan over that country’s future; and a key theatre of a transnational insurgency spanning Afghanistan and Pakistan and linked to al Qa’eda. All of this alongside an intensification of the ethnic, tribal, regional and sectarian cleavages that have always marked Afghan politics.
If it seems unlikely that Afghanistan can return to its days of isolation, that is because all of the elements that enabled it to survive in relative stability for nearly a century have disappeared: a population largely isolated in remote valleys with few links to the outside world, some small arms and no organisation above the local level; a government subsidised by great powers and accepted as legitimate by all its neighbours; and an economy largely based on subsistence farming, pastoralism, limited pockets of commercial agriculture and trade.
The territory of today’s Afghanistan has never sustained a state without international aid to its security forces, and it has repeatedly collapsed in the face of invasion or contestation. The stability of such a state would require a level of income and legitimacy sufficient to recruit and maintain security forces adequate to defend against any threats to the state; in the current environment, that is a tall order indeed.
Three key elements ensured Afghanistan’s stability after it was first demarcated as a buffer between the British and Russian empires in the 19th century. First and foremost, the great powers themselves agreed not to interfere inside Afghanistan or use Afghanistan’s weakness against each other, ensuring few international challenges to the Afghan state and the separation of rival powers by a neutralised Afghanistan. Second, the population remained disarmed, demobilised and isolated, without political organisation and largely engaged in subsistence activities, resulting in few domestic demands on the state or challenges to its legitimacy. And third, international subsidies to the state enabled it to finance security forces adequate to the low-threat environment.
The events of September 11 made it clear that the Afghan state was weak and no longer integrated into the global community, and that its territory was home to the leadership of a highly organised global network of political violence. The American response was to destroy the weak government of the Taliban and call on the UN to try to rebuild the Afghan state. But resurrecting the previous Afghan state under current conditions may be doomed to failure.
Afghanistan’s relationship to the international system has changed decisively. Virtually every major international organisation and influential state has become involved there. But the result has been to import innumerable other conflicts into the country. First, of course, is the War on Terror, which as defined by the Bush administration includes not only the destruction of al Qa’eda, but also the destruction of organisations or states that harbour or support “terrorists”. Second, the conflict between India and Pakistan; Pakistan seeks to exclude Indian influence from Afghanistan, which it considers part of its security perimeter; India considers a presence in Afghanistan important to gain a back window into Pakistan. Third, a Sunni-Shia conflict, since Saudi Arabia and Iran, which still compete for the leadership of the Islamic world, both have proxies in Afghanistan. The situation in Afghanistan is also straining American relations with its Nato allies – who, though they opposed the war in Iraq, agreed to deploy troops to Afghanistan – and increasing already high tensions between America and Russia, which supports the war and sanctions against the Taliban, but does not want a permanent Nato deployment in its backyard. Finally there is the conflict between the US and Iran; the two countries worked together to overthrow the Taliban and bring the current Afghan government to power, but the Bush administration rebuffed Iran’s overtures. Iran has furnished support to insurgents as a warning of the consequences that might follow an American attack. In short, the number of stakeholders is now prohibitively high to secure agreement on who will hold power.
The Afghan population is no longer isolated and quiescent. Every group has been mobilised militarily and politically and enjoys some patronage from foreign powers or movements. Afghans have been heavily politicised and listen incessantly to international news. At least half of Afghans have suffered war displacement and perhaps a third travelled abroad (largely as refugees). The subsistence economy has been largely destroyed, and Afghanistan relies on imports of food and exports of a cash crop – narcotics. Afghans are participating in global labour, commodity and capital markets and in global politics and warfare. The expansion of cash transactions has empowered ideological groups, including the ulama and Islamists, that do not own or control physical assets, but can assert rights to their share of this income. Without a cash economy, the Taliban regime would not have been possible.
As community coping mechanisms have become less reliable, families and communities increasingly look to the state for income and services. Afghanistan has become the most rapidly urbanising society in Asia, and demands for public services and political participation have risen accordingly. The demands placed on the state are far greater and the task of legitimation far more difficult than at any time in the past. Hence the type of weak state that functioned with a quiescent Afghan society is no longer feasible or effective; yet the state is still structured and resourced to maintain control, not provide services.
Under these conditions stability would require a state and security forces with substantially more resources and capabilities than at any time in the past. Currently the Afghan government extracts about seven per cent of licit GDP in revenues. The entire defence and development budget is paid for by foreign assistance; an even greater amount is spent by donors outside of the government budget. The size of the armed forces and police that Afghanistan needs to maintain its own security continues to rise, and there is no scenario under which the country would be able to finance such costs. Hence the Afghan state is now on an unsustainable trajectory.
Of the three trends outlined above, the increase in mobilisation, politicisation, education and urbanisation of the Afghan population is least likely to be reversed. It is difficult but not impossible to imagine the mounting external tensions becoming less threatening: if the top leadership of al Qa’eda in Pakistan is neutralised, a political settlement with insurgents might become more feasible. US-Iran relations might warm slightly. If an elected government led by civilians with a primarily economic program remains in power in Pakistan, we might see a shift in in Pakistan-India relations from confrontation to competition and even economic co-operation. The reduction of the level of threat would also favour investment and economic activity. Such growth might make it possible to increase the tax base as well as the government’s share of GDP to pay for public services.
These do not, however, seem to be the most likely trends. While the next US administration is likely to seek less confrontational and militaristic ways of coping with global challenges, the persistence of al Qa’eda in Pakistan could create pressure for broader intervention there, destabilising that country and its neighbour further. Any number of unpredictable events – another major al Qa’eda attack in the US leading to reprisals in Pakistan; a riot in Kabul or another Afghan city; the collapse of a regional centre (most likely Kandahar) under Taliban assault – could precipitate a rapid crisis.
There are several policy approaches that might begin to address these threats, including a renewal of regional diplomacy and economic co-operation to lower present tensions; the development of a plan to properly finance the Afghan security forces; phasing out the most intrusive aspects of the counter-terrorism campaign in the country; expanding Afghan higher education and employment to provide opportunities to educated young people; and strengthening the legitimacy of the central government by taking strong action against corruption.
But there is still no foreseeable trajectory under which the Afghan state will become a self-sustaining member of the international community at peace with its neighbours in the coming decade. It might be possible, however, to approach rather than recede from that goal.
Barnett R Rubin, Director of Studies at the Center on International Cooperation at NYU, is the author of The Fragmentation of Afghanistan.
Monday, 25 August 2008
Afghan article backs New York Times view of Afghan situation
Text of editorial, "The war on terror does not require occupying countries", by independent Afghan newspaper Cheragh on 23 August
The New York Times American daily in its latest edition cast doubt on views expressed by the White House and its attempts to increase the number of its soldiers in Afghanistan, which is apparently being done for the four reasons listed bellow.
1- Removal of terrorist sanctuaries.
2- Expanding America influence and power in this sensitive region.
3- Winning the hearts, minds and support of Muslims
4- Eradication of narcotics.
The above-mentioned newspaper gave rational and proven replies to these vain and unjustified interpretations and rejected them as follows:
5- those who organized 9/11 were trained professionally in the state of Florida, which is under the governance of Bush's son and not in Afghanistan. Therefore, for the continuous struggle against terrorists who are being strengthened and reorganized along the borders of Afghanistan, intelligence and an efficient limited military capacity are required, not the occupying of this country .
6- Afghanistan is located in the neighbourhood of two enemies and rivals of America (China and Iran) and this country is so poor and needy that it cannot be used by western countries as a strategic position. The newspaper doubts that having airbases in Afghanistan is required only for supporting ground troops, because America has already had cheap military airbases in Uzbekistan, Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan.
7- regarding eradication of narcotics, it partially confirmed the permanent view of the Cheragh journal, which has said several times that for a decrease in the production, trafficking and supply of narcotics, the demand of the international consumers must fall, because in this dirty business the Afghan farmers are not guilty.
The confession by this famous American daily about the policy and attempts of the Bush government to occupy countries under the pretext of war against terrorism is not something confined to the mind of the enlightened analyst. It can no longer acquire international support. Because Bush, during his period in office, has been spilling the blood of, and killing, innocent people, this has left a big headache for the great nation of America and for his successor when they try to rehabilitate the American personality.
The solutions offered by this daily are very important for the successors of Bush and for the security and stability of the world, and can have positive consequences for universal peace, which has been extremely fragile since the incidents in the Caucasus.
The best strategy and policy is to equip, reinforce and train the Afghan security forces. Not only Afghan officials have requested this several times, the British prime minister also agreed with it during his recent visit to Afghanistan. Otherwise, every kind of exported and imposed view from foreign countries under the pretext of war against terrorism will change the country into the battlefield of numerous countries' interests and there will be no winners, but many countries will stand accused.
Source: Cheragh, Kabul, in Dari 23 Aug 08
The New York Times American daily in its latest edition cast doubt on views expressed by the White House and its attempts to increase the number of its soldiers in Afghanistan, which is apparently being done for the four reasons listed bellow.
1- Removal of terrorist sanctuaries.
2- Expanding America influence and power in this sensitive region.
3- Winning the hearts, minds and support of Muslims
4- Eradication of narcotics.
The above-mentioned newspaper gave rational and proven replies to these vain and unjustified interpretations and rejected them as follows:
5- those who organized 9/11 were trained professionally in the state of Florida, which is under the governance of Bush's son and not in Afghanistan. Therefore, for the continuous struggle against terrorists who are being strengthened and reorganized along the borders of Afghanistan, intelligence and an efficient limited military capacity are required, not the occupying of this country .
6- Afghanistan is located in the neighbourhood of two enemies and rivals of America (China and Iran) and this country is so poor and needy that it cannot be used by western countries as a strategic position. The newspaper doubts that having airbases in Afghanistan is required only for supporting ground troops, because America has already had cheap military airbases in Uzbekistan, Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan.
7- regarding eradication of narcotics, it partially confirmed the permanent view of the Cheragh journal, which has said several times that for a decrease in the production, trafficking and supply of narcotics, the demand of the international consumers must fall, because in this dirty business the Afghan farmers are not guilty.
The confession by this famous American daily about the policy and attempts of the Bush government to occupy countries under the pretext of war against terrorism is not something confined to the mind of the enlightened analyst. It can no longer acquire international support. Because Bush, during his period in office, has been spilling the blood of, and killing, innocent people, this has left a big headache for the great nation of America and for his successor when they try to rehabilitate the American personality.
The solutions offered by this daily are very important for the successors of Bush and for the security and stability of the world, and can have positive consequences for universal peace, which has been extremely fragile since the incidents in the Caucasus.
The best strategy and policy is to equip, reinforce and train the Afghan security forces. Not only Afghan officials have requested this several times, the British prime minister also agreed with it during his recent visit to Afghanistan. Otherwise, every kind of exported and imposed view from foreign countries under the pretext of war against terrorism will change the country into the battlefield of numerous countries' interests and there will be no winners, but many countries will stand accused.
Source: Cheragh, Kabul, in Dari 23 Aug 08
Thursday, 21 August 2008
Paper slams Iran for harassing Afghan refugees
Excerpts from by Afghan independent secular daily newspaper Hasht-e Sobh on 17 August
The inhumane and anti-religious and anti-humanitarian instructions of Iran's Sheraz Province governor have made the point clear that Afghans have now been victimized and insulted by the Islamic Republic of Iran more than ever. Iranians operate based on the logic that due to international laws and principles of good neighbourly coexistence they cannot lift Afghans like bags of sand and throw them to the other side of the border, therefore, they have chosen to victimize them and insult them to force them to return to Afghanistan. However, more than 20 years of insults and victimization have hardened Afghan refugees in that country.
Hasht-e Sobh newspaper has called this action of the Iranians as Islamic Semitism. I think this is an extremely beautiful yet shocking description. It is true that Afghans are not leaving Iran, but it is also true that they are thrown out as dirty beings from their own houses and they are introduced to the people of the area as thieves, robbers and dirty beings.
Once I read views of an Iranian national who had responded to a complaint by an Afghan refugee. The Iranian had written a nice joke: We Iranians are insulted and oppressed in our own country so much that I do not know how we can ask our government to respect your rights.
[Passage omitted: Iranians' rights have been habitually flouted; the author says more than 5,000 men and women were killed in Iran in 1367 for their affiliation with different groups]
It is interesting that in its conflict with the West over its nuclear program, Iran passes itself as an oppressed victim and describes the West as a tyrant. Its television and radio channels keep talking about Palestine and the south of Lebanon. Iran claims to be an example government for Shiites in the Middle East. However, it is clear that, while calling the West a tyrant, it insults and oppresses the largest Muslim refugee population on its soil. How can a government that cries over the death of a woman and a child in Lebanon and Gaza tolerate the torture of other Muslims in its camps?
[Passage omitted: Afghan refugees are brutally treated at some refugee camps in Afghanistan]
Mr [Mahmud] Ahmadinezhad] thinks that the West is arrogant and the USA is a big Satan because they are cruel to Muslim polities. But how should we assess the cruelty of Muslim states on fellow Muslim countries?. A minor comparison of the situation of Muslims in Europe with that of Muslims in Iran would add to the shame of those who claim to be fighting the tyrants.
Afghan nationals living in Europe and Canada and other [Western] countries are easily supported by the governments of those countries. They have access to free medical service, free health insurance, monthly financial assistance, free maternity support, financial support to newly born babies, free primary and secondary education, financial assistance for higher education and the ability to assume senior governmental and non-governmental positions. These are privileges that an Afghan refugee can avail in Western hegemonic countries without feeling inferior. They have the right to vote, the right to become a citizen without being discriminated against, the right to object and not vote for political parties with anti-immigration policies.
What about rights in the brotherly and Muslim state of Iran? Can a refugee enjoy any of the above rights in the country that shouts against tyranny and claims to be a strong Muslim state? Even if a refugee does not ask for anything and bear all the costs that he incurs, without complaining about it, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran will still not leave him alone and in peace. It will expel him by insulting him a thousand times.
I think that from a legal and structural point of view the Iranian government is primitive, racist, uncommitted to human rights in this modern world and is prepared to exercise all forms of violence and insult to use its authority. Under these circumstances, it is very difficult for Iranian government officials to portray themselves as Muslim champions and the Westerners as symbols of tyranny, arrogance and imperiousness because they [the Iranian government] are not committed to the very values and principles that they condemn the West for not upholding.
Source: Hasht-e Sobh, Kabul, in Dari 17 Aug 08
The inhumane and anti-religious and anti-humanitarian instructions of Iran's Sheraz Province governor have made the point clear that Afghans have now been victimized and insulted by the Islamic Republic of Iran more than ever. Iranians operate based on the logic that due to international laws and principles of good neighbourly coexistence they cannot lift Afghans like bags of sand and throw them to the other side of the border, therefore, they have chosen to victimize them and insult them to force them to return to Afghanistan. However, more than 20 years of insults and victimization have hardened Afghan refugees in that country.
Hasht-e Sobh newspaper has called this action of the Iranians as Islamic Semitism. I think this is an extremely beautiful yet shocking description. It is true that Afghans are not leaving Iran, but it is also true that they are thrown out as dirty beings from their own houses and they are introduced to the people of the area as thieves, robbers and dirty beings.
Once I read views of an Iranian national who had responded to a complaint by an Afghan refugee. The Iranian had written a nice joke: We Iranians are insulted and oppressed in our own country so much that I do not know how we can ask our government to respect your rights.
[Passage omitted: Iranians' rights have been habitually flouted; the author says more than 5,000 men and women were killed in Iran in 1367 for their affiliation with different groups]
It is interesting that in its conflict with the West over its nuclear program, Iran passes itself as an oppressed victim and describes the West as a tyrant. Its television and radio channels keep talking about Palestine and the south of Lebanon. Iran claims to be an example government for Shiites in the Middle East. However, it is clear that, while calling the West a tyrant, it insults and oppresses the largest Muslim refugee population on its soil. How can a government that cries over the death of a woman and a child in Lebanon and Gaza tolerate the torture of other Muslims in its camps?
[Passage omitted: Afghan refugees are brutally treated at some refugee camps in Afghanistan]
Mr [Mahmud] Ahmadinezhad] thinks that the West is arrogant and the USA is a big Satan because they are cruel to Muslim polities. But how should we assess the cruelty of Muslim states on fellow Muslim countries?. A minor comparison of the situation of Muslims in Europe with that of Muslims in Iran would add to the shame of those who claim to be fighting the tyrants.
Afghan nationals living in Europe and Canada and other [Western] countries are easily supported by the governments of those countries. They have access to free medical service, free health insurance, monthly financial assistance, free maternity support, financial support to newly born babies, free primary and secondary education, financial assistance for higher education and the ability to assume senior governmental and non-governmental positions. These are privileges that an Afghan refugee can avail in Western hegemonic countries without feeling inferior. They have the right to vote, the right to become a citizen without being discriminated against, the right to object and not vote for political parties with anti-immigration policies.
What about rights in the brotherly and Muslim state of Iran? Can a refugee enjoy any of the above rights in the country that shouts against tyranny and claims to be a strong Muslim state? Even if a refugee does not ask for anything and bear all the costs that he incurs, without complaining about it, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran will still not leave him alone and in peace. It will expel him by insulting him a thousand times.
I think that from a legal and structural point of view the Iranian government is primitive, racist, uncommitted to human rights in this modern world and is prepared to exercise all forms of violence and insult to use its authority. Under these circumstances, it is very difficult for Iranian government officials to portray themselves as Muslim champions and the Westerners as symbols of tyranny, arrogance and imperiousness because they [the Iranian government] are not committed to the very values and principles that they condemn the West for not upholding.
Source: Hasht-e Sobh, Kabul, in Dari 17 Aug 08
Friday, 8 August 2008
Afghan paper discusses drug addiction among women
Excerpt from report by privately-owned Afghan newspaper Payman daily on 6 August
We are living in a traditional and closed society, but events that happen in this society are amazing. Murder, violence, sexual assault against children, addiction, kidnapping, selling girls, forced marriages, underage marriages, and depravation of education are some of the problems women are facing in our society. The most amazing of all is addiction among women which is a bitter reality in our society.
But why women turn to addiction?
I visited several women addicts in the Sanga Amaj Mental Health Clinic. One of those who did not want her name to be revealed said: I smoked tobacco in the past. After the death of my only 12-year-old daughter, I became anxious and worried and I could not forget her. Under such circumstances, one of my neighbours told me to use opium to forget the pain of losing my daughter. It is now 10 years that I am taking opium, but still I could not forget my daughter who was my only hope in life.
While looking at me in despair, she said: My husband is old and frail. We are in a difficult economic situation, but worst than that is the loneliness and the pain of losing my daughter that always bothers me. She continued: Opium is the only thing that can calm me down and make me forget my sorrow.
She said to Payman daily: It has been one month since I have been admitted to Sanga Amaj hospital to quit my addiction. I am happy.
Another lady, who did not want to mention her name, said that her addiction was caused by the death of her brother.
She added: After the martyrdom of my brother, I was in a very bad condition, until a female neighbour told me to mix poppy with tea and drink it in order to forget my sorrow. I did so and having been using opium for eight years now.
Dr Shayesta, the deputy head of the Sanga Amaj hospital, says: Migration, poverty, domestic violence, and treating illnesses by narcotics at the advice of the relatives, friends, and neighbours and also having addict and drug trafficker husbands are the reasons that lead women to drug addiction.
According to Dr Shayesta, there are no specific statistics to show the percentage of women addicts in the country. While some women in the country are addicted to opium, some women who return from courtiers such as Iran are addicted to heroin.
Shakila the deputy head of Legal Department at the Women's Affairs Ministry says: We have one million addicts in Afghanistan, 12 per cent of whom are women.
She said: Most of these addicts are carpet weavers who live in the northern provinces of the country. But we were unable to talk to women who were addicted while carpet weaving. [Passage omitted: Dr Shayesta talking about women whose addiction are due to use of prescribed painkiller medication]
But, how many medical clinics are there to treat the rising number of drug addicts? Masuda Aref, the head of Mental Health Department at the Women's Affairs Ministry, says: There are several treatments canters for the addicts in the capital that we can name: The Nejat Centre, the centre for mental treatment in Kart-e 3 and a centre which is only for the female called Sanga Amaj with 20 beds.
Sayed Eskandar, a sportsman, says: Lack of family control and unemployment are two main reasons that the young generation turn to narcotic substances. But women addiction is caused by family problems, poverty, and migration.
He continued: I think that the treatment centres should have a sport programme beside all other programmes for the addicts. This can be very useful. Also addicts should be kept away for one year from where they may return to addiction. Addicted women also face other problems beside their addict; most of the addicted women are sexually exploited or turn to other acts.
Dr Shayesta says: A mother and her daughter were both addicted. The girl was occasionally stealing to buy opium and resorted to prostitution. They were admitted here, the girl managed to quit taking opium, but not prostitution. While her mother could not quit her addiction.
She added that we keep the patients in the centre for one month; the first 15 days is for prescribing anti-toxins and the last 15 days is for recovering. After one month we discharge the patient. But for one year we follow the patient out of the hospital.
She added: In this hospital, which is built and funded by the Colombo Plan, we treat our patients with both medication and psychotherapy - 20 per cent and 80 per cent respectively.
But how much can addiction among women be dangerous? Are the problems caused by women addict worst than the men? Dr Shayesta says: Taking narcotics by injection is less common in women than men, but they result in blood diseases that will lead to tragedy if not controlled seriously. She says: In any case, addiction in women is more dangerous than in men, because they women are more in contact with their children.
She said: We had a patient who blew opium smoke in his child mouth, thus causing the child to get addicted.
According to officials, there are less women addicts in Afghanistan than in other countries, but if we do not treat this 12 per cent and the government does not deal seriously with this problem, our country will encounter crises.
Source: Payman daily, Kabul, in Dari 6 Aug 08
We are living in a traditional and closed society, but events that happen in this society are amazing. Murder, violence, sexual assault against children, addiction, kidnapping, selling girls, forced marriages, underage marriages, and depravation of education are some of the problems women are facing in our society. The most amazing of all is addiction among women which is a bitter reality in our society.
But why women turn to addiction?
I visited several women addicts in the Sanga Amaj Mental Health Clinic. One of those who did not want her name to be revealed said: I smoked tobacco in the past. After the death of my only 12-year-old daughter, I became anxious and worried and I could not forget her. Under such circumstances, one of my neighbours told me to use opium to forget the pain of losing my daughter. It is now 10 years that I am taking opium, but still I could not forget my daughter who was my only hope in life.
While looking at me in despair, she said: My husband is old and frail. We are in a difficult economic situation, but worst than that is the loneliness and the pain of losing my daughter that always bothers me. She continued: Opium is the only thing that can calm me down and make me forget my sorrow.
She said to Payman daily: It has been one month since I have been admitted to Sanga Amaj hospital to quit my addiction. I am happy.
Another lady, who did not want to mention her name, said that her addiction was caused by the death of her brother.
She added: After the martyrdom of my brother, I was in a very bad condition, until a female neighbour told me to mix poppy with tea and drink it in order to forget my sorrow. I did so and having been using opium for eight years now.
Dr Shayesta, the deputy head of the Sanga Amaj hospital, says: Migration, poverty, domestic violence, and treating illnesses by narcotics at the advice of the relatives, friends, and neighbours and also having addict and drug trafficker husbands are the reasons that lead women to drug addiction.
According to Dr Shayesta, there are no specific statistics to show the percentage of women addicts in the country. While some women in the country are addicted to opium, some women who return from courtiers such as Iran are addicted to heroin.
Shakila the deputy head of Legal Department at the Women's Affairs Ministry says: We have one million addicts in Afghanistan, 12 per cent of whom are women.
She said: Most of these addicts are carpet weavers who live in the northern provinces of the country. But we were unable to talk to women who were addicted while carpet weaving. [Passage omitted: Dr Shayesta talking about women whose addiction are due to use of prescribed painkiller medication]
But, how many medical clinics are there to treat the rising number of drug addicts? Masuda Aref, the head of Mental Health Department at the Women's Affairs Ministry, says: There are several treatments canters for the addicts in the capital that we can name: The Nejat Centre, the centre for mental treatment in Kart-e 3 and a centre which is only for the female called Sanga Amaj with 20 beds.
Sayed Eskandar, a sportsman, says: Lack of family control and unemployment are two main reasons that the young generation turn to narcotic substances. But women addiction is caused by family problems, poverty, and migration.
He continued: I think that the treatment centres should have a sport programme beside all other programmes for the addicts. This can be very useful. Also addicts should be kept away for one year from where they may return to addiction. Addicted women also face other problems beside their addict; most of the addicted women are sexually exploited or turn to other acts.
Dr Shayesta says: A mother and her daughter were both addicted. The girl was occasionally stealing to buy opium and resorted to prostitution. They were admitted here, the girl managed to quit taking opium, but not prostitution. While her mother could not quit her addiction.
She added that we keep the patients in the centre for one month; the first 15 days is for prescribing anti-toxins and the last 15 days is for recovering. After one month we discharge the patient. But for one year we follow the patient out of the hospital.
She added: In this hospital, which is built and funded by the Colombo Plan, we treat our patients with both medication and psychotherapy - 20 per cent and 80 per cent respectively.
But how much can addiction among women be dangerous? Are the problems caused by women addict worst than the men? Dr Shayesta says: Taking narcotics by injection is less common in women than men, but they result in blood diseases that will lead to tragedy if not controlled seriously. She says: In any case, addiction in women is more dangerous than in men, because they women are more in contact with their children.
She said: We had a patient who blew opium smoke in his child mouth, thus causing the child to get addicted.
According to officials, there are less women addicts in Afghanistan than in other countries, but if we do not treat this 12 per cent and the government does not deal seriously with this problem, our country will encounter crises.
Source: Payman daily, Kabul, in Dari 6 Aug 08
Afghan daily says designs for disintegration of Afghanistan will fail
Text of article by Rahima Sapi entitled: "Can Afghanistan be made to disintegrate?" by pro-government Afghan newspaper Weesa on 5 August
There have been rumours that the international forces and a number of internal groups are trying to disintegrate Afghanistan to overcome the ongoing problems. As to whether the disintegration of Afghanistan will solve the country's problems, is something that requires a long debate. However, a number of internal groups prefer to save themselves from the unrest in the south and the lasting dominant mentality. These groups and pro-foreign personalities see their existence in the implementation of this plan. Perhaps the statements of (?Simon Pagdarasove), a Russian MP, are not wrong that the Northern Alliance has reached a number of agreements with America, and that this alliance wants to establish a separate government of Tajik and Uzbek minorities in Afghanistan.
A close examination of the recent situation in Afghanistan shows that there are signs of such a plan and conspiracy. The current two leaders of the Uzbek and Tajik minorities, Mr Abdorrashid Dostum and Abdol Latif Pedram, are the open and a number of former members of Northern Alliance are the main secret players of this game. Fuelling the dispute between Hazara people and nomads, insulting national personalities and conducting a prejudiced propaganda campaign through media are indirect efforts for implementing this plan. Giving people the impression that Afghans are not a united nation and saying that Afghanistan's identity, history and champions are fake show that those, who chant such slogans, overtly and covertly want to disintegrate Afghanistan.
Afghanistan's thousands of years old history shows that its geography cannot be made to disintegrate. There has always been a fear of disintegration of Afghanistan with every invasion. However, the joint uprising of Afghans against invaders has overcome this fear. This position and situation demonstrate the existence of a nation in the name of Afghan. If Afghanistan did not have a common nation and identity, its geographic location would have not remained in this form. Afghanistan's human structure and geography are the main obstacles for disintegration. The structure of people living in north and south, and southeast and southwest prevents the implementation of this conspiracy. Moreover, ethnic, language, political and religious affiliations guarantee the unity of the Afghan nation. Those, who want a federal system and the disintegration of Afghanistan through this system, are facing ethnic and political challenges in areas which they believe are under their influence. Those who speak of disintegration of the country by relying on Iran, Russia, America and other such powers should at least take a look at the nation's structure which runs completely counter to the foreign theories and plans. Those who want to disintegrate Afghanistan should realize that this country still has its people who can sacrifice their lives for defending its territorial integrity.
Source: Weesa, Kabul, in Pashto 5 Aug 08
There have been rumours that the international forces and a number of internal groups are trying to disintegrate Afghanistan to overcome the ongoing problems. As to whether the disintegration of Afghanistan will solve the country's problems, is something that requires a long debate. However, a number of internal groups prefer to save themselves from the unrest in the south and the lasting dominant mentality. These groups and pro-foreign personalities see their existence in the implementation of this plan. Perhaps the statements of (?Simon Pagdarasove), a Russian MP, are not wrong that the Northern Alliance has reached a number of agreements with America, and that this alliance wants to establish a separate government of Tajik and Uzbek minorities in Afghanistan.
A close examination of the recent situation in Afghanistan shows that there are signs of such a plan and conspiracy. The current two leaders of the Uzbek and Tajik minorities, Mr Abdorrashid Dostum and Abdol Latif Pedram, are the open and a number of former members of Northern Alliance are the main secret players of this game. Fuelling the dispute between Hazara people and nomads, insulting national personalities and conducting a prejudiced propaganda campaign through media are indirect efforts for implementing this plan. Giving people the impression that Afghans are not a united nation and saying that Afghanistan's identity, history and champions are fake show that those, who chant such slogans, overtly and covertly want to disintegrate Afghanistan.
Afghanistan's thousands of years old history shows that its geography cannot be made to disintegrate. There has always been a fear of disintegration of Afghanistan with every invasion. However, the joint uprising of Afghans against invaders has overcome this fear. This position and situation demonstrate the existence of a nation in the name of Afghan. If Afghanistan did not have a common nation and identity, its geographic location would have not remained in this form. Afghanistan's human structure and geography are the main obstacles for disintegration. The structure of people living in north and south, and southeast and southwest prevents the implementation of this conspiracy. Moreover, ethnic, language, political and religious affiliations guarantee the unity of the Afghan nation. Those, who want a federal system and the disintegration of Afghanistan through this system, are facing ethnic and political challenges in areas which they believe are under their influence. Those who speak of disintegration of the country by relying on Iran, Russia, America and other such powers should at least take a look at the nation's structure which runs completely counter to the foreign theories and plans. Those who want to disintegrate Afghanistan should realize that this country still has its people who can sacrifice their lives for defending its territorial integrity.
Source: Weesa, Kabul, in Pashto 5 Aug 08
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