The Website ALL4SYRIA reported (in Arabic) on July 17, 2010 that private Islamist elementary schools have been proliferating in Syria. The title of the article: Secrets and Background Behind the Decision to Ban the Wearing of the Niqab in Syria’s Schools and Universities Taken by the Office of National Security.
A Summary of the ALL4SYRIA article
Islamist groups in Syria have succeeded in controlling most private elementary schools (up to sixth grade), estimated to be around 200 schools (presumably in Damascus) with approximately 25% to 30% of all elementary schools enrolment. The article revealed that teachers are all women, don the Niqab (black covering of face and body), and belong to Islamist proselytizing groups, typically led and controlled by women. ALL4SYRIA added that classroom teaching material contravenes Ministry of Education curriculum and textbooks, that young children are instructed to insist that their mothers must wear the Niqab so that they avoid burning in hell’s fire, that large amounts of money have been paid by Islamist organizers to purchase secular private schools from their owners; for example, Dar Al-Faraj, Dar Al-Na’eem, Omar bin Al-Khattab, The Arab Islamic College, Ummat Al-Majd, Al-Yaqzah…).
Significance of the article
Such a development is disconcerting. Syria must be vigilant. At the core of Islamist teaching, just like Wahhabi teaching, is indoctrination and brainwashing in fanaticism. Sunni Islamists, Syria’s included, embrace Wahhabi extremism with all their being. Their speech and actions are akin to being members of a religious cult.
It should be noted that the word "Islamist" refers only to the tiny minority among individual Muslims who are extremists in their religious fervor and beliefs; specifically, the Hanbalite Wahhabis. The word "Islamist" does not apply to the 95% of Sunnis who follow the other three schools of jurisprudence (Hanafites, Maliktes, and Shafiates). This great majority is moderate, enlightened, and tolerant. On a macro level, the word "Islamist" refers to extremist Islamic states, not to moderate Islamic countries. While Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Syria, and Turkey, for example, are Islamic countries, Saudi Arabia is an Islamist country.
Source: Daring Opinion, Stop Wahhabi Indoctrination of Syrian Youth
Showing posts with label politics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label politics. Show all posts
Sunday, 1 August 2010
Sunday, 23 May 2010
T E Lawrence: hero or mirage?
The legacy of T E Lawrence, the British intelligence officer who fought alongside Arab irregulars and was immortalised in David Lean’s film, varies markedly between the West and the Middle East. Alasdair Soussi looks at the man and myth, 75 years after his death.
The arrival of the British-led Imperial Camel Corps into the Arab camp at Aqaba was always likely to cause friction. Despite fighting as allies against the might of the Ottoman Empire in the 1916-18 Arab campaign to drive the Turks out of the Middle East, the British troopers and the Arab irregulars never made comfortable bedfellows. This particular summer’s day in 1918, at the closing stages of the Great War, was to be no different.
The army encampment, in what is today Jordan’s southernmost city, reverberated to the sound of excited cries and musket fire as the 314-strong imperial troops galloped into town. Such was the greeting afforded them by the Arabs that many in the Camel Corps thought Aqaba itself was under attack.
By nightfall, tensions had reached breaking point. Unfamiliar with the ways of the Arab camp and convinced they had been shot at while bathing in the sea earlier that day, several troopers were about to take matters into their own hands with the aid of a few grenades when a figure in white appeared.
“He stood in the middle of the square, flung back his aba, showing his white undergarment, and illuminated by the countless fires, raised his hand,” one soldier recalled. “Immediately the firing ceased, the hubbub died down and we had a peaceful night.”
That figure was Thomas Edward Lawrence. T E Lawrence, who died 75 years ago this week, and who was pivotal in the success of the Arab revolt against the Turks, was the man the world would come to know as Lawrence of Arabia, and that anecdote – almost mythical in tone, yet a documented fact – is one of hundreds that have surrounded a life that continues to provoke the debate.
David Lean’s 1962 epic, starring Peter O’Toole, was based on Seven Pillars of Wisdom, Lawrence’s memoir of the two-year campaign. The film was a global sensation, but it was not the first time that the Lawrence myth had captured the popular imagination.
Forty-three years earlier, Lowell Thomas, a US journalist, toured the world with a highly romanticised film about Lawrence shot in the desert towards the end of the war. With Allenby In Palestine And Lawrence In Arabia was an immediate hit, not least in Great Britain where Lawrence was born in 1888. Consequently, Lawrence’s role in the Arab uprising, his pursuit of victory against the Ottomans, and his complete immersion in the Arab way of life as a British intelligence officer, all contrived to create a man more otherworldly than simply flesh and bone. Michael Asher, the English-born explorer and Arabist, and author of Lawrence: The Uncrowned King Of Arabia, is one of many who readily subscribes to this view.
“When I went to Lawrence’s cottage – now a museum – at Clouds Hill in Dorset [south-west England], it felt like a church. I realised that he was seen in Britain as a secular saint. If you think about it, Lawrence was really the only ‘hero’ to emerge from the First World War, a war in which millions died – he was the man who seemed to resurrect in his person the lost dead boys of a whole generation.”
Here, in the Middle East, the arena in which Lawrence gained his reputation, there are no such memorials.
So what is his legacy in this part of the world? Like many things concerning Lawrence, the answer is far from simple.
At only 1.65m tall and with a head that looked too big for his body, this shy Welsh-born son of an Anglo-Irish father and a Scottish mother was an unremarkable-looking man. Yet, he possessed a mind that was quite brilliant. After gaining a first-class degree in modern history from Jesus College, Oxford, Lawrence became an archaeologist, and travelled across the Middle East honing his knowledge of its geography and language, both of which he would come to master.
At the outbreak of the First World War, he joined the British intelligence service in Cairo and soon became involved in negotiations to orchestrate an Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire, which was sealed when Britain all but promised the Arabs a single unified nation should they triumph. But, while the revolt would be a major success, the European powers went back on their word. The Sykes-Picot Agreement, a secret pact cooked up by Britain and France in 1916, carved up the Middle East into colonial spheres of influence in a post-Ottoman world, a betrayal that put paid to any Arab hopes of freedom.
Continue reading T E Lawrence: hero or mirage? Source: The National, Abu Dhabi
The arrival of the British-led Imperial Camel Corps into the Arab camp at Aqaba was always likely to cause friction. Despite fighting as allies against the might of the Ottoman Empire in the 1916-18 Arab campaign to drive the Turks out of the Middle East, the British troopers and the Arab irregulars never made comfortable bedfellows. This particular summer’s day in 1918, at the closing stages of the Great War, was to be no different.
The army encampment, in what is today Jordan’s southernmost city, reverberated to the sound of excited cries and musket fire as the 314-strong imperial troops galloped into town. Such was the greeting afforded them by the Arabs that many in the Camel Corps thought Aqaba itself was under attack.
By nightfall, tensions had reached breaking point. Unfamiliar with the ways of the Arab camp and convinced they had been shot at while bathing in the sea earlier that day, several troopers were about to take matters into their own hands with the aid of a few grenades when a figure in white appeared.
“He stood in the middle of the square, flung back his aba, showing his white undergarment, and illuminated by the countless fires, raised his hand,” one soldier recalled. “Immediately the firing ceased, the hubbub died down and we had a peaceful night.”
That figure was Thomas Edward Lawrence. T E Lawrence, who died 75 years ago this week, and who was pivotal in the success of the Arab revolt against the Turks, was the man the world would come to know as Lawrence of Arabia, and that anecdote – almost mythical in tone, yet a documented fact – is one of hundreds that have surrounded a life that continues to provoke the debate.
David Lean’s 1962 epic, starring Peter O’Toole, was based on Seven Pillars of Wisdom, Lawrence’s memoir of the two-year campaign. The film was a global sensation, but it was not the first time that the Lawrence myth had captured the popular imagination.
Forty-three years earlier, Lowell Thomas, a US journalist, toured the world with a highly romanticised film about Lawrence shot in the desert towards the end of the war. With Allenby In Palestine And Lawrence In Arabia was an immediate hit, not least in Great Britain where Lawrence was born in 1888. Consequently, Lawrence’s role in the Arab uprising, his pursuit of victory against the Ottomans, and his complete immersion in the Arab way of life as a British intelligence officer, all contrived to create a man more otherworldly than simply flesh and bone. Michael Asher, the English-born explorer and Arabist, and author of Lawrence: The Uncrowned King Of Arabia, is one of many who readily subscribes to this view.
“When I went to Lawrence’s cottage – now a museum – at Clouds Hill in Dorset [south-west England], it felt like a church. I realised that he was seen in Britain as a secular saint. If you think about it, Lawrence was really the only ‘hero’ to emerge from the First World War, a war in which millions died – he was the man who seemed to resurrect in his person the lost dead boys of a whole generation.”
Here, in the Middle East, the arena in which Lawrence gained his reputation, there are no such memorials.
So what is his legacy in this part of the world? Like many things concerning Lawrence, the answer is far from simple.
At only 1.65m tall and with a head that looked too big for his body, this shy Welsh-born son of an Anglo-Irish father and a Scottish mother was an unremarkable-looking man. Yet, he possessed a mind that was quite brilliant. After gaining a first-class degree in modern history from Jesus College, Oxford, Lawrence became an archaeologist, and travelled across the Middle East honing his knowledge of its geography and language, both of which he would come to master.
At the outbreak of the First World War, he joined the British intelligence service in Cairo and soon became involved in negotiations to orchestrate an Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire, which was sealed when Britain all but promised the Arabs a single unified nation should they triumph. But, while the revolt would be a major success, the European powers went back on their word. The Sykes-Picot Agreement, a secret pact cooked up by Britain and France in 1916, carved up the Middle East into colonial spheres of influence in a post-Ottoman world, a betrayal that put paid to any Arab hopes of freedom.
Continue reading T E Lawrence: hero or mirage? Source: The National, Abu Dhabi
Friday, 1 January 2010
The caged and the saved: finding feminism in the Islamic world
Like most ideas, this one did not have a single genesis. I’ve been thinking, and to some extent writing, about feminism for many years and in many guises.
The word itself is controversial, with some damning it as the force that destroyed the family and others defending it as the movement that freed a gender.
It is one of those terms that starts simply and rapidly gets tangled: if you look around the world and think there are inequalities between the genders, and that those inequalities are not biological and are unfair, you are probably a feminist. And that’s where the arguments begin.
But definitions are only useful for what they illuminate, and the language of feminism, like the languages of democracy or freedom, has often been used to obscure.
So much of the discourse around the West’s relationship with the Muslim world has been framed through the language of women.
It was around women that early Christian Europe framed its opposition to the pleasure palaces of the “Mohammedans”, the barely disguised yearning for the exoticism of the Orient. The role of women in Egyptian society was cited by Napoleon as a wedge through which to enter the country; was cited again as a justification for the Anglo-American invasions of both Iraq and Afghanistan, and is regularly cited as apparent evidence of a lack of commitment to equal rights in Muslim communities.
Within the Muslim world, discourse around women’s roles and rights remains highly charged. As much as some point to the treatment of women in Europe as evidence of the vanishing of the West’s moral compass, it is also the case that, across much of the Muslim world, women’s dress has become a way to impose a religious vision upon the society, even as Muslim women use the veil to reclaim their own identities.
And, still, in too many countries, internal social and cultural wars are fought on the battleground of women’s bodies.
So the question of what counts as feminism, as liberation, in the Arab and Islamic worlds is complicated and intricate. To try and answer it, I am leaving London next week for Beirut, the first stop on a journey that will take me thousands of kilometres across Arab and Islamic lands, through Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan and to the very edges of Indonesia.
Through interviews, experiences and research, I hope to come close to an answer, and I’ve been immensely privileged to be awarded a Churchill Fellowship, the living memorial to Britain’s wartime leader, to fund this exploration.
What do I hope to find? Not easy answers, for sure. Even the idea of what counts as liberation is mixed.
I have called the introductory chapter of the book I am writing about this journey “The caged and the saved”, reflecting the two ways people think of what the Muslim veil does.
In it, I tell an anecdote of encountering these contrasting attitudes in real life, when, walking around London with a friend, she asked me, of a woman wearing a Saudi abaya, “How can she think she is liberated when she dresses like that?” It occurred to me another woman might ask the same question about the women around her displaying acres of flesh.
Nor is there a clear dividing line between political and religious perspectives. Earlier this year in Morocco I interviewed Nadia Yassine, of the banned Islamist group Al Adl wal Ihsane. As much as she spoke the language of women’s rights and of female liberation, she was reluctant to be pigeonholed as a feminist in the western understanding of the term. Her perspective, she said, stemmed from her faith. The imam and the activist can sometimes reach the same conclusions.
Within the Muslim world, as within the West, the idea of what feminism is, where it comes from, how relevant it is, what form equality ought to take are real, live debates. They come to us in snatches: harassment of women on the streets of Cairo, the wearing of trousers in Sudan, unsegregated university campuses in Saudi Arabia, the burning of girls’ schools in Pakistan.
And threaded through these snatches are less-regular glimpses of clear successes: the leadership of women such as Queen Rania, Benazir Bhutto and Lubna Olayan. And there is the immense lived experience of millions of women, who assert their own independence daily through their work, relationships, devotion to their family and faith.
The Arab and Islamic worlds are going through a period of immense change and the ideology that holds nations and regions together is altering. The big –isms of the world – nationalism, capitalism, Islamism – affect women in each country differently.
The outward symbols of faith are obvious illustrations of this, but the framework of the society is equally important.
The professor in Tehran and the village-woman in Indonesia will not only dress differently, they may also have different conceptions of the relationship between men and women. I expect to meet those who espouse feminism from a purely secular perspective, and those who say that Islam has provided a clear manifesto for women’s rights.
So I am not setting out with preconceived notions. I don’t begin from the assumption that one way of living is better than another, nor do I go in with the assumption that what occurs to one person in one country is indicative of a nation or a faith. But I do think it is possible to delineate between ways of organising a society: that if you look closely enough at a society’s history and people, it is possible to make fine, sensitive judgements. Though I expect differences, I also hope for some common ground.
The Arab world is a complex place; nations of Arabic speakers who think they are one but act like they are many. It is a place that defies easy categorisation.
I have lived, travelled and reported across many Arab countries over many years, but there are still times when I come across something – an event, a conversation – that makes me think I have barely scratched the surface.
Such has been the case with my conversations about feminism: I’ve often understood the word in terms of equality of laws, education and employment. But it is astonishing how varied people’s perceptions are around the Middle East.
If that is the case with the Arab world, with all its many commonalities, imagine the complexity of the Islamic worlds that stretch across Asia and Africa. That’s the reason I have broadened the journey out to encompass the vast non-Arab Islamic world: the Shia customs of Iran, the South Asian experience in Pakistan and the newer Asian traditions in Indonesia.
The exploration of these places will be a key theme, because no idea lives in isolation; all are shaped by the experience of their societies. I want to go beyond a purely intellectual discussion to understand the lived experiences of women in these societies.
I admit there have been times these last few weeks, as I prepare to leave London and skim through old books on the subject, that I have wondered if it is perhaps an overwhelming one. I have been incredibly lucky so far to have friends and colleagues who have helped me get started – I know I will meet many more over the next few months. What I don’t know is if I will find any answers, or even if there are any: that’s why I am going.
Follow Faisal al Yafai’s journey at faisalalyafai.com. His book will be published by IB Tauris in 2011.
Source: The National 'The caged and the saved: finding feminism in the Islamic world'
The word itself is controversial, with some damning it as the force that destroyed the family and others defending it as the movement that freed a gender.
It is one of those terms that starts simply and rapidly gets tangled: if you look around the world and think there are inequalities between the genders, and that those inequalities are not biological and are unfair, you are probably a feminist. And that’s where the arguments begin.
But definitions are only useful for what they illuminate, and the language of feminism, like the languages of democracy or freedom, has often been used to obscure.
So much of the discourse around the West’s relationship with the Muslim world has been framed through the language of women.
It was around women that early Christian Europe framed its opposition to the pleasure palaces of the “Mohammedans”, the barely disguised yearning for the exoticism of the Orient. The role of women in Egyptian society was cited by Napoleon as a wedge through which to enter the country; was cited again as a justification for the Anglo-American invasions of both Iraq and Afghanistan, and is regularly cited as apparent evidence of a lack of commitment to equal rights in Muslim communities.
Within the Muslim world, discourse around women’s roles and rights remains highly charged. As much as some point to the treatment of women in Europe as evidence of the vanishing of the West’s moral compass, it is also the case that, across much of the Muslim world, women’s dress has become a way to impose a religious vision upon the society, even as Muslim women use the veil to reclaim their own identities.
And, still, in too many countries, internal social and cultural wars are fought on the battleground of women’s bodies.
So the question of what counts as feminism, as liberation, in the Arab and Islamic worlds is complicated and intricate. To try and answer it, I am leaving London next week for Beirut, the first stop on a journey that will take me thousands of kilometres across Arab and Islamic lands, through Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan and to the very edges of Indonesia.
Through interviews, experiences and research, I hope to come close to an answer, and I’ve been immensely privileged to be awarded a Churchill Fellowship, the living memorial to Britain’s wartime leader, to fund this exploration.
What do I hope to find? Not easy answers, for sure. Even the idea of what counts as liberation is mixed.
I have called the introductory chapter of the book I am writing about this journey “The caged and the saved”, reflecting the two ways people think of what the Muslim veil does.
In it, I tell an anecdote of encountering these contrasting attitudes in real life, when, walking around London with a friend, she asked me, of a woman wearing a Saudi abaya, “How can she think she is liberated when she dresses like that?” It occurred to me another woman might ask the same question about the women around her displaying acres of flesh.
Nor is there a clear dividing line between political and religious perspectives. Earlier this year in Morocco I interviewed Nadia Yassine, of the banned Islamist group Al Adl wal Ihsane. As much as she spoke the language of women’s rights and of female liberation, she was reluctant to be pigeonholed as a feminist in the western understanding of the term. Her perspective, she said, stemmed from her faith. The imam and the activist can sometimes reach the same conclusions.
Within the Muslim world, as within the West, the idea of what feminism is, where it comes from, how relevant it is, what form equality ought to take are real, live debates. They come to us in snatches: harassment of women on the streets of Cairo, the wearing of trousers in Sudan, unsegregated university campuses in Saudi Arabia, the burning of girls’ schools in Pakistan.
And threaded through these snatches are less-regular glimpses of clear successes: the leadership of women such as Queen Rania, Benazir Bhutto and Lubna Olayan. And there is the immense lived experience of millions of women, who assert their own independence daily through their work, relationships, devotion to their family and faith.
The Arab and Islamic worlds are going through a period of immense change and the ideology that holds nations and regions together is altering. The big –isms of the world – nationalism, capitalism, Islamism – affect women in each country differently.
The outward symbols of faith are obvious illustrations of this, but the framework of the society is equally important.
The professor in Tehran and the village-woman in Indonesia will not only dress differently, they may also have different conceptions of the relationship between men and women. I expect to meet those who espouse feminism from a purely secular perspective, and those who say that Islam has provided a clear manifesto for women’s rights.
So I am not setting out with preconceived notions. I don’t begin from the assumption that one way of living is better than another, nor do I go in with the assumption that what occurs to one person in one country is indicative of a nation or a faith. But I do think it is possible to delineate between ways of organising a society: that if you look closely enough at a society’s history and people, it is possible to make fine, sensitive judgements. Though I expect differences, I also hope for some common ground.
The Arab world is a complex place; nations of Arabic speakers who think they are one but act like they are many. It is a place that defies easy categorisation.
I have lived, travelled and reported across many Arab countries over many years, but there are still times when I come across something – an event, a conversation – that makes me think I have barely scratched the surface.
Such has been the case with my conversations about feminism: I’ve often understood the word in terms of equality of laws, education and employment. But it is astonishing how varied people’s perceptions are around the Middle East.
If that is the case with the Arab world, with all its many commonalities, imagine the complexity of the Islamic worlds that stretch across Asia and Africa. That’s the reason I have broadened the journey out to encompass the vast non-Arab Islamic world: the Shia customs of Iran, the South Asian experience in Pakistan and the newer Asian traditions in Indonesia.
The exploration of these places will be a key theme, because no idea lives in isolation; all are shaped by the experience of their societies. I want to go beyond a purely intellectual discussion to understand the lived experiences of women in these societies.
I admit there have been times these last few weeks, as I prepare to leave London and skim through old books on the subject, that I have wondered if it is perhaps an overwhelming one. I have been incredibly lucky so far to have friends and colleagues who have helped me get started – I know I will meet many more over the next few months. What I don’t know is if I will find any answers, or even if there are any: that’s why I am going.
Follow Faisal al Yafai’s journey at faisalalyafai.com. His book will be published by IB Tauris in 2011.
Source: The National 'The caged and the saved: finding feminism in the Islamic world'
Twelve months
Elias Muhanna reviews a year of realignments in Middle Eastern politics.
The year 2009 began with the Middle East ablaze. On January 1, for the fifth day running, Israeli jets continued to pummel Gaza in advance of a ground invasion that produced over 1,000 Palestinian deaths and hundreds of thousands of refugees. The war’s effects rippled across the region in an all too familiar way: suicide bombers in Iraq targeted groups of civilians protesting the Gaza invasion, while America’s allies in the region criticised Hamas for provoking the onslaught. Meanwhile, Iran castigated Egypt for collaborating with the enemy and Syria called off its peace negotiations with Israel. The region had slipped back into the trenches of its Cold War, in which a single Katyusha could trigger a massive military response and an international diplomatic crisis.
A year later, the atmosphere in the region is markedly different. Bitter rivals have visited each other’s capitals to mend fences and the media is full of reports about a new age of reconciliation and diplomatic engagement. Following the turmoil of the previous five years, which witnessed a series of proxy wars between the Western-supported Sunni Arab regimes and the axis consisting of Iran, Syria, and their non-state allies (Hamas and Hizbollah), the relative calm that prevailed in 2009 was just one of many signs that a realignment of interests had begun to take shape.
The reasons for this realignment stem from two basic uncertainties. On the one hand, there is a question mark about the effects of a new – and still seemingly undefined – American policy for the region. Indeed, as disruptive as the neoconservative experiment was to Arab power dynamics, the presence of a new administration in Washington with a different outlook and a different set of priorities has forced the region to reorganise itself once again. On the other hand, Iran’s growing influence and the concomitant challenges to its regime’s authority have further muddied the waters, as its allies and adversaries try to gauge the health and durability of the Islamic Republic on its 30th anniversary. When these two unknown variables are combined, in attempts to assess shifting American policy toward the volatile regional heavyweight, the tea leaves become all the more difficult to read.
While the entire world may have caught a whiff of the sense of optimism and renewal that swept through the United States in January, the Middle East surely felt its impact in an even bigger way. The Arabs heralded Obama’s election as though he were one of their own, laying claim to his Muslim ancestry and Arabic name, and holding out hope that his administration would bring about a major reorientation of America’s diplomatic posture in the Middle East. These hopes crested in early June, when Obama delivered his famous address to the Muslim world from Cairo. Following the speech, he was lionised for weeks by the Arab press, with some commentators going so far as to claim that it was Obama’s influence that led the March 14 coalition to victory in the Lebanese parliamentary elections and ushered the Iranian Green Movement into the streets of Tehran.
A gross overstatement, to be certain. But there was no mistaking the new American approach, from Obama’s much-discussed Persian New Year greetings, to his “Day One” strategy vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli peace process, which had lain dormant for seven years under Bush. At the same time, however, the inchoate character of this new policy meant that while many of the old battle lines had been rubbed out, the new ones had yet to emerge. The result: a sea of uncertainty and bet-hedging, as the region’s political elite shifted their foreign policies into neutral – if not yet into reverse.
Nowhere was this sense of ambivalence more evident than in Lebanon, always a trusty barometer of regional political dynamics. A historic parliamentary election resulted in a repeat victory for the pro-American majority and a surprise defeat for the Iran and Syria-backed opposition. However, rather than leveraging the win into an effort to curtail Hezbollah’s military capabilities – once a central plank of the March 14 agenda – the Lebanese prime minister, Saad Hariri, spent four months putting together a national unity government that gave his former political opponents a large share of power.
This accommodation was virtually mandated by a larger rapprochement between Lebanon’s two principal foreign sponsors, Saudi Arabia and Syria, whose leaders also buried the hatchet in 2009 after four years of deep hostility and proxy warfare. As the Obama White House signalled its openness to re-establishing diplomatic relations with Syria, the Saudis silenced their media attacks on Damascus and began to explore ways in which to woo Bashar al Assad away from the encroaching influence of Iran.
Indeed, the “Iranian question” looms large in the new calculus of Arab reconciliation. As America has shifted its attention from the Gulf to Afghanistan, Iraq’s neighbours have found increased latitude to shape the occupation’s aftermath. Their main concern has been to check Iran’s influence over the Shiite-dominated government, empowering Sunni factions to provide a counterbalance thereto. Washington’s determination to deal with Tehran through engagement rather than coercion has fuelled Arab suspicion that Obama sees an expanded Iranian sphere of influence as an acceptable price to pay in the larger calculations about America’s global strategy.
Continue reading The National: Twelve months
The year 2009 began with the Middle East ablaze. On January 1, for the fifth day running, Israeli jets continued to pummel Gaza in advance of a ground invasion that produced over 1,000 Palestinian deaths and hundreds of thousands of refugees. The war’s effects rippled across the region in an all too familiar way: suicide bombers in Iraq targeted groups of civilians protesting the Gaza invasion, while America’s allies in the region criticised Hamas for provoking the onslaught. Meanwhile, Iran castigated Egypt for collaborating with the enemy and Syria called off its peace negotiations with Israel. The region had slipped back into the trenches of its Cold War, in which a single Katyusha could trigger a massive military response and an international diplomatic crisis.
A year later, the atmosphere in the region is markedly different. Bitter rivals have visited each other’s capitals to mend fences and the media is full of reports about a new age of reconciliation and diplomatic engagement. Following the turmoil of the previous five years, which witnessed a series of proxy wars between the Western-supported Sunni Arab regimes and the axis consisting of Iran, Syria, and their non-state allies (Hamas and Hizbollah), the relative calm that prevailed in 2009 was just one of many signs that a realignment of interests had begun to take shape.
The reasons for this realignment stem from two basic uncertainties. On the one hand, there is a question mark about the effects of a new – and still seemingly undefined – American policy for the region. Indeed, as disruptive as the neoconservative experiment was to Arab power dynamics, the presence of a new administration in Washington with a different outlook and a different set of priorities has forced the region to reorganise itself once again. On the other hand, Iran’s growing influence and the concomitant challenges to its regime’s authority have further muddied the waters, as its allies and adversaries try to gauge the health and durability of the Islamic Republic on its 30th anniversary. When these two unknown variables are combined, in attempts to assess shifting American policy toward the volatile regional heavyweight, the tea leaves become all the more difficult to read.
While the entire world may have caught a whiff of the sense of optimism and renewal that swept through the United States in January, the Middle East surely felt its impact in an even bigger way. The Arabs heralded Obama’s election as though he were one of their own, laying claim to his Muslim ancestry and Arabic name, and holding out hope that his administration would bring about a major reorientation of America’s diplomatic posture in the Middle East. These hopes crested in early June, when Obama delivered his famous address to the Muslim world from Cairo. Following the speech, he was lionised for weeks by the Arab press, with some commentators going so far as to claim that it was Obama’s influence that led the March 14 coalition to victory in the Lebanese parliamentary elections and ushered the Iranian Green Movement into the streets of Tehran.
A gross overstatement, to be certain. But there was no mistaking the new American approach, from Obama’s much-discussed Persian New Year greetings, to his “Day One” strategy vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli peace process, which had lain dormant for seven years under Bush. At the same time, however, the inchoate character of this new policy meant that while many of the old battle lines had been rubbed out, the new ones had yet to emerge. The result: a sea of uncertainty and bet-hedging, as the region’s political elite shifted their foreign policies into neutral – if not yet into reverse.
Nowhere was this sense of ambivalence more evident than in Lebanon, always a trusty barometer of regional political dynamics. A historic parliamentary election resulted in a repeat victory for the pro-American majority and a surprise defeat for the Iran and Syria-backed opposition. However, rather than leveraging the win into an effort to curtail Hezbollah’s military capabilities – once a central plank of the March 14 agenda – the Lebanese prime minister, Saad Hariri, spent four months putting together a national unity government that gave his former political opponents a large share of power.
This accommodation was virtually mandated by a larger rapprochement between Lebanon’s two principal foreign sponsors, Saudi Arabia and Syria, whose leaders also buried the hatchet in 2009 after four years of deep hostility and proxy warfare. As the Obama White House signalled its openness to re-establishing diplomatic relations with Syria, the Saudis silenced their media attacks on Damascus and began to explore ways in which to woo Bashar al Assad away from the encroaching influence of Iran.
Indeed, the “Iranian question” looms large in the new calculus of Arab reconciliation. As America has shifted its attention from the Gulf to Afghanistan, Iraq’s neighbours have found increased latitude to shape the occupation’s aftermath. Their main concern has been to check Iran’s influence over the Shiite-dominated government, empowering Sunni factions to provide a counterbalance thereto. Washington’s determination to deal with Tehran through engagement rather than coercion has fuelled Arab suspicion that Obama sees an expanded Iranian sphere of influence as an acceptable price to pay in the larger calculations about America’s global strategy.
Continue reading The National: Twelve months
Tuesday, 29 December 2009
Coming of age
Hamas, which recently celebrated its 22nd birthday, has grown up quite quickly: what began as a clandestine group of activists determined to form an Islamic resistance movement out of a previously quiescent Muslim Brotherhood is now a governing party in Gaza and a major focus of international attention. But having achieved such success, the movement’s leaders now find themselves confronted with difficult choices about their priorities. Hamas’s leaders have promised their followers that they can resist Israel, govern Gaza and reform Palestinian society along Islamic lines. But those goals increasingly pull the movement in very different directions. Since its startling triumph in Palestine’s January 2006 elections and especially since its seizure of power in Gaza in June 2007, Hamas is showing signs of strain over which path to emphasise.
One set of goals emphasises the group’s Islamist agenda. The Muslim Brotherhood, since its founding in Egypt 80 years ago, has always emphasised reforming the individual and society according to Islamic dictates. For many years, Palestinian members of the Muslim Brotherhood emphasised personal and social reform at the expense of politics and the national struggle; Palestine could be liberated, they held, only after it had become more thoroughly Islamic. Hamas was founded by Brotherhood activists frustrated with such passivity and tired of being taunted by secular Palestinian nationalists who accused the Islamists of contributing nothing to the liberation struggle. The founders of Hamas insisted that there was no need to postpone resistance: they could take direct action against the Israeli occupation while pursuing the Islamisation of Palestinian society.
Yet since it won the 2006 parliamentary elections, Hamas has given mixed signals regarding its Islamic agenda. Religious issues were deliberately played down in the electoral campaign, and the group did not use its parliamentary majority to rush through any religiously-inspired education. It kept the existing school curriculum, moving only to modestly expand the classroom time devoted to religious instruction. But since its seizure of power in Gaza in June 2007, some movement activists have become impatient: they seek to use the movement’s dominant political position to bring Palestine’s legal framework and public life in line with Islamic values and teachings. Some of their efforts – such as the formation of a morality police – have received international attention, but much has taken place on a grass-roots level.
A second path for Hamas emphasises resistance – literally the movement’s middle name (Hamas is an acronym for Islamic Resistance Movement). Hamas was born in an effort to participate in what Palestinians term their “revolution”. While a latecomer to armed action, Hamas emerged from the Oslo process as the most prominent movement dedicated to continued resistance. Even during the second intifada, when other movements (including parts of Fatah) returned to violent activity, Hamas still stood at the vanguard of Palestinian resistance to Israel.
Yet as with its Islamist agenda, Hamas’s pursuit of resistance has been uneven for the past three years. From March 2006, when it formed the Palestinian Authority cabinet, until June 2007, when the Palestinian Authority split in two (with Hamas controlling only the Gaza half), Hamas came under enormous international pressure to renounce violence. It responded with a half-measure: while it completely rejected the international calls in theory, in practice it held its own activities to a minimum. Since June 2007, this pattern has actually become more pronounced. Hamas has generally sought a ceasefire with Israel while disavowing any intention of reaching a permanent settlement or disarming. It has, of course, fired rockets from Gaza – but with the declared aim of securing a ceasefire on more favourable terms. And when an indirectly negotiated ceasefire prevailed, Hamas largely observed it; not only that, the movement enforced other factions’ observance.
Continue reading The National: Coming of age
One set of goals emphasises the group’s Islamist agenda. The Muslim Brotherhood, since its founding in Egypt 80 years ago, has always emphasised reforming the individual and society according to Islamic dictates. For many years, Palestinian members of the Muslim Brotherhood emphasised personal and social reform at the expense of politics and the national struggle; Palestine could be liberated, they held, only after it had become more thoroughly Islamic. Hamas was founded by Brotherhood activists frustrated with such passivity and tired of being taunted by secular Palestinian nationalists who accused the Islamists of contributing nothing to the liberation struggle. The founders of Hamas insisted that there was no need to postpone resistance: they could take direct action against the Israeli occupation while pursuing the Islamisation of Palestinian society.
Yet since it won the 2006 parliamentary elections, Hamas has given mixed signals regarding its Islamic agenda. Religious issues were deliberately played down in the electoral campaign, and the group did not use its parliamentary majority to rush through any religiously-inspired education. It kept the existing school curriculum, moving only to modestly expand the classroom time devoted to religious instruction. But since its seizure of power in Gaza in June 2007, some movement activists have become impatient: they seek to use the movement’s dominant political position to bring Palestine’s legal framework and public life in line with Islamic values and teachings. Some of their efforts – such as the formation of a morality police – have received international attention, but much has taken place on a grass-roots level.
A second path for Hamas emphasises resistance – literally the movement’s middle name (Hamas is an acronym for Islamic Resistance Movement). Hamas was born in an effort to participate in what Palestinians term their “revolution”. While a latecomer to armed action, Hamas emerged from the Oslo process as the most prominent movement dedicated to continued resistance. Even during the second intifada, when other movements (including parts of Fatah) returned to violent activity, Hamas still stood at the vanguard of Palestinian resistance to Israel.
Yet as with its Islamist agenda, Hamas’s pursuit of resistance has been uneven for the past three years. From March 2006, when it formed the Palestinian Authority cabinet, until June 2007, when the Palestinian Authority split in two (with Hamas controlling only the Gaza half), Hamas came under enormous international pressure to renounce violence. It responded with a half-measure: while it completely rejected the international calls in theory, in practice it held its own activities to a minimum. Since June 2007, this pattern has actually become more pronounced. Hamas has generally sought a ceasefire with Israel while disavowing any intention of reaching a permanent settlement or disarming. It has, of course, fired rockets from Gaza – but with the declared aim of securing a ceasefire on more favourable terms. And when an indirectly negotiated ceasefire prevailed, Hamas largely observed it; not only that, the movement enforced other factions’ observance.
Continue reading The National: Coming of age
Wednesday, 19 August 2009
What Egyptians want from Washington
Egypt is set to use its president's visit to Washington to trumpet its position as a key US ally and major regional player.
Hosni Mubarak and Barack Obama, the US president, are expected to discuss a number of regional issues including the pivotal Palestinian-Israeli peace process, Iran's nuclear programme, stabilising Iraq, and fighting armed Islamist groups throughout the Middle East.
But many ordinary Egyptians, who once cared about their country's foreign policy, may no longer be interested in such talks.
Abdullah al-Ashaal, a professor of international relations and law at the American University in Cairo, says Egyptians will tune out because they believe the meetings in Washington on Tuesday will follow "an elitist agenda that has no direct link to the ordinary Egyptian citizen".
Al-Ashal, a critic of Egyptian foreign policy who describes himself as an independent political intellectual, said: "The most important item on Mubarak's agenda in Washington is to visit the White House. The man has in the past lost hope in visiting the White House and he has been dreaming about this visit."
Five-year absence
Mubarak has not visited the US since 2004, when the administration of George Bush, Obama's predecessor, pressed the Egyptian government on political plurality and democratisation.
Bush, left, visited Cairo often, but Mubarak has not been to the US since 2004 [AFP]
At that time, Bush pressed some of Washington's traditional Arab allies, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to create multi-party political systems and hold free elections.
But he quickly backed away from this once it became clear that such elections had led to the rise of Islamist groups in Iraq, Egypt, and the occupied Palestinian Territories.
The Obama administration has applied a more realistic approach towards the region.
It has been seeking the help of Arab governments in securing Iraq and pushing forward the peace process with Israel in return for turning a blind eye to political repression and media crackdowns.
Obama's strategy is a boon to Cairo which shares Washington's interest in minimising the influence of Iran and Islamist groups in the region.
In the meantime, Egypt continues to reject domestic and foreign pressure to democratise.
To Keep reading click on Al Jazeera: What Egyptians want from Washington
Hosni Mubarak and Barack Obama, the US president, are expected to discuss a number of regional issues including the pivotal Palestinian-Israeli peace process, Iran's nuclear programme, stabilising Iraq, and fighting armed Islamist groups throughout the Middle East.
But many ordinary Egyptians, who once cared about their country's foreign policy, may no longer be interested in such talks.
Abdullah al-Ashaal, a professor of international relations and law at the American University in Cairo, says Egyptians will tune out because they believe the meetings in Washington on Tuesday will follow "an elitist agenda that has no direct link to the ordinary Egyptian citizen".
Al-Ashal, a critic of Egyptian foreign policy who describes himself as an independent political intellectual, said: "The most important item on Mubarak's agenda in Washington is to visit the White House. The man has in the past lost hope in visiting the White House and he has been dreaming about this visit."
Five-year absence
Mubarak has not visited the US since 2004, when the administration of George Bush, Obama's predecessor, pressed the Egyptian government on political plurality and democratisation.
Bush, left, visited Cairo often, but Mubarak has not been to the US since 2004 [AFP]
At that time, Bush pressed some of Washington's traditional Arab allies, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to create multi-party political systems and hold free elections.
But he quickly backed away from this once it became clear that such elections had led to the rise of Islamist groups in Iraq, Egypt, and the occupied Palestinian Territories.
The Obama administration has applied a more realistic approach towards the region.
It has been seeking the help of Arab governments in securing Iraq and pushing forward the peace process with Israel in return for turning a blind eye to political repression and media crackdowns.
Obama's strategy is a boon to Cairo which shares Washington's interest in minimising the influence of Iran and Islamist groups in the region.
In the meantime, Egypt continues to reject domestic and foreign pressure to democratise.
To Keep reading click on Al Jazeera: What Egyptians want from Washington
Monday, 17 August 2009
A Message for Mubarak
By Michele Dunne
Monday, August 17, 2009
When President Obama receives Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in the Oval Office on Tuesday, I wonder whether the two will sense that something is missing from the meeting. That would be the interests of Egypt's 83 million citizens, whose collective hopes and aspirations have disappeared from U.S. considerations since President George W. Bush's freedom agenda flamed out years ago. American citizens are also not invited to the party; Congress is out of session, and Mubarak will make no public appearances.
Relations between Washington and Cairo have settled back into the comfortable pre-Sept. 11 pattern, in which the only people who count are presidents and foreign ministers and the only important agenda items are Israeli-Arab peace and containing regional bullies. That is ironic, considering the ability Obama demonstrated to reach the Arab public directly during his June 4 speech in Cairo.
The problem now is that, while Washington is trying to turn back the clock on its Cairo policy, Egypt is moving toward a leadership transition that we cannot ignore. Egypt will elect a new parliament next year and a new president in 2011. By then, Mubarak will be 83, and even if he decides to run again -- after 30 years in power under a state of "emergency" that allows him to suspend laws -- it is likely to be a few years at most before change comes.
Recent developments suggest that the 2010 parliamentary elections will be even less free than those of 2005, which were far from perfect. Mubarak's son Gamal has been training to succeed him for a decade, but he remains largely unpopular in Egypt. While the Obama administration should avoid direct involvement in or public comment on succession issues, the president should encourage Mubarak to use this transition period to move toward a more inclusive political process and improved human rights practices.
It is especially important for Obama to deliver a pro-democracy message to Mubarak. It will be relatively easy to do so now, during a quiet period, without the tension of immediate elections or succession, and in a climate of renewed goodwill between the United States and Egypt.
But it is also important to correct the idea -- prevailing in Cairo -- that the United States no longer cares about democratization in Egypt. Egyptians have gotten that impression from Obama's rhetoric, which is softer than that of his predecessor, and particularly from a drastic cut in funding this year for U.S. democracy promotion programs in Egypt. A July report by the Project on Middle East Democracy found that while the Obama administration has increased its request for democracy funding in the Middle East overall, it has cut such funding for Egypt by more than half and cut aid to independent civil society organizations by more than two-thirds.
Why is the Obama administration backing off democracy promotion just as Egypt faces critical elections and a likely leadership change? It appears to be worried that Mubarak will withhold cooperation on regional peace and stability if Washington annoys him by expressing concern for the rights of Egyptians.
But Obama can have Mubarak's help without having to pay for it with his silence. Mubarak shares Washington's interests in preventing the emergence of a permanent Hamas state in Gaza, in promoting a peace agreement between Palestinians and Israel, and in containing Iranian nuclear ambitions. He will work toward those ends for his own reasons and cooperate with the United States accordingly -- as he did even at the height of the Bush administration's democracy promotion rhetoric in 2004 and 2005.
Obama should work with Mubarak on Arab-Israeli issues and Iran, and listen to the Egyptian leader's counsel. But he should also ask Mubarak how he plans to address rising demand for the rule of law and free political competition in Egypt. The U.S. administration should reconsider its disengagement from Egyptian civil society and find a way to establish partnerships with the many institutions and organizations that can play constructive roles in a transition toward a more open system.
Then Obama will have shown his respect not just for our man in Cairo but for 83 million Egyptians as well.
The writer is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and editor of the Arab Reform Bulletin.
Monday, August 17, 2009
When President Obama receives Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in the Oval Office on Tuesday, I wonder whether the two will sense that something is missing from the meeting. That would be the interests of Egypt's 83 million citizens, whose collective hopes and aspirations have disappeared from U.S. considerations since President George W. Bush's freedom agenda flamed out years ago. American citizens are also not invited to the party; Congress is out of session, and Mubarak will make no public appearances.
Relations between Washington and Cairo have settled back into the comfortable pre-Sept. 11 pattern, in which the only people who count are presidents and foreign ministers and the only important agenda items are Israeli-Arab peace and containing regional bullies. That is ironic, considering the ability Obama demonstrated to reach the Arab public directly during his June 4 speech in Cairo.
The problem now is that, while Washington is trying to turn back the clock on its Cairo policy, Egypt is moving toward a leadership transition that we cannot ignore. Egypt will elect a new parliament next year and a new president in 2011. By then, Mubarak will be 83, and even if he decides to run again -- after 30 years in power under a state of "emergency" that allows him to suspend laws -- it is likely to be a few years at most before change comes.
Recent developments suggest that the 2010 parliamentary elections will be even less free than those of 2005, which were far from perfect. Mubarak's son Gamal has been training to succeed him for a decade, but he remains largely unpopular in Egypt. While the Obama administration should avoid direct involvement in or public comment on succession issues, the president should encourage Mubarak to use this transition period to move toward a more inclusive political process and improved human rights practices.
It is especially important for Obama to deliver a pro-democracy message to Mubarak. It will be relatively easy to do so now, during a quiet period, without the tension of immediate elections or succession, and in a climate of renewed goodwill between the United States and Egypt.
But it is also important to correct the idea -- prevailing in Cairo -- that the United States no longer cares about democratization in Egypt. Egyptians have gotten that impression from Obama's rhetoric, which is softer than that of his predecessor, and particularly from a drastic cut in funding this year for U.S. democracy promotion programs in Egypt. A July report by the Project on Middle East Democracy found that while the Obama administration has increased its request for democracy funding in the Middle East overall, it has cut such funding for Egypt by more than half and cut aid to independent civil society organizations by more than two-thirds.
Why is the Obama administration backing off democracy promotion just as Egypt faces critical elections and a likely leadership change? It appears to be worried that Mubarak will withhold cooperation on regional peace and stability if Washington annoys him by expressing concern for the rights of Egyptians.
But Obama can have Mubarak's help without having to pay for it with his silence. Mubarak shares Washington's interests in preventing the emergence of a permanent Hamas state in Gaza, in promoting a peace agreement between Palestinians and Israel, and in containing Iranian nuclear ambitions. He will work toward those ends for his own reasons and cooperate with the United States accordingly -- as he did even at the height of the Bush administration's democracy promotion rhetoric in 2004 and 2005.
Obama should work with Mubarak on Arab-Israeli issues and Iran, and listen to the Egyptian leader's counsel. But he should also ask Mubarak how he plans to address rising demand for the rule of law and free political competition in Egypt. The U.S. administration should reconsider its disengagement from Egyptian civil society and find a way to establish partnerships with the many institutions and organizations that can play constructive roles in a transition toward a more open system.
Then Obama will have shown his respect not just for our man in Cairo but for 83 million Egyptians as well.
The writer is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and editor of the Arab Reform Bulletin.
Tuesday, 28 July 2009
A worrying Saudi backslide
By Ian Bremmer
On Friday, Saudis will celebrate the 85th birthday of Abdullah bin Abd Al-Aziz. On Sunday, they'll mark the fourth anniversary of the day he became king. For those inside and outside the kingdom hoping for deeper and broader political and social liberalization, Abdullah's reign has always been a good news/bad news story. The good news: reform has made progress. He has actively promoted "brotherly dialogue" with Christian, Jewish, Buddhist, Confucian, and other religious leaders. Media criticism of government and of the kingdom's religious conservatism has become much more commonplace. Several hardliners have been pushed from positions of power within the establishment. Abdullah's reign has encouraged female members of the royal family to campaign openly for greater rights for women, and we've seen the first appointment of a female deputy minister. These achievements haven't come easily and shouldn't be dismissed.
The bad news: reform has moved very, very slowly. The inter-faith dialogue has not created anything approaching religious freedom within the kingdom. Women are still denied rights considered fundamental in other Arab countries. Efforts to rein in the so-called Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, a religious militia that uses physical violence to enforce Wahhabi rules of dress and behavior, have produced little progress.
But a pair of recent setbacks suggests the opening of Saudi society may actually be moving from slow speed into reverse. First, despite direct early support from King Abdullah, plans to reopen public movie theaters, banned across the kingdom for the past three decades, have recently been reversed-and a Saudi film festival in Jeddah was abruptly cancelled two weeks ago. Second, the editor of a leading Saudi newspaper was fired in June after a reporter at the paper offended Interior Minister Prince Nayef bin Abd Al-Aziz by appearing to criticize the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice.
In addition, though there's nothing new about Internet censorship in the kingdom, credible rumors suggest the Saudi government may soon mandate installation of a state-owned computer chip in every Saudi computer, one that would allow authorities to track all Internet activity within the country. As with the controversial Green Dam project in China, the stated purpose would be to crack down on pornography. But, also as in China, the state officials who monitor all this traffic would be unlikely to ignore online content that poses political or social challenges for the House of Saud.
Prince Nayef, Abdullah's half-brother, is the embodiment of the conservative backlash. His clout appears to have grown with his appointment earlier this spring as second deputy prime minister, an innocuous sounding position that some fear may position him to become king following Abdullah's death. This speculation has intensified with doubts over the health of 84-year-old Crown Prince Sultan, the man most likely to replace Abdullah -- if he lives long enough.
These defeats for reform provide an early warning sign of rising levels of dissension within the Saudi elite -- and possibly of anxiety among senior members of the royal family as they begin to think more seriously about the eventual succession process.
In the near term, infighting could undermine the ongoing effort to diversify the Saudi economy -- as well as the political and social reform process. Longer-term, if Sultan dies before Abdullah, champions of reform inside and outside the kingdom will worry more openly that Nayef might one day become Saudi Arabia's king.
HASSAN AMMAR/AFP/Getty Images
On Friday, Saudis will celebrate the 85th birthday of Abdullah bin Abd Al-Aziz. On Sunday, they'll mark the fourth anniversary of the day he became king. For those inside and outside the kingdom hoping for deeper and broader political and social liberalization, Abdullah's reign has always been a good news/bad news story. The good news: reform has made progress. He has actively promoted "brotherly dialogue" with Christian, Jewish, Buddhist, Confucian, and other religious leaders. Media criticism of government and of the kingdom's religious conservatism has become much more commonplace. Several hardliners have been pushed from positions of power within the establishment. Abdullah's reign has encouraged female members of the royal family to campaign openly for greater rights for women, and we've seen the first appointment of a female deputy minister. These achievements haven't come easily and shouldn't be dismissed.
The bad news: reform has moved very, very slowly. The inter-faith dialogue has not created anything approaching religious freedom within the kingdom. Women are still denied rights considered fundamental in other Arab countries. Efforts to rein in the so-called Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, a religious militia that uses physical violence to enforce Wahhabi rules of dress and behavior, have produced little progress.
But a pair of recent setbacks suggests the opening of Saudi society may actually be moving from slow speed into reverse. First, despite direct early support from King Abdullah, plans to reopen public movie theaters, banned across the kingdom for the past three decades, have recently been reversed-and a Saudi film festival in Jeddah was abruptly cancelled two weeks ago. Second, the editor of a leading Saudi newspaper was fired in June after a reporter at the paper offended Interior Minister Prince Nayef bin Abd Al-Aziz by appearing to criticize the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice.
In addition, though there's nothing new about Internet censorship in the kingdom, credible rumors suggest the Saudi government may soon mandate installation of a state-owned computer chip in every Saudi computer, one that would allow authorities to track all Internet activity within the country. As with the controversial Green Dam project in China, the stated purpose would be to crack down on pornography. But, also as in China, the state officials who monitor all this traffic would be unlikely to ignore online content that poses political or social challenges for the House of Saud.
Prince Nayef, Abdullah's half-brother, is the embodiment of the conservative backlash. His clout appears to have grown with his appointment earlier this spring as second deputy prime minister, an innocuous sounding position that some fear may position him to become king following Abdullah's death. This speculation has intensified with doubts over the health of 84-year-old Crown Prince Sultan, the man most likely to replace Abdullah -- if he lives long enough.
These defeats for reform provide an early warning sign of rising levels of dissension within the Saudi elite -- and possibly of anxiety among senior members of the royal family as they begin to think more seriously about the eventual succession process.
In the near term, infighting could undermine the ongoing effort to diversify the Saudi economy -- as well as the political and social reform process. Longer-term, if Sultan dies before Abdullah, champions of reform inside and outside the kingdom will worry more openly that Nayef might one day become Saudi Arabia's king.
HASSAN AMMAR/AFP/Getty Images
A worrying Saudi backslide
By Ian Bremmer
On Friday, Saudis will celebrate the 85th birthday of Abdullah bin Abd Al-Aziz. On Sunday, they'll mark the fourth anniversary of the day he became king. For those inside and outside the kingdom hoping for deeper and broader political and social liberalization, Abdullah's reign has always been a good news/bad news story. The good news: reform has made progress. He has actively promoted "brotherly dialogue" with Christian, Jewish, Buddhist, Confucian, and other religious leaders. Media criticism of government and of the kingdom's religious conservatism has become much more commonplace. Several hardliners have been pushed from positions of power within the establishment. Abdullah's reign has encouraged female members of the royal family to campaign openly for greater rights for women, and we've seen the first appointment of a female deputy minister. These achievements haven't come easily and shouldn't be dismissed.
The bad news: reform has moved very, very slowly. The inter-faith dialogue has not created anything approaching religious freedom within the kingdom. Women are still denied rights considered fundamental in other Arab countries. Efforts to rein in the so-called Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, a religious militia that uses physical violence to enforce Wahhabi rules of dress and behavior, have produced little progress.
But a pair of recent setbacks suggests the opening of Saudi society may actually be moving from slow speed into reverse. First, despite direct early support from King Abdullah, plans to reopen public movie theaters, banned across the kingdom for the past three decades, have recently been reversed-and a Saudi film festival in Jeddah was abruptly cancelled two weeks ago. Second, the editor of a leading Saudi newspaper was fired in June after a reporter at the paper offended Interior Minister Prince Nayef bin Abd Al-Aziz by appearing to criticize the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice.
In addition, though there's nothing new about Internet censorship in the kingdom, credible rumors suggest the Saudi government may soon mandate installation of a state-owned computer chip in every Saudi computer, one that would allow authorities to track all Internet activity within the country. As with the controversial Green Dam project in China, the stated purpose would be to crack down on pornography. But, also as in China, the state officials who monitor all this traffic would be unlikely to ignore online content that poses political or social challenges for the House of Saud.
Prince Nayef, Abdullah's half-brother, is the embodiment of the conservative backlash. His clout appears to have grown with his appointment earlier this spring as second deputy prime minister, an innocuous sounding position that some fear may position him to become king following Abdullah's death. This speculation has intensified with doubts over the health of 84-year-old Crown Prince Sultan, the man most likely to replace Abdullah -- if he lives long enough.
These defeats for reform provide an early warning sign of rising levels of dissension within the Saudi elite -- and possibly of anxiety among senior members of the royal family as they begin to think more seriously about the eventual succession process.
In the near term, infighting could undermine the ongoing effort to diversify the Saudi economy -- as well as the political and social reform process. Longer-term, if Sultan dies before Abdullah, champions of reform inside and outside the kingdom will worry more openly that Nayef might one day become Saudi Arabia's king.
HASSAN AMMAR/AFP/Getty Images
On Friday, Saudis will celebrate the 85th birthday of Abdullah bin Abd Al-Aziz. On Sunday, they'll mark the fourth anniversary of the day he became king. For those inside and outside the kingdom hoping for deeper and broader political and social liberalization, Abdullah's reign has always been a good news/bad news story. The good news: reform has made progress. He has actively promoted "brotherly dialogue" with Christian, Jewish, Buddhist, Confucian, and other religious leaders. Media criticism of government and of the kingdom's religious conservatism has become much more commonplace. Several hardliners have been pushed from positions of power within the establishment. Abdullah's reign has encouraged female members of the royal family to campaign openly for greater rights for women, and we've seen the first appointment of a female deputy minister. These achievements haven't come easily and shouldn't be dismissed.
The bad news: reform has moved very, very slowly. The inter-faith dialogue has not created anything approaching religious freedom within the kingdom. Women are still denied rights considered fundamental in other Arab countries. Efforts to rein in the so-called Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, a religious militia that uses physical violence to enforce Wahhabi rules of dress and behavior, have produced little progress.
But a pair of recent setbacks suggests the opening of Saudi society may actually be moving from slow speed into reverse. First, despite direct early support from King Abdullah, plans to reopen public movie theaters, banned across the kingdom for the past three decades, have recently been reversed-and a Saudi film festival in Jeddah was abruptly cancelled two weeks ago. Second, the editor of a leading Saudi newspaper was fired in June after a reporter at the paper offended Interior Minister Prince Nayef bin Abd Al-Aziz by appearing to criticize the Committee for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice.
In addition, though there's nothing new about Internet censorship in the kingdom, credible rumors suggest the Saudi government may soon mandate installation of a state-owned computer chip in every Saudi computer, one that would allow authorities to track all Internet activity within the country. As with the controversial Green Dam project in China, the stated purpose would be to crack down on pornography. But, also as in China, the state officials who monitor all this traffic would be unlikely to ignore online content that poses political or social challenges for the House of Saud.
Prince Nayef, Abdullah's half-brother, is the embodiment of the conservative backlash. His clout appears to have grown with his appointment earlier this spring as second deputy prime minister, an innocuous sounding position that some fear may position him to become king following Abdullah's death. This speculation has intensified with doubts over the health of 84-year-old Crown Prince Sultan, the man most likely to replace Abdullah -- if he lives long enough.
These defeats for reform provide an early warning sign of rising levels of dissension within the Saudi elite -- and possibly of anxiety among senior members of the royal family as they begin to think more seriously about the eventual succession process.
In the near term, infighting could undermine the ongoing effort to diversify the Saudi economy -- as well as the political and social reform process. Longer-term, if Sultan dies before Abdullah, champions of reform inside and outside the kingdom will worry more openly that Nayef might one day become Saudi Arabia's king.
HASSAN AMMAR/AFP/Getty Images
Saturday, 25 July 2009
Protest Movement in Iran Fighting the Arrogance of Power
In Iran the talk is no longer simply of election fraud. The issue has long since become the regime's ignorance of the population and its contempt for their intelligence, writes the Iranian cultural journalist Parandis Ahmadi*
| Bild: Protests in Iran (photo: AP)
Bild vergrössern "Enough is enough!" It is above all women who have led the peaceful protests against the suspected election fraud and re-election of president Ahmadinejad | Initially the Iranians had not seen the presidential elections as worth wasting their breath on, never mind protesting about them. The debates in the run-up to the elections centred around the fact that it was clear the winner had been chosen already. Many Iranians said that the people who endorsed this system had always been murderers or thieves anyway.
Such comments and curses were always uttered in the safety of people's own homes however. Everyone was waiting for someone to come along, who would spark a new revolution. But as the Persian poet Akhavan-e Thaleth wrote:
"If there is no hope any more that a saviour such Nader Shah will come, then it is better that a destroyer such as Alexander the Great should come…" (An ironic reference to the Iranian king and successful conqueror, Nader Schah, who extended Iran's boundaries, and to Alexander, who razed Persepolis to the ground and caused the Achaemenid Persian Empire to fall.)
"Let the people starve, then they will obey!"
Iranians felt they had lost their courage, pride, the desire for freedom and even for revenge. The Iranian government had done something which Agha Mohammad Khan, a despotic Iranian king and founder of the Qajaren Dynasty, had described as the only way to control the Iranian population: "Let the people starve, then they will always obey!"
| Bild: Battle during the Iran-Iraq War (photo: AP)
Bild vergrössern During the First Gulf War, which lasted eight years in total, the Iranian civil population was mainly concerned with ensuring their personal economic survival | What has happened in the thirty years of the Islamic Republic?
Straight after the revolution countless women and men were killed, their crimes unknown, and many political leaders and opposition supporters were executed or forced into exile. Scores of young people were killed in the Iran-Iraq War; the population had to fight for its economic survival, and were mainly concerned with protecting their own families in this critical phase.
In the 1980s the Basij militias and the vice squad were not excessively concerned if people were married or not, but they did check carefully whether people had consumed any alcohol and searched their cars. If they discovered alcohol, video players, films or forbidden music cassettes they exploited their power to the full: people were imprisoned and flogged in the cells.
The "greatest sin" was for young men and women to take a walk together on the street. There was a period in which any unmarried couples they picked up were actually forced to marry.
A whole population in black
At that time our people's colours were black, grey and brown. Right from infant school children were forbidden even from wearing colourful socks.
| Bild: photo: AP
Bild vergrössern Iran's schoolchildren dressed as if in mourning: "At that time our people's colours were black, grey and brown," writes Parandis Ahmadi | At the beginning of the 1990s, with the spread of computers and the internet, the colours in people's lives changed a little. In Iran you cannot easily see people as they really are: at home they are free and colourful, but on the streets they wear black and the colours of mourning.
The cheerful colours of the different stations and sounds of diverse music eventually caused a change in society. Although satellite television is still banned in Iran, and Iranians are constantly forced to endure controls, where their homes are invaded and their satellite receivers confiscated, they soon find a way to watch the programmes again.
Step by step the people's desire for change also became visible in the clothes women chose to wear. And people wanted finally to be able to listen to whatever music they liked, not just classical, traditional Iranian music. First the state TV and radio company caved in, then the ministries for culture and Islamic leadership ("Ershad").
The bleached-out colour of war
In the Khatami era rock and pop music was heard alongside classical and traditional music. Theatre and cinema took new paths, with more contemporary subjects. The colour of war slowly receded beneath the colours of life. At the same time political and legal demands smouldered like glowing embers beneath the ashes.
| Bild: Mohammed Khatami during a speech given at the University of Tehran in 2004 (photo: AP)
Bild vergrössern A democratic beacon of hope turned disappointment to many reformist Iranians: during Khatami's period in office the chain murders of intellectuals and the suppression of the student protests of 1999 occurred | Because they saw a chance for reform within the existing political framework, people who were satisfied with the changes offered said "yes" to Khatami.
Freedom is a right which you have to take, and the people wanted to achieve this freedom, gently, step by step. Khatami's eight year period in office, which was more of a fight within the system than a fight for the wishes of the people, ended with imprisonments and attacks: the "chain murders" of countless opposition supporters and writers and the bloody suppression of the student protests on 9 July 1999, the "Eighteenth of Tir", in which many people were killed or incarcerated.
Black uniformed special police units were deployed to lock up anyone letting loud music be heard from their cars, along with any unmarried young people driving around the city. The presence of so much black spread fear and terror among the people.
Presidential elections with serious consequences
Then came the elections of 2005 when, thanks to low voter turnout, Mahmud Ahmadinejad was able to gain power. Till then few people even knew his name. Other presidential candidates spoke of fraud, but no significant protest took place.
Four years later and the people now knew how serious the consequences of the choice between bad and worse really can be. Many Iranians had been subjected to insults and incarceration from the vice squad, who clearly wanted to suppress the protests of the women's movement in its infancy. "We are the people who call the shots", was their message.
Together with the special units who, according to their own statements, were intended to drive the riffraff out of Tehran, this was the beginning of a military regime. The people were supposed to learn to conform and keep their mouths shut.
The slogan "Drug addiction is bad!" was plastered all over billboards and hoardings throughout the city. But where did all those illegal substances come from? Addiction and prostitution – and the health problems associated with them – increased rapidly over these four years.
"Down with Ahmadinejad!"
| Bild: photo: AP
Bild vergrössern After Ahmadinejad's election in 2005 the reform process begun under Khatami came to an abrupt end. The political pressure from civilian society has increased steadily since then | Most people therefore decided to participate in the next elections and give one of the other three candidates their vote, none of them could be a worse president than Ahmadinejad. People in Iran were becoming visibly poorer each day, yet luxury vehicles could be seen on the streets of Tehran, cars which were more expensive on the Iranian market than anywhere else in the world. In short: the president was subject to enormous criticism by this point.
During the election campaign the people raised the courage to go out onto the streets and support their candidates. This had never occurred once in the previous thirty years. The announcement of the election results finally pushed people over the edge.
A group of young women and men took on the organisation of the protest marches. They asked people to stay calm and simply raise their hands as a sign of protest. With their mere presence millions of Iranians showed their opposition to the regime. Khamenei's pronouncements caused the people's anger and determination to keep growing, leading to violence and death.
Slogans aimed at the entire political system
Up until Khamenei's speech at Friday prayers the people had simply been demanding an investigation into election fraud. After this their slogans were aimed at the entire political system. Now there is no more talk of election fraud. The issue is now the regime's ignorance of the people and its apparent contempt for their intelligence. Religious reformers have been imprisoned, in order to show that even people from the system's own ranks cannot expect to be treated tolerantly.
During all these events, one issue has been forgotten. Over the last thirty years Iranians have never known their government to reveal its cards. Given the powers the constitution allows the president, if Mir Hussein Mussawi were to be elected there might still be no change.
The most that could be hoped for would be a repeat of the Khatami era. Who has actually benefited from all this unrest?
Parandis Ahmadi
*The author's name changed by the editor for security reasons.
| Bild: Protests in Iran (photo: AP)
Bild vergrössern "Enough is enough!" It is above all women who have led the peaceful protests against the suspected election fraud and re-election of president Ahmadinejad | Initially the Iranians had not seen the presidential elections as worth wasting their breath on, never mind protesting about them. The debates in the run-up to the elections centred around the fact that it was clear the winner had been chosen already. Many Iranians said that the people who endorsed this system had always been murderers or thieves anyway.
Such comments and curses were always uttered in the safety of people's own homes however. Everyone was waiting for someone to come along, who would spark a new revolution. But as the Persian poet Akhavan-e Thaleth wrote:
"If there is no hope any more that a saviour such Nader Shah will come, then it is better that a destroyer such as Alexander the Great should come…" (An ironic reference to the Iranian king and successful conqueror, Nader Schah, who extended Iran's boundaries, and to Alexander, who razed Persepolis to the ground and caused the Achaemenid Persian Empire to fall.)
"Let the people starve, then they will obey!"
Iranians felt they had lost their courage, pride, the desire for freedom and even for revenge. The Iranian government had done something which Agha Mohammad Khan, a despotic Iranian king and founder of the Qajaren Dynasty, had described as the only way to control the Iranian population: "Let the people starve, then they will always obey!"
| Bild: Battle during the Iran-Iraq War (photo: AP)
Bild vergrössern During the First Gulf War, which lasted eight years in total, the Iranian civil population was mainly concerned with ensuring their personal economic survival | What has happened in the thirty years of the Islamic Republic?
Straight after the revolution countless women and men were killed, their crimes unknown, and many political leaders and opposition supporters were executed or forced into exile. Scores of young people were killed in the Iran-Iraq War; the population had to fight for its economic survival, and were mainly concerned with protecting their own families in this critical phase.
In the 1980s the Basij militias and the vice squad were not excessively concerned if people were married or not, but they did check carefully whether people had consumed any alcohol and searched their cars. If they discovered alcohol, video players, films or forbidden music cassettes they exploited their power to the full: people were imprisoned and flogged in the cells.
The "greatest sin" was for young men and women to take a walk together on the street. There was a period in which any unmarried couples they picked up were actually forced to marry.
A whole population in black
At that time our people's colours were black, grey and brown. Right from infant school children were forbidden even from wearing colourful socks.
| Bild: photo: AP
Bild vergrössern Iran's schoolchildren dressed as if in mourning: "At that time our people's colours were black, grey and brown," writes Parandis Ahmadi | At the beginning of the 1990s, with the spread of computers and the internet, the colours in people's lives changed a little. In Iran you cannot easily see people as they really are: at home they are free and colourful, but on the streets they wear black and the colours of mourning.
The cheerful colours of the different stations and sounds of diverse music eventually caused a change in society. Although satellite television is still banned in Iran, and Iranians are constantly forced to endure controls, where their homes are invaded and their satellite receivers confiscated, they soon find a way to watch the programmes again.
Step by step the people's desire for change also became visible in the clothes women chose to wear. And people wanted finally to be able to listen to whatever music they liked, not just classical, traditional Iranian music. First the state TV and radio company caved in, then the ministries for culture and Islamic leadership ("Ershad").
The bleached-out colour of war
In the Khatami era rock and pop music was heard alongside classical and traditional music. Theatre and cinema took new paths, with more contemporary subjects. The colour of war slowly receded beneath the colours of life. At the same time political and legal demands smouldered like glowing embers beneath the ashes.
| Bild: Mohammed Khatami during a speech given at the University of Tehran in 2004 (photo: AP)
Bild vergrössern A democratic beacon of hope turned disappointment to many reformist Iranians: during Khatami's period in office the chain murders of intellectuals and the suppression of the student protests of 1999 occurred | Because they saw a chance for reform within the existing political framework, people who were satisfied with the changes offered said "yes" to Khatami.
Freedom is a right which you have to take, and the people wanted to achieve this freedom, gently, step by step. Khatami's eight year period in office, which was more of a fight within the system than a fight for the wishes of the people, ended with imprisonments and attacks: the "chain murders" of countless opposition supporters and writers and the bloody suppression of the student protests on 9 July 1999, the "Eighteenth of Tir", in which many people were killed or incarcerated.
Black uniformed special police units were deployed to lock up anyone letting loud music be heard from their cars, along with any unmarried young people driving around the city. The presence of so much black spread fear and terror among the people.
Presidential elections with serious consequences
Then came the elections of 2005 when, thanks to low voter turnout, Mahmud Ahmadinejad was able to gain power. Till then few people even knew his name. Other presidential candidates spoke of fraud, but no significant protest took place.
Four years later and the people now knew how serious the consequences of the choice between bad and worse really can be. Many Iranians had been subjected to insults and incarceration from the vice squad, who clearly wanted to suppress the protests of the women's movement in its infancy. "We are the people who call the shots", was their message.
Together with the special units who, according to their own statements, were intended to drive the riffraff out of Tehran, this was the beginning of a military regime. The people were supposed to learn to conform and keep their mouths shut.
The slogan "Drug addiction is bad!" was plastered all over billboards and hoardings throughout the city. But where did all those illegal substances come from? Addiction and prostitution – and the health problems associated with them – increased rapidly over these four years.
"Down with Ahmadinejad!"
| Bild: photo: AP
Bild vergrössern After Ahmadinejad's election in 2005 the reform process begun under Khatami came to an abrupt end. The political pressure from civilian society has increased steadily since then | Most people therefore decided to participate in the next elections and give one of the other three candidates their vote, none of them could be a worse president than Ahmadinejad. People in Iran were becoming visibly poorer each day, yet luxury vehicles could be seen on the streets of Tehran, cars which were more expensive on the Iranian market than anywhere else in the world. In short: the president was subject to enormous criticism by this point.
During the election campaign the people raised the courage to go out onto the streets and support their candidates. This had never occurred once in the previous thirty years. The announcement of the election results finally pushed people over the edge.
A group of young women and men took on the organisation of the protest marches. They asked people to stay calm and simply raise their hands as a sign of protest. With their mere presence millions of Iranians showed their opposition to the regime. Khamenei's pronouncements caused the people's anger and determination to keep growing, leading to violence and death.
Slogans aimed at the entire political system
Up until Khamenei's speech at Friday prayers the people had simply been demanding an investigation into election fraud. After this their slogans were aimed at the entire political system. Now there is no more talk of election fraud. The issue is now the regime's ignorance of the people and its apparent contempt for their intelligence. Religious reformers have been imprisoned, in order to show that even people from the system's own ranks cannot expect to be treated tolerantly.
During all these events, one issue has been forgotten. Over the last thirty years Iranians have never known their government to reveal its cards. Given the powers the constitution allows the president, if Mir Hussein Mussawi were to be elected there might still be no change.
The most that could be hoped for would be a repeat of the Khatami era. Who has actually benefited from all this unrest?
Parandis Ahmadi
*The author's name changed by the editor for security reasons.
Friday, 17 July 2009
Israel to drop Arabic names
NAZARETH, ISRAEL // Thousands of road signs are the latest front in Israel’s battle to erase the Arab heritage from much of the Holy Land, according to critics in both Israel and the wider Arab world.
Israel Katz, the transport minister, announced this week that signs on all major roads in Israel, East Jerusalem and possibly parts of the West Bank would be “standardised”, converting English and Arabic place names into straight transliterations of the Hebrew name.
Currently, road signs include the place name as it is traditionally rendered in all three languages.
Under the new scheme, the Arab identity of important Palestinian communities will be obscured: Jerusalem, or “al Quds” in Arabic, will be Hebraised to “Yerushalayim”; Nazareth, or “al Nasra” in Arabic, the city of Jesus’s childhood, will become “Natzrat”; and Jaffa, the port city after which Palestine’s oranges were named, will be “Yafo”.
Arab leaders are concerned that Mr Katz’s plan offers a foretaste of the demand by Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, that the Palestinians recognise Israel as a Jewish state.
On Wednesday, Mohammed Sabih, a senior official at the Arab League, called the initiative “racist and dangerous”.
“This decision comes in the framework of a series of steps in Israel aimed at implementing the ‘Jewish State’ slogan on the ground.”
Palestinians in Israel and Jerusalem, meanwhile, have responded with alarm to a policy they believe is designed to make them ever less visible.
Ahmed Tibi, an Arab legislator in the Israeli parliament, said: “Minister Katz is mistaken if he thinks that changing a few words can erase the existence of the Arab people or their connection to Israel.”
The transport ministry has made little effort to conceal the political motivation behind its policy of Hebraising road signs.
In announcing the move on Monday, Mr Katz, a hawkish member of Likud, Mr Netanyahu’s right-wing party, said he objected to Palestinians using the names of communities that existed before Israel’s establishment in 1948.
“I will not allow that on our signs,” he said. “This government, and certainly this minister, will not allow anyone to turn Jewish Jerusalem into Palestinian al Quds.”
Other Israeli officials have played down the political significance of Mr Katz’s decision. A transport department spokesman, Yeshaayahu Ronen, said: “The lack of uniform spelling on signs has been a problem for those speaking foreign languages, citizens and tourists alike.”
“That’s ridiculous,” responded Tareq Shehadeh, head of the Nazareth Cultural and Tourism Association. “Does the ministry really think it’s helping tourists by renaming Nazareth, one of the most famous places in the world, ‘Natzrat’, a Hebrew name only Israeli Jews recognise?”
Meron Benvenisti, a former deputy mayor of Jerusalem, said Israel had begun interfering with the Arabic on the signs for East Jerusalem as soon as it occupied the city in 1967. It invented a new word, “Urshalim”, that was supposed to be the Arabic form of the Hebrew word for Jerusalem, “Yerushalayim”.
“I was among those who intervened at the time to get the word ‘al Quds’ placed on signs, too, after ‘Urshalim’ and separated by a hyphen. But over the years ‘al Quds’ was demoted to brackets and nowadays it’s not included on new signs at all.”
He said Mr Katz’s scheme would push this process even further by requiring not only the Arabic equivalent of the Hebrew word for Jerusalem, but the replication of the Hebrew spelling as well. “It’s completely chauvinistic and an insult,” he said.
Meir Margalit, a former Jerusalem councillor, said official policy was to make the Palestinian population in East Jerusalem as invisible as possible, including by ignoring their neighbourhoods on many signs.
The transport ministry’s plans for the West Bank are less clear. In his announcement Mr Katz said Palestinian-controlled areas of the territory would still be free to use proper Arabic place names. But he hinted that signs in the 60 per cent of the West Bank under Israeli military rule would be Hebraised, too.
That could mean Palestinians driving across parts of the West Bank to the Palestinian city of Nablus, for example, will have to look for the Hebrew name “Shechem” spelt out in Arabic.
Mr Benvenisti said that, after Israel’s establishment in 1948, a naming committee was given the task of erasing thousands of Arab place names, including those of hills, valleys and springs, and creating Hebrew names. The country’s first prime minister, David Ben Gurion, told the committee: “We are obliged to remove the Arabic names for reasons of state.”
In addition, the Arabic names of more than 400 Palestinian villages destroyed by Israel during and after the 1948 war were lost as Jewish communities took their place.
Israel’s surviving Palestinian minority, today one-fifth of the population, have had to battle in the courts for the inclusion of Arabic on road signs, despite Arabic being an official language.
Many signs on national highways were provided only in Hebrew and English until the courts in 1999 insisted Arabic be included. Three years later the courts ruled that Arabic must also be included on signs in cities where a significant number of Arabs live.
However, as the political climate has shifted rightward in Israel, there has been a backlash, including an unsuccessful bid by legislators to end Arabic’s status as an official language last year.
Recently the Israeli media revealed that nationalist groups have been spraying over Arabic names on road signs, especially in the Jerusalem area. Israel has also antagonised Palestinians in both Israel and the West Bank by naming roads after right-wing figures.
The main motorway in the Jordan Valley, which runs through Palestinian territory but is used by Israelis to drive between northern Israel and Jerusalem, is named “Gandhi’s Road” – not for the Indian spiritual leader but after the nickname of an Israeli general, Rehavam Zeevi, who called for the expulsion of Palestinians from Greater Israel.
Israel Katz, the transport minister, announced this week that signs on all major roads in Israel, East Jerusalem and possibly parts of the West Bank would be “standardised”, converting English and Arabic place names into straight transliterations of the Hebrew name.
Currently, road signs include the place name as it is traditionally rendered in all three languages.
Under the new scheme, the Arab identity of important Palestinian communities will be obscured: Jerusalem, or “al Quds” in Arabic, will be Hebraised to “Yerushalayim”; Nazareth, or “al Nasra” in Arabic, the city of Jesus’s childhood, will become “Natzrat”; and Jaffa, the port city after which Palestine’s oranges were named, will be “Yafo”.
Arab leaders are concerned that Mr Katz’s plan offers a foretaste of the demand by Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, that the Palestinians recognise Israel as a Jewish state.
On Wednesday, Mohammed Sabih, a senior official at the Arab League, called the initiative “racist and dangerous”.
“This decision comes in the framework of a series of steps in Israel aimed at implementing the ‘Jewish State’ slogan on the ground.”
Palestinians in Israel and Jerusalem, meanwhile, have responded with alarm to a policy they believe is designed to make them ever less visible.
Ahmed Tibi, an Arab legislator in the Israeli parliament, said: “Minister Katz is mistaken if he thinks that changing a few words can erase the existence of the Arab people or their connection to Israel.”
The transport ministry has made little effort to conceal the political motivation behind its policy of Hebraising road signs.
In announcing the move on Monday, Mr Katz, a hawkish member of Likud, Mr Netanyahu’s right-wing party, said he objected to Palestinians using the names of communities that existed before Israel’s establishment in 1948.
“I will not allow that on our signs,” he said. “This government, and certainly this minister, will not allow anyone to turn Jewish Jerusalem into Palestinian al Quds.”
Other Israeli officials have played down the political significance of Mr Katz’s decision. A transport department spokesman, Yeshaayahu Ronen, said: “The lack of uniform spelling on signs has been a problem for those speaking foreign languages, citizens and tourists alike.”
“That’s ridiculous,” responded Tareq Shehadeh, head of the Nazareth Cultural and Tourism Association. “Does the ministry really think it’s helping tourists by renaming Nazareth, one of the most famous places in the world, ‘Natzrat’, a Hebrew name only Israeli Jews recognise?”
Meron Benvenisti, a former deputy mayor of Jerusalem, said Israel had begun interfering with the Arabic on the signs for East Jerusalem as soon as it occupied the city in 1967. It invented a new word, “Urshalim”, that was supposed to be the Arabic form of the Hebrew word for Jerusalem, “Yerushalayim”.
“I was among those who intervened at the time to get the word ‘al Quds’ placed on signs, too, after ‘Urshalim’ and separated by a hyphen. But over the years ‘al Quds’ was demoted to brackets and nowadays it’s not included on new signs at all.”
He said Mr Katz’s scheme would push this process even further by requiring not only the Arabic equivalent of the Hebrew word for Jerusalem, but the replication of the Hebrew spelling as well. “It’s completely chauvinistic and an insult,” he said.
Meir Margalit, a former Jerusalem councillor, said official policy was to make the Palestinian population in East Jerusalem as invisible as possible, including by ignoring their neighbourhoods on many signs.
The transport ministry’s plans for the West Bank are less clear. In his announcement Mr Katz said Palestinian-controlled areas of the territory would still be free to use proper Arabic place names. But he hinted that signs in the 60 per cent of the West Bank under Israeli military rule would be Hebraised, too.
That could mean Palestinians driving across parts of the West Bank to the Palestinian city of Nablus, for example, will have to look for the Hebrew name “Shechem” spelt out in Arabic.
Mr Benvenisti said that, after Israel’s establishment in 1948, a naming committee was given the task of erasing thousands of Arab place names, including those of hills, valleys and springs, and creating Hebrew names. The country’s first prime minister, David Ben Gurion, told the committee: “We are obliged to remove the Arabic names for reasons of state.”
In addition, the Arabic names of more than 400 Palestinian villages destroyed by Israel during and after the 1948 war were lost as Jewish communities took their place.
Israel’s surviving Palestinian minority, today one-fifth of the population, have had to battle in the courts for the inclusion of Arabic on road signs, despite Arabic being an official language.
Many signs on national highways were provided only in Hebrew and English until the courts in 1999 insisted Arabic be included. Three years later the courts ruled that Arabic must also be included on signs in cities where a significant number of Arabs live.
However, as the political climate has shifted rightward in Israel, there has been a backlash, including an unsuccessful bid by legislators to end Arabic’s status as an official language last year.
Recently the Israeli media revealed that nationalist groups have been spraying over Arabic names on road signs, especially in the Jerusalem area. Israel has also antagonised Palestinians in both Israel and the West Bank by naming roads after right-wing figures.
The main motorway in the Jordan Valley, which runs through Palestinian territory but is used by Israelis to drive between northern Israel and Jerusalem, is named “Gandhi’s Road” – not for the Indian spiritual leader but after the nickname of an Israeli general, Rehavam Zeevi, who called for the expulsion of Palestinians from Greater Israel.
Wednesday, 15 July 2009
Trouble brewing in Tajikistan
Mirzo Ziyoyev's battle-hardened lieutenants watched us closely from the fields of his farmstead, as we drove up in our four-wheel drive vehicle.
We had come to the Rasht valley, a geographical area that includes several smaller valleys, to meet the former military chief of staff of the Tajik Islamist opposition.
Although welcomed as guests and given tea and bread, as is the custom, we did not have an invitation.
"Regional and Russian media has speculated that groups like the [Taliban-linked] Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan may once again be trickling back into Central Asia"
Ziyoyev's men told us he was not available for comment, and we were politely given the signal to leave.
As we pulled away from the village it was becoming clear that things were not well between the powerful former warlord and the powers that be in the capital Dushanbe.
A week later, on July 11, Ziyoyev was dead.
In a press conference held by the interior ministry after the weekend, officials said Ziyoyev had died in the crossfire of a shootout between a militant Islamist group he had joined and Tajik police officers.
Ziyoyev was apparently already in police custody, but had agreed to go with officers to try to persuade other members to surrender when they came under fire.
He was also, it is alleged, about to reveal the whereabouts of a weapons cache.
Until now, the government has officially denied its operations in the Rasht valley - which have been going on since early May - were anything more serious than an annual anti-narcotics campaign.
This year's operation, known as Poppy 2009, is aimed at tackling poppy cultivation and the vast quantities of heroin and opium that are trafficked through the country from Afghanistan, and on to Europe.
More than just drugs
IN VIDEO
Afghan unrest puts Tajikistan on alert
More videos ...
But, after weeks of rumour and speculation among the Tajik press and foreign diplomatic community, the government has now acknowledged for the first time that its enemies in the Rasht valley may be more than just drug smugglers.
A written statement issued by the interior ministry after the press conference includes a dramatic claim: That the group Ziyoyev had joined is led by an operative of the Taliban-linked Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and that the group has been smuggling drugs through Rasht to finance "terrorism".
In neighbouring Garm valley, we met Mirzokhujo Ahmadov.
Like Ziyoyev, Ahmadov is another bearded Islamist commander from Tajikistan's 1992-97 civil war.
The conflict was broadly fought between government forces and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) - a coalition of Islamists and secular reformists.
Former Islamist commanders such as Ziyoyev and Ahmadov were eventually integrated into the government as part of a peace agreement brokered by the UN.
Ziyoyev was given a cabinet role. He had been emergencies minister until his dismissal in 2006. Ahmadov had headed a regional anti-crime unit.
Emomali Rahmon, the president, has since been accused by international observers - including the International Crisis Group - of conducting a shrewd policy of sidelining, imprisoning and co-opting his opposition.
That is certainly a view shared by Ahmadov.
Ahmadov says the government is using the drugs crackdown to sideline opposition leaders
Speaking from the relative security of his walled compound, Ahamadov believes the operation in the Rasht valley is simply the administration's latest effort to arrest or eliminate surviving members of the opposition.
"The reconciliation that was made in 1997 wasn't trustworthy and if the government had accepted it, as we accepted it, this would never have happened. It they were trustworthy, they wouldn't be chasing us now."
Ahmadov is also without a job. His anti-crime team was disbanded following an investigation into the death in 2008 of a commanding officer from a special police unit, who was killed in a gun battle with Ahmadov's supporters.
No one is really certain whether Rahmon pardoned him as he claims, or whether the state prosecutor intends to pursue the case.
But that is the murky, uncertain world of Tajik politics.
Now, Ahmadov has told Al Jazeera that he and his supporters are ready to fight again, if necessary.
"We are supporters of peace. But if we can’t stay in peace even in our own homes we will have to start fighting," he says.
The Tavildara area of the Rasht valley is isolated mountainous terrain, within easy trekking distance of the Afghan border.
For the Islamists who formed the backbone of the UTO during the civil war, Rasht was their stronghold.
After 1997, Tavildara became a haven for the IMU, which sought to support their UTO comrades in arms.
The IMU also used Rasht as a base to carry out attacks against Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000, but was eventually forced to relocate to Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.
Since government forces began their Poppy 2009 operation in Tavildara in early May, rumours have abounded that the campaign has been a cover to intercept former fighters who might have returned there.
Euros and roubles
In trying to verify these rumours, Al Jazeera was able to access much of the Tavildara region after registering at a series of police checkpoints.
We met a respected elder whose work requires him to travel widely across the region.
The elder, who did not wish to be named, said that before the trouble started, two drivers told him they had driven "strange-looking" foreign men from Dushanbe to an isolated village nearby.
"They had suitcases filled with bread and sweets," he learnt from their conversation, "and they tried to pay with euros and Russian roubles. What can we do with roubles and euros?"
When we attempted to access the remote villages around which the operation has been centred, we encountered an armed unit of the Tajik KGB from the interior ministry.
The government has issued footage of staged anti-narcotics operations
Our investigation on the ground ended after troops threatened our driver and the commanding officer told us, in no uncertain terms, that we could go no further.
Since Al Jazeera visited the valley, fighting has been reported even in the administrative town of Tavildara.
In press statements issued over the past week, the interior ministry has now confirmed that troops have been involved in skirmishes with heavily armed men.
Both sides, according to the ministry, have taken casualties.
Before the shootout which the government claims ended the life of Ziyoyev, the most significant incident happened earlier in the week when, on the July 8, gunmen "attempted to take over the administrative centre of Tavildara", an interior ministry press release states.
It is also claimed that in recent operations five Chechens were among a number of suspects arrested.
Foreign hand?
There appears to be a consensus among analysts and the diplomatic community that these events in Tavildara may be more than just a domestic fight between former Islamists and the government.
If foreign fighters were to have infiltrated Tajik territory, they may have required assistance.
Parviz Mullojanov, an independent regional analyst, says: "There is a lot of information coming out of different sources that there was such a group of people that crossed the border and moved further into other Central Asian countries.
"It looks like an intelligence service operation which wasn't designed in Tajikistan. There is a power which may be trying to influence the region as a whole."
Then there have been reports that the fighting could be related to an intensifying conflict in the tribal border region of Pakistan.
Intelligence sources believe IMU fighters who fought for the Taliban after the 9/11 attacks on the US, later relocated to the Pakistani tribal areas.
Regional and Russian media has speculated in recent weeks that groups such as the IMU may once again be trickling back into Central Asia, to re-ignite a dormant conflict against the governments there.
Lately there has been a string of incidents in Fergana, the Central Asian region from which the IMU originates and which straddles the borders of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
These have included an alleged suicide bombing in Uzbekistan and raids on houses in Kyrgyzstan in which suspected fighters were killed.
It is possible that these events are simply a coincidence. Given a consistent lack of openness shared by all governments within the region, Central Asia is fertile territory for rumours.
But to make the connection would support the arguments of observers who have been warning of wider regional unrest for some time.
Such theories will only be tested in the coming weeks and months.
We had come to the Rasht valley, a geographical area that includes several smaller valleys, to meet the former military chief of staff of the Tajik Islamist opposition.
Although welcomed as guests and given tea and bread, as is the custom, we did not have an invitation.
"Regional and Russian media has speculated that groups like the [Taliban-linked] Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan may once again be trickling back into Central Asia"
Ziyoyev's men told us he was not available for comment, and we were politely given the signal to leave.
As we pulled away from the village it was becoming clear that things were not well between the powerful former warlord and the powers that be in the capital Dushanbe.
A week later, on July 11, Ziyoyev was dead.
In a press conference held by the interior ministry after the weekend, officials said Ziyoyev had died in the crossfire of a shootout between a militant Islamist group he had joined and Tajik police officers.
Ziyoyev was apparently already in police custody, but had agreed to go with officers to try to persuade other members to surrender when they came under fire.
He was also, it is alleged, about to reveal the whereabouts of a weapons cache.
Until now, the government has officially denied its operations in the Rasht valley - which have been going on since early May - were anything more serious than an annual anti-narcotics campaign.
This year's operation, known as Poppy 2009, is aimed at tackling poppy cultivation and the vast quantities of heroin and opium that are trafficked through the country from Afghanistan, and on to Europe.
More than just drugs
IN VIDEO
Afghan unrest puts Tajikistan on alert
More videos ...
But, after weeks of rumour and speculation among the Tajik press and foreign diplomatic community, the government has now acknowledged for the first time that its enemies in the Rasht valley may be more than just drug smugglers.
A written statement issued by the interior ministry after the press conference includes a dramatic claim: That the group Ziyoyev had joined is led by an operative of the Taliban-linked Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and that the group has been smuggling drugs through Rasht to finance "terrorism".
In neighbouring Garm valley, we met Mirzokhujo Ahmadov.
Like Ziyoyev, Ahmadov is another bearded Islamist commander from Tajikistan's 1992-97 civil war.
The conflict was broadly fought between government forces and the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) - a coalition of Islamists and secular reformists.
Former Islamist commanders such as Ziyoyev and Ahmadov were eventually integrated into the government as part of a peace agreement brokered by the UN.
Ziyoyev was given a cabinet role. He had been emergencies minister until his dismissal in 2006. Ahmadov had headed a regional anti-crime unit.
Emomali Rahmon, the president, has since been accused by international observers - including the International Crisis Group - of conducting a shrewd policy of sidelining, imprisoning and co-opting his opposition.
That is certainly a view shared by Ahmadov.
Ahmadov says the government is using the drugs crackdown to sideline opposition leaders
Speaking from the relative security of his walled compound, Ahamadov believes the operation in the Rasht valley is simply the administration's latest effort to arrest or eliminate surviving members of the opposition.
"The reconciliation that was made in 1997 wasn't trustworthy and if the government had accepted it, as we accepted it, this would never have happened. It they were trustworthy, they wouldn't be chasing us now."
Ahmadov is also without a job. His anti-crime team was disbanded following an investigation into the death in 2008 of a commanding officer from a special police unit, who was killed in a gun battle with Ahmadov's supporters.
No one is really certain whether Rahmon pardoned him as he claims, or whether the state prosecutor intends to pursue the case.
But that is the murky, uncertain world of Tajik politics.
Now, Ahmadov has told Al Jazeera that he and his supporters are ready to fight again, if necessary.
"We are supporters of peace. But if we can’t stay in peace even in our own homes we will have to start fighting," he says.
The Tavildara area of the Rasht valley is isolated mountainous terrain, within easy trekking distance of the Afghan border.
For the Islamists who formed the backbone of the UTO during the civil war, Rasht was their stronghold.
After 1997, Tavildara became a haven for the IMU, which sought to support their UTO comrades in arms.
The IMU also used Rasht as a base to carry out attacks against Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in 1999 and 2000, but was eventually forced to relocate to Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.
Since government forces began their Poppy 2009 operation in Tavildara in early May, rumours have abounded that the campaign has been a cover to intercept former fighters who might have returned there.
Euros and roubles
In trying to verify these rumours, Al Jazeera was able to access much of the Tavildara region after registering at a series of police checkpoints.
We met a respected elder whose work requires him to travel widely across the region.
The elder, who did not wish to be named, said that before the trouble started, two drivers told him they had driven "strange-looking" foreign men from Dushanbe to an isolated village nearby.
"They had suitcases filled with bread and sweets," he learnt from their conversation, "and they tried to pay with euros and Russian roubles. What can we do with roubles and euros?"
When we attempted to access the remote villages around which the operation has been centred, we encountered an armed unit of the Tajik KGB from the interior ministry.
The government has issued footage of staged anti-narcotics operations
Our investigation on the ground ended after troops threatened our driver and the commanding officer told us, in no uncertain terms, that we could go no further.
Since Al Jazeera visited the valley, fighting has been reported even in the administrative town of Tavildara.
In press statements issued over the past week, the interior ministry has now confirmed that troops have been involved in skirmishes with heavily armed men.
Both sides, according to the ministry, have taken casualties.
Before the shootout which the government claims ended the life of Ziyoyev, the most significant incident happened earlier in the week when, on the July 8, gunmen "attempted to take over the administrative centre of Tavildara", an interior ministry press release states.
It is also claimed that in recent operations five Chechens were among a number of suspects arrested.
Foreign hand?
There appears to be a consensus among analysts and the diplomatic community that these events in Tavildara may be more than just a domestic fight between former Islamists and the government.
If foreign fighters were to have infiltrated Tajik territory, they may have required assistance.
Parviz Mullojanov, an independent regional analyst, says: "There is a lot of information coming out of different sources that there was such a group of people that crossed the border and moved further into other Central Asian countries.
"It looks like an intelligence service operation which wasn't designed in Tajikistan. There is a power which may be trying to influence the region as a whole."
Then there have been reports that the fighting could be related to an intensifying conflict in the tribal border region of Pakistan.
Intelligence sources believe IMU fighters who fought for the Taliban after the 9/11 attacks on the US, later relocated to the Pakistani tribal areas.
Regional and Russian media has speculated in recent weeks that groups such as the IMU may once again be trickling back into Central Asia, to re-ignite a dormant conflict against the governments there.
Lately there has been a string of incidents in Fergana, the Central Asian region from which the IMU originates and which straddles the borders of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.
These have included an alleged suicide bombing in Uzbekistan and raids on houses in Kyrgyzstan in which suspected fighters were killed.
It is possible that these events are simply a coincidence. Given a consistent lack of openness shared by all governments within the region, Central Asia is fertile territory for rumours.
But to make the connection would support the arguments of observers who have been warning of wider regional unrest for some time.
Such theories will only be tested in the coming weeks and months.
Monday, 13 July 2009
Were Syria’s conservatives just testing the water?
Most Syrians may never know that a controversial draft law, dubbed by its opponents the “Taliban initiative”, was rejected last week by the country’s parliament. Nor may they believe the level of controversy it created during the one month period after it was leaked to activists and a circle of Syrian intellectuals.
Though the chance of the draft ever becoming law may have been slim, the discussion it created provided a revealing look at the dance between ultra-conservative Islamists and their nemeses in Syria, which include secularists, the renewal movement known as Tajdeed – Islamists who aim to renew Sharia by going back to the essence of Islam – and a long list of minority groups who feel their rights would be jeopardised by an Islamic state. Whether the ultra conservatives were just testing the waters or whether they believed that their efforts would succeed is difficult to determine. What is certain is that the contents of their draft law would have sent Syria back centuries in time, and would have probably shocked most Syrians, especially women and minorities, if only they had known about it.
The draft law managed to circumvent all the usual channels that the public relies upon to remain informed of the latest legislation proposed in the government. Draft laws usually show up in the local press, generating reaction from readers, but in this case the press was banned from covering it. The Syrian parliament also posts draft laws on a website so affected parties have a chance to comment, but again, not in this case.
The reasons behind these cloak and dagger tactics were unclear. If it hadn’t been for a leak in early June, not even the activists would have learnt of it.
Even more mysterious, the law was the product of a secret committee commissioned by the head of parliament, the Syrian prime minister Naji al Otri. The committee worked on the draft for two years, and until now the names of the committee members could only be guessed at, except for one man, Hassan Awad, a professor at the Sharia law school in Damascus who came forward on public radio. Mr Awad is now in Sudan doing research, and he did not respond to repeated queries asking him to comment.
The draft law would have required women to travel only if accompanied by a mahram, a close male relative. A loophole in the draft law would have allowed a Christian man to take on a second wife and Christians would have discovered their right to divorce, despite any objections from their own church. As Father Antone Musleh, a patriarch of the Orthodox Church, put it: “The draft law dares to infringe on marriage within Christianity, which to the Church is a sacrament. It’s a Divine hand that plays into the life of humans, and the Church is the first and last party responsible for interpreting this for its flock.”
The draft law provided that a girl as young as 13 could take her parents to court and make the judge pressure them to allow her to marry.
A complete stranger could sue the couple next door if he thought one of them had become an apostate, which is enough reason to annul their marriage before a Sharia court.
“This is the most dangerous part of the draft law, the introduction of apostasy legal code,” said Dr Mohammed Habash, a parliamentarian and Islamic scholar and one of the leading figures of the renewal movement in Syria.
Apostasy laws were used for decades during Islam’s beginnings, usually with the purpose of punishing men who defected from a Muslim army to join the enemy’s lines at a time of war. But used in the context of the draft law’s proposal, Dr Habash explained, apostasy laws “undermine the family, which is the essence of society’s fabric”.
This law, known also as hasba, was used infamously in Egypt in 2001 by Islamists who tried to annul the marriage of Nawal al Saadawi, a feminist author, after deeming her an apostate for her writings. An Egyptian emergency court overturned the verdict after an international outcry.
Perhaps most absurdly, the “Taliban initiative” would have technically prohibited the legal marriage of any apostate, even to another non-believer.
The Syrian foreign minister Walid al Muallem told me during an outing with his family: “The president has already said he will not sanction it. It’s already dead in the water.”
But in the meantime, in true Syrian form, there were conflicting statements from the people’s assembly, who said that the draft law was thrown out, and the parliament, which insisted it was “still under review”.
Opponents breathed a sigh of relief when one week later parliament issued a statement saying it “rejected the contents of the draft law”, sending it back to the Ministry of Justice “to take a fresh look at the issue”.
But at least one activist thinks this development is a small victory for real reform in Syria. He has already pledged to keep “a very close eye on extremist views, and to publish them for everyone to know”. He is also launching an aggressive campaign to push for progressive reforms, such as ensuring better rights for divorced women, allowing all mothers to pass on to their children Syrian citizenship and to better address domestic violence and child abuse.
“Starting today, we will knock on the doors of official and non-official organisations, political and religious, everyone, and hold them responsible for all the issues that affect women and children in Syria,” he said.
“No more usual excuses like ‘this is because of cultural norms and traditions or class warfare’. And no more procrastinations like ‘it is not the right time or we have other, more pressing issues’.”
Though the chance of the draft ever becoming law may have been slim, the discussion it created provided a revealing look at the dance between ultra-conservative Islamists and their nemeses in Syria, which include secularists, the renewal movement known as Tajdeed – Islamists who aim to renew Sharia by going back to the essence of Islam – and a long list of minority groups who feel their rights would be jeopardised by an Islamic state. Whether the ultra conservatives were just testing the waters or whether they believed that their efforts would succeed is difficult to determine. What is certain is that the contents of their draft law would have sent Syria back centuries in time, and would have probably shocked most Syrians, especially women and minorities, if only they had known about it.
The draft law managed to circumvent all the usual channels that the public relies upon to remain informed of the latest legislation proposed in the government. Draft laws usually show up in the local press, generating reaction from readers, but in this case the press was banned from covering it. The Syrian parliament also posts draft laws on a website so affected parties have a chance to comment, but again, not in this case.
The reasons behind these cloak and dagger tactics were unclear. If it hadn’t been for a leak in early June, not even the activists would have learnt of it.
Even more mysterious, the law was the product of a secret committee commissioned by the head of parliament, the Syrian prime minister Naji al Otri. The committee worked on the draft for two years, and until now the names of the committee members could only be guessed at, except for one man, Hassan Awad, a professor at the Sharia law school in Damascus who came forward on public radio. Mr Awad is now in Sudan doing research, and he did not respond to repeated queries asking him to comment.
The draft law would have required women to travel only if accompanied by a mahram, a close male relative. A loophole in the draft law would have allowed a Christian man to take on a second wife and Christians would have discovered their right to divorce, despite any objections from their own church. As Father Antone Musleh, a patriarch of the Orthodox Church, put it: “The draft law dares to infringe on marriage within Christianity, which to the Church is a sacrament. It’s a Divine hand that plays into the life of humans, and the Church is the first and last party responsible for interpreting this for its flock.”
The draft law provided that a girl as young as 13 could take her parents to court and make the judge pressure them to allow her to marry.
A complete stranger could sue the couple next door if he thought one of them had become an apostate, which is enough reason to annul their marriage before a Sharia court.
“This is the most dangerous part of the draft law, the introduction of apostasy legal code,” said Dr Mohammed Habash, a parliamentarian and Islamic scholar and one of the leading figures of the renewal movement in Syria.
Apostasy laws were used for decades during Islam’s beginnings, usually with the purpose of punishing men who defected from a Muslim army to join the enemy’s lines at a time of war. But used in the context of the draft law’s proposal, Dr Habash explained, apostasy laws “undermine the family, which is the essence of society’s fabric”.
This law, known also as hasba, was used infamously in Egypt in 2001 by Islamists who tried to annul the marriage of Nawal al Saadawi, a feminist author, after deeming her an apostate for her writings. An Egyptian emergency court overturned the verdict after an international outcry.
Perhaps most absurdly, the “Taliban initiative” would have technically prohibited the legal marriage of any apostate, even to another non-believer.
The Syrian foreign minister Walid al Muallem told me during an outing with his family: “The president has already said he will not sanction it. It’s already dead in the water.”
But in the meantime, in true Syrian form, there were conflicting statements from the people’s assembly, who said that the draft law was thrown out, and the parliament, which insisted it was “still under review”.
Opponents breathed a sigh of relief when one week later parliament issued a statement saying it “rejected the contents of the draft law”, sending it back to the Ministry of Justice “to take a fresh look at the issue”.
But at least one activist thinks this development is a small victory for real reform in Syria. He has already pledged to keep “a very close eye on extremist views, and to publish them for everyone to know”. He is also launching an aggressive campaign to push for progressive reforms, such as ensuring better rights for divorced women, allowing all mothers to pass on to their children Syrian citizenship and to better address domestic violence and child abuse.
“Starting today, we will knock on the doors of official and non-official organisations, political and religious, everyone, and hold them responsible for all the issues that affect women and children in Syria,” he said.
“No more usual excuses like ‘this is because of cultural norms and traditions or class warfare’. And no more procrastinations like ‘it is not the right time or we have other, more pressing issues’.”
Sunday, 12 July 2009
Syria renaissance excludes human rights
In a quiet neighbourhood in the centre of Damascus Michel Kilo sits in his small flat sipping coffee as his wife shells beans for lunch.
Syrian sits in a cafe as US President Barack Obama speaks in cairo 04.06.09
Syrians talk openly about global and regional but not domestic politics
His TV is tuned to an Arabic news channel, his reading glasses sitting on his nose as he catches the latest developments from Tehran.
Weeks after finishing a three-year prison sentence, Mr Kilo dedicates his time to family life, while the enthusiasm that characterised his writing before his arrest is now directed solely at articles focusing on pan-Arab and regional issues, rather than local ones.
In 2006, Mr Kilo and 10 other activists were arrested after signing the Damascus-Beirut declaration.
The statement, backed by Lebanese and Syrian intellectuals, called for normalising bilateral relations after decades of Syrian domination of its smaller neighbour Lebanon.
International thaw
At the time, with Syria under severe international pressure, the authorities' tolerance of the move was very limited.
Damascus faced accusations of supporting insurgency in Iraq, and involvement in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.
Dissident Syrian writer Michel Kilo
Mr Kilo was in prison for three years after signing the declaration
But today, the situation has changed. The country is no longer isolated by the West and key Western leaders have approached Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to help stabilise the region.
The country has attracted both foreign investment as well as tourism - signs it is beginning to come in from the cold.
But the authorities show no sign of relinquishing the tight control which the Baath Party has exerted since it took power in a 1963 coup and banned all opposition.
"The priority is not to have any opposition or independent voices and it is successful in oppressing this scene," says Yassin Haj Saleh, a writer and human rights activist.
Clampdown
A campaign of arrests has left an estimated 6,000 people in jail as political prisoners.
Meanwhile, about 400-450 people are subject to official travel bans, although the real number could be in the thousands, human rights groups say.
The measures are extended to young bloggers and some internet users, as well as civil society activists and some artists.
Civil society needs to be revived and reactivated and this is only in the hands of the authorities"
Mohannad al-Hassani
Lawyer and human rights activist
"There is a continuous deterioration in the human rights situation in Syria," says lawyer and head of Syrian Human Rights Organization Mohannad al-Hassani.
But the worst situation is suffered by the Islamists, according to Yassin Haj Saleh.
"There are many young people who are arrested for their Islamic affiliation, but they are not organised. They are mostly villagers and their families are being harassed and pressured," he says.
The crackdown has attracted little media attention, especially in suburbs and rural areas.
Last year, riots erupted in Sadnaya prison. A number of prisoners were reported killed. The government said then the prisoners were Islamists.
Human Rights Watch recently called on the Syrian government to provide information on the incident.
"The Syrian government should end the anguish of the prisoners' families, disclose the names of those injured or killed, and immediately grant them access to their loved ones," said Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East and North Africa director at Human Rights Watch.
'Lack of vision'
There is no organised opposition in Syria, just individuals who oppose government policies.
And even these figures are fragmented and lack vision says Omar Amirallai, an intellectual and filmmaker.
"The opposition in Syria is in need of self-criticism, reform and reconciliation," he says.
But others believe that even with more vision and organisation, their efforts will come to nothing under current government restrictions.
The streets of Damascus have the feel of a relaxed and bustling city.
Around cafe and restaurant tables, discussions are heated about global and regional politics - but no one talks about the political situation in Syria.
Mohannad al-Hassani believes the country should embrace international and regional changes with its own progress on the level of civil and human rights.
"Civil society needs to be revived and reactivated and this is only in the hands of the authorities.
"They should look into these needs seriously as it is difficult for Syria to continue in isolation from what the whole world is moving towards."
Syrian sits in a cafe as US President Barack Obama speaks in cairo 04.06.09
Syrians talk openly about global and regional but not domestic politics
His TV is tuned to an Arabic news channel, his reading glasses sitting on his nose as he catches the latest developments from Tehran.
Weeks after finishing a three-year prison sentence, Mr Kilo dedicates his time to family life, while the enthusiasm that characterised his writing before his arrest is now directed solely at articles focusing on pan-Arab and regional issues, rather than local ones.
In 2006, Mr Kilo and 10 other activists were arrested after signing the Damascus-Beirut declaration.
The statement, backed by Lebanese and Syrian intellectuals, called for normalising bilateral relations after decades of Syrian domination of its smaller neighbour Lebanon.
International thaw
At the time, with Syria under severe international pressure, the authorities' tolerance of the move was very limited.
Damascus faced accusations of supporting insurgency in Iraq, and involvement in the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.
Dissident Syrian writer Michel Kilo
Mr Kilo was in prison for three years after signing the declaration
But today, the situation has changed. The country is no longer isolated by the West and key Western leaders have approached Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to help stabilise the region.
The country has attracted both foreign investment as well as tourism - signs it is beginning to come in from the cold.
But the authorities show no sign of relinquishing the tight control which the Baath Party has exerted since it took power in a 1963 coup and banned all opposition.
"The priority is not to have any opposition or independent voices and it is successful in oppressing this scene," says Yassin Haj Saleh, a writer and human rights activist.
Clampdown
A campaign of arrests has left an estimated 6,000 people in jail as political prisoners.
Meanwhile, about 400-450 people are subject to official travel bans, although the real number could be in the thousands, human rights groups say.
The measures are extended to young bloggers and some internet users, as well as civil society activists and some artists.
Civil society needs to be revived and reactivated and this is only in the hands of the authorities"
Mohannad al-Hassani
Lawyer and human rights activist
"There is a continuous deterioration in the human rights situation in Syria," says lawyer and head of Syrian Human Rights Organization Mohannad al-Hassani.
But the worst situation is suffered by the Islamists, according to Yassin Haj Saleh.
"There are many young people who are arrested for their Islamic affiliation, but they are not organised. They are mostly villagers and their families are being harassed and pressured," he says.
The crackdown has attracted little media attention, especially in suburbs and rural areas.
Last year, riots erupted in Sadnaya prison. A number of prisoners were reported killed. The government said then the prisoners were Islamists.
Human Rights Watch recently called on the Syrian government to provide information on the incident.
"The Syrian government should end the anguish of the prisoners' families, disclose the names of those injured or killed, and immediately grant them access to their loved ones," said Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East and North Africa director at Human Rights Watch.
'Lack of vision'
There is no organised opposition in Syria, just individuals who oppose government policies.
And even these figures are fragmented and lack vision says Omar Amirallai, an intellectual and filmmaker.
"The opposition in Syria is in need of self-criticism, reform and reconciliation," he says.
But others believe that even with more vision and organisation, their efforts will come to nothing under current government restrictions.
The streets of Damascus have the feel of a relaxed and bustling city.
Around cafe and restaurant tables, discussions are heated about global and regional politics - but no one talks about the political situation in Syria.
Mohannad al-Hassani believes the country should embrace international and regional changes with its own progress on the level of civil and human rights.
"Civil society needs to be revived and reactivated and this is only in the hands of the authorities.
"They should look into these needs seriously as it is difficult for Syria to continue in isolation from what the whole world is moving towards."
Wednesday, 17 June 2009
The Most Elegant Scene: Mass Protest in Tehran
An eyewitness writes from Tehran an account of Monday's massive demonstration for Mousavi. I am not including his name because we don't know how this will turn out and as a historian I have a duty to protect my interviewees, but it is not anonymous.
I left my home in Tajrish along with my family at 3 p.m. We went down Valiast Street which is the main northern-southern avenue in Tehran and entered the Evin Exp'way which leads to Enghelab Street. We knew that people are supposed to gather in Enghelab Sq. (Revolution Sq.) at 4 and march toward Azadi Sq. (Freedom Sq.). From Gisha Bridge onwards, we saw people walking down. Cars were blowing their horns and people were showing victory sign. We went to Navvab Street and parked our car at the end of the street. Then we took a taxi to bring us back to the Enghelab Street. On our way, near Jomhouri Sq. (Republic Sq.), I saw a group of about 20 militia with long beards and batons on motorbikes.
My hand was out of the car window with a little green ribbon (the sign of reformists) around my finger. One of the militia told me to throw that ribbon away. I showed him a finger.
All of a sudden, about 15 people attacked me inside the car. They beat me with their batons and wanted to pull me out. My wife and my daughter who were sitting in the back seat cried and hold me tight. I also hold myself tight on the chair. They wanted to shatter the car windows. The driver went out and explained that he is a taxi and we are his passengers and he has no fault. After about 5 minutes,they left. My elbow hurts severely.
Then, a young man from their group came and kissed my elbow! I told him: You know, I don't hate you. I am like you with the only difference that I know more and you are ignorant. He apologized and left.
We joined the crowd in Enghelab Street.
Read carefully:
What I saw today was the most elegant scene I had ever witnessed in my life. The huge number of people were marching hand in hand in full peace. Silence. Silence was everywhere. There was no slogan. No violence. Hands were up in victory sign with green ribbons. People carried placards which read: Silence. Old and young, man and woman of all social groups were marching cheerfully. This was a magnificent show of solidarity. Enghelab Street which is the widest avenue in Tehran was full of people. I was told that the march has begun in Ferdowsi Sq. and the end of the march was now in Imam Hossein Sq. to the further east of Tehran while on the other end people had already gathered in Azadi Sq.
The length of this street is about 6 kilometers. The estimate is about 2 million people [Cole: Western press reporting was up to 500,000 people]. On the way, we passed a police department and a militia (Baseej) base. In both places, the doors were closed and we could see fully-armed riot police and militia watching the people from behind the fences. Near Sharif University of Technology where the students had chased away Ahmadinejad a few days ago, Mirhossein Mousavi (the reformist elect president) and Karrubi (the other reformist candidate spoke to people for a few minutes which was received by cries of praise and applause.
I felt proud to find myself among such a huge number of passionate people who were showing the most reasonable act of protest. Frankly, I didn't expect such a political maturity from emotional Iranians who easily get excited. My family and I had put stickers on our mouths to represent the suppression. Placards that people carried were different; from poems by the national poet Ahmad Shamlu to light-hearted slogans against Ahmadinejad.
Examples include: " To slaughter us/ why did you need to invite us / to such an elegant party" (Poem by Shamlu). " Hello! Hello! 999? / Our votes were stolen" or " The Miracle of the Third Millenium: 2 x 2 = 24 millions" (alluding to the claim by Government that Ahmadinejad obtained 24 million votes) , "Where is my vote?" , " Give me back my vote" and many other.
We arrived in Azadi Square where the entire square was full of population. It is said that around 500,000 people can be accommodated in this huge square and it was full. Suddenly we saw smoke from Jenah Freeway and heard the gunshot. People were scared at first but then went forward.
I just heard the gunshots but my sister who had been on the scene at that part told me later that she saw 4 militia came out from a house and shot a girl. Then they shot a young boy in his eye and the bullet came out of his ear. She said that 4 people were shot. At least one person dead has been confirmed. People arrested one of the Baseeji militia but the three others ran away when they ran out of bullet. At around 8 we went back on foot.
On the way back people were still in the street and were chanting Allah Akbar (God is Great).
I was coming home at around 2 a.m. In parkway, I saw about ten buses full of armed riot police parked on the side of the street. Then I saw scattered militia in civil clothes with clubs in hand patroling the empty streets. In Tajrish Square, I saw a very young boy (around 16) with a club who was looking at the cars to see if he can find something to attack. I don't know how and under what teachings can young boys change into militia.
I came home. Tomorrow [Tuesday June 16], people will gather again in Valiasr Square for another peaceful march toward the IRIB building which controls all the media and which spreads filthy lies. The day before Yesterday, Ahmadinejad had hold his victory ceremony. Government buses had transported all his supporters from nearby cities. There was full coverage of that ceremony where fruit juice and cake was plenty. A maximum of 100,000 had gathered to hear his speech. These included all the militia and the soldiers and all supporters he could gather by the use of free TV publicity. Today, at least 2 million came only relying on word of mouth while reformists have no newspaper, no radio, no TV.
All their internet sites are filtered as well as social networks such as facebook. Text messaging and mobile communication was also cut off during the demonstration. Since yesterday, the Iranian TV was announcing that there is no license for any gathering and riot police will severely punish anybody who may demonstrates. Ahmadinejad called the opposition as a bunch of insignificant dirt who try to make the taste of victory bitter to the nation. He also called the western leaders as a bunch of "filthy homosexuals". All these disgusting remarks was today answered by that largest demonstration ever. Older people compared the demonstration of today with the Ashura Demonstration of 1979 which marks the downfall of the Shah regime and even said that it outnumbered that event.
The militia burnt a house themselves to find the excuse to commit violence. People neutralized their tactic to a large degree by their solidarity, their wisdom and their denial to enage in any violent act.
I feel sad for the loss of those young girls and boys. It is said that they also killed 3 students last night in their attack at Tehran University residence halls. I heard that a number of professors of Sharif University and AmirKabir University (Tehran Polytechnic) have resigned.
Democracy is a long way ahead. I may not be alive to see that day. With eyes full of tear in these early hours of Tuesday 16th June 2009, I glorify the courage and bravery of those martyrs and I hope that their blood will make every one of us more committed to freedom, to democracy and to human rights.
Viva Freedom, Viva Democracy, Viva Iran
I left my home in Tajrish along with my family at 3 p.m. We went down Valiast Street which is the main northern-southern avenue in Tehran and entered the Evin Exp'way which leads to Enghelab Street. We knew that people are supposed to gather in Enghelab Sq. (Revolution Sq.) at 4 and march toward Azadi Sq. (Freedom Sq.). From Gisha Bridge onwards, we saw people walking down. Cars were blowing their horns and people were showing victory sign. We went to Navvab Street and parked our car at the end of the street. Then we took a taxi to bring us back to the Enghelab Street. On our way, near Jomhouri Sq. (Republic Sq.), I saw a group of about 20 militia with long beards and batons on motorbikes.
My hand was out of the car window with a little green ribbon (the sign of reformists) around my finger. One of the militia told me to throw that ribbon away. I showed him a finger.
All of a sudden, about 15 people attacked me inside the car. They beat me with their batons and wanted to pull me out. My wife and my daughter who were sitting in the back seat cried and hold me tight. I also hold myself tight on the chair. They wanted to shatter the car windows. The driver went out and explained that he is a taxi and we are his passengers and he has no fault. After about 5 minutes,they left. My elbow hurts severely.
Then, a young man from their group came and kissed my elbow! I told him: You know, I don't hate you. I am like you with the only difference that I know more and you are ignorant. He apologized and left.
We joined the crowd in Enghelab Street.
Read carefully:
What I saw today was the most elegant scene I had ever witnessed in my life. The huge number of people were marching hand in hand in full peace. Silence. Silence was everywhere. There was no slogan. No violence. Hands were up in victory sign with green ribbons. People carried placards which read: Silence. Old and young, man and woman of all social groups were marching cheerfully. This was a magnificent show of solidarity. Enghelab Street which is the widest avenue in Tehran was full of people. I was told that the march has begun in Ferdowsi Sq. and the end of the march was now in Imam Hossein Sq. to the further east of Tehran while on the other end people had already gathered in Azadi Sq.
The length of this street is about 6 kilometers. The estimate is about 2 million people [Cole: Western press reporting was up to 500,000 people]. On the way, we passed a police department and a militia (Baseej) base. In both places, the doors were closed and we could see fully-armed riot police and militia watching the people from behind the fences. Near Sharif University of Technology where the students had chased away Ahmadinejad a few days ago, Mirhossein Mousavi (the reformist elect president) and Karrubi (the other reformist candidate spoke to people for a few minutes which was received by cries of praise and applause.
I felt proud to find myself among such a huge number of passionate people who were showing the most reasonable act of protest. Frankly, I didn't expect such a political maturity from emotional Iranians who easily get excited. My family and I had put stickers on our mouths to represent the suppression. Placards that people carried were different; from poems by the national poet Ahmad Shamlu to light-hearted slogans against Ahmadinejad.
Examples include: " To slaughter us/ why did you need to invite us / to such an elegant party" (Poem by Shamlu). " Hello! Hello! 999? / Our votes were stolen" or " The Miracle of the Third Millenium: 2 x 2 = 24 millions" (alluding to the claim by Government that Ahmadinejad obtained 24 million votes) , "Where is my vote?" , " Give me back my vote" and many other.
We arrived in Azadi Square where the entire square was full of population. It is said that around 500,000 people can be accommodated in this huge square and it was full. Suddenly we saw smoke from Jenah Freeway and heard the gunshot. People were scared at first but then went forward.
I just heard the gunshots but my sister who had been on the scene at that part told me later that she saw 4 militia came out from a house and shot a girl. Then they shot a young boy in his eye and the bullet came out of his ear. She said that 4 people were shot. At least one person dead has been confirmed. People arrested one of the Baseeji militia but the three others ran away when they ran out of bullet. At around 8 we went back on foot.
On the way back people were still in the street and were chanting Allah Akbar (God is Great).
I was coming home at around 2 a.m. In parkway, I saw about ten buses full of armed riot police parked on the side of the street. Then I saw scattered militia in civil clothes with clubs in hand patroling the empty streets. In Tajrish Square, I saw a very young boy (around 16) with a club who was looking at the cars to see if he can find something to attack. I don't know how and under what teachings can young boys change into militia.
I came home. Tomorrow [Tuesday June 16], people will gather again in Valiasr Square for another peaceful march toward the IRIB building which controls all the media and which spreads filthy lies. The day before Yesterday, Ahmadinejad had hold his victory ceremony. Government buses had transported all his supporters from nearby cities. There was full coverage of that ceremony where fruit juice and cake was plenty. A maximum of 100,000 had gathered to hear his speech. These included all the militia and the soldiers and all supporters he could gather by the use of free TV publicity. Today, at least 2 million came only relying on word of mouth while reformists have no newspaper, no radio, no TV.
All their internet sites are filtered as well as social networks such as facebook. Text messaging and mobile communication was also cut off during the demonstration. Since yesterday, the Iranian TV was announcing that there is no license for any gathering and riot police will severely punish anybody who may demonstrates. Ahmadinejad called the opposition as a bunch of insignificant dirt who try to make the taste of victory bitter to the nation. He also called the western leaders as a bunch of "filthy homosexuals". All these disgusting remarks was today answered by that largest demonstration ever. Older people compared the demonstration of today with the Ashura Demonstration of 1979 which marks the downfall of the Shah regime and even said that it outnumbered that event.
The militia burnt a house themselves to find the excuse to commit violence. People neutralized their tactic to a large degree by their solidarity, their wisdom and their denial to enage in any violent act.
I feel sad for the loss of those young girls and boys. It is said that they also killed 3 students last night in their attack at Tehran University residence halls. I heard that a number of professors of Sharif University and AmirKabir University (Tehran Polytechnic) have resigned.
Democracy is a long way ahead. I may not be alive to see that day. With eyes full of tear in these early hours of Tuesday 16th June 2009, I glorify the courage and bravery of those martyrs and I hope that their blood will make every one of us more committed to freedom, to democracy and to human rights.
Viva Freedom, Viva Democracy, Viva Iran
Tuesday, 16 June 2009
1984
I was born in 1984, amid a devastating war that had laid waste and destruction to my country. I was born between two subsequent nights of bombing raids. I was born into rationing, despair and hardship. I was born when young lives perished at the fronts. My father later told me that when I was born 1984 sounded so much like the 1984 predicted by Orwell. But my birth had turned over the glum outlook for my parents and 1984 had become a sign of hope, a hope for a future to come, or as my father put it, “a better future for my child to live.”
My parents were not alone in this. During the baby boom of 1983 to 1986, millions of us came into this world, mouths to feed and miracles to be cherished. There and then a new generation was born, a generation who would bear witness to the legacy of generations of their parents, a legacy that was mainly composed of one thing, “the Islamic Republic.”
In later years, in our schools, on TV, in books and newspapers they told us that before our time lived a tyrant who held a firm grip on our country, and that the defiant and valiant nation of Iran had risen up and overthrown him to establish three things, “Esteghlal, Azadi, Jomhouri Eslami.”
Independence.
Freedom.
Islamic Republic.
We were fascinated by the epic tales of young students, some as young as thirteen who during the war had sacrificed themselves for the greater good of the society. We were made to believe that we were living in Utopia, but the delusion only lasted a few years. Before long, that once naïve and innocent generation of 1984 had grown to be the young men and women of Iran, the so called third generation of the revolution.
Faced with harsh realities of life we quickly came to realize that our world was far from the Utopia painted for us. It was more like a Dystopia where we had to fight for every single right, every single freedom.You have denied us so much.
Out of this dark age one day emerged a man with qualities of a hero who would lead this generation out of this Dystopia and into that promised paradise. His name was Mohammad Khatami. Yet it turned out that he was neither the hero everyone expected him to be, nor did he have the capacity or desire to lead them out. To be fair things started crawling toward progress and modernization; there was a smaller degree of social rights and freedom, but it did not come at the pace that this restless third generation wanted.
Thus a hero fell, and four years of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad started.
By the end of the four years, we were desperate for change. Hope materialized in the shape of Mir Hossein Mousavi, who happened to be the prime minister that now long gone 1984. But the totalitarians ruling the Dystopia swooped in and crushed that last bit of hope.
In Brecht’s “Life of Galileo,” Galileo’s students condemn him at the end of the court proceedings with these words: “Pity the nation that doesn’t have a hero.”
“Pity the nation that needs a hero,” he responds wisely.
My generation is tired of being disillusioned. We refuse to accept the status quo and we have risen up in defiance. I am not sure how long it will take for the totalitarians to crush our resistance. For now though, we’re holding up just fine. We’re holding up fine even though our brothers at Basij and the police are murdering their dear fellow Iranians. We’re holding up even though you bash us with clubs and batons and try to suffocate us with your tear gas.
A nation stands tall refusing to succumb that easily.
Yesterday among the crowds who were just back from the warzone with their wounds and anger and sadness, I spotted an old friend of mine.
“Welcome to 1984, my friend,” he said in great anguish.
I nodded in agreement; we’d come full circle.
He went on, “There we were facing the bloodthirsty riot police, hand in hand, like that ‘Brothers in Arms’ song from Dire Straits.”
It was in that moment that I realized why the French Revolutionaries added “Fraternity” to their revolutionary slogan.
My parents were not alone in this. During the baby boom of 1983 to 1986, millions of us came into this world, mouths to feed and miracles to be cherished. There and then a new generation was born, a generation who would bear witness to the legacy of generations of their parents, a legacy that was mainly composed of one thing, “the Islamic Republic.”
In later years, in our schools, on TV, in books and newspapers they told us that before our time lived a tyrant who held a firm grip on our country, and that the defiant and valiant nation of Iran had risen up and overthrown him to establish three things, “Esteghlal, Azadi, Jomhouri Eslami.”
Independence.
Freedom.
Islamic Republic.
We were fascinated by the epic tales of young students, some as young as thirteen who during the war had sacrificed themselves for the greater good of the society. We were made to believe that we were living in Utopia, but the delusion only lasted a few years. Before long, that once naïve and innocent generation of 1984 had grown to be the young men and women of Iran, the so called third generation of the revolution.
Faced with harsh realities of life we quickly came to realize that our world was far from the Utopia painted for us. It was more like a Dystopia where we had to fight for every single right, every single freedom.You have denied us so much.
Out of this dark age one day emerged a man with qualities of a hero who would lead this generation out of this Dystopia and into that promised paradise. His name was Mohammad Khatami. Yet it turned out that he was neither the hero everyone expected him to be, nor did he have the capacity or desire to lead them out. To be fair things started crawling toward progress and modernization; there was a smaller degree of social rights and freedom, but it did not come at the pace that this restless third generation wanted.
Thus a hero fell, and four years of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad started.
By the end of the four years, we were desperate for change. Hope materialized in the shape of Mir Hossein Mousavi, who happened to be the prime minister that now long gone 1984. But the totalitarians ruling the Dystopia swooped in and crushed that last bit of hope.
In Brecht’s “Life of Galileo,” Galileo’s students condemn him at the end of the court proceedings with these words: “Pity the nation that doesn’t have a hero.”
“Pity the nation that needs a hero,” he responds wisely.
My generation is tired of being disillusioned. We refuse to accept the status quo and we have risen up in defiance. I am not sure how long it will take for the totalitarians to crush our resistance. For now though, we’re holding up just fine. We’re holding up fine even though our brothers at Basij and the police are murdering their dear fellow Iranians. We’re holding up even though you bash us with clubs and batons and try to suffocate us with your tear gas.
A nation stands tall refusing to succumb that easily.
Yesterday among the crowds who were just back from the warzone with their wounds and anger and sadness, I spotted an old friend of mine.
“Welcome to 1984, my friend,” he said in great anguish.
I nodded in agreement; we’d come full circle.
He went on, “There we were facing the bloodthirsty riot police, hand in hand, like that ‘Brothers in Arms’ song from Dire Straits.”
It was in that moment that I realized why the French Revolutionaries added “Fraternity” to their revolutionary slogan.
Thursday, 11 June 2009
Turkey fined for failing to protect woman
ISTANBUL // In a debut that was inglorious but could yet turn out to be a watershed for women’s rights in this country, Turkey this week became the first member state of the Council of Europe to have been convicted by the Council’s court for failing to protect a woman from violent abuse by her former husband.
In the verdict, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France, ordered Turkey to pay a total of €36,500 (Dh187,748) in damages and expenses to Nahide Opuz, 37, from the city of Diyarbakir in Turkey’s south-east. The court ruled unanimously that Turkey’s judiciary and police had failed to protect Mrs Opuz from repeated assaults and threats by her former husband, Huseyin Opuz, despite numerous pleas for help by Mrs Opuz and despite the fact that Opuz killed her mother to prevent the two women from fleeing.
“I want to see an end to violence against women and I want the state, the judiciary and the police to take it seriously,” Mrs Opuz said through her lawyer, Mesut Bestas. Mrs Opuz still feels threatened by her former husband and does not want to speak to the media herself, Mr Bestas said in a telephone interview. She wants to lead a “free life, far away from worries”, the lawyer quoted her as saying. Mr Bestas said his client had not received police protection.
Click here to find out more!
According to a statement by the Strasbourg court, the couple got married in 1995. They had three children. Soon after the wedding, Mrs Opuz said she and her mother were beaten and threatened by her husband. Opuz was repeatedly remanded in custody, but always released. Charges against him were dropped when the two women withdrew their complaints, apparently under pressure from Opuz, the court said.
Although Mrs Opuz and her mother told the authorities their lives were in danger and although Opuz was repeatedly questioned over the years, he was never held in custody for a long period. In Oct 2001 he stabbed his wife seven times with a knife and in March 2002 he shot and killed his mother-in-law as the two women were preparing to run away. He told police “his honour had been at stake”, the court said. He was later convicted of murder, but he was again released pending an appeal. Mrs Opuz filed for divorce after the killing.
Seven years after Mrs Opuz first applied to Strasbourg, the court ruled that Turkey’s judiciary and police had ignored the fact that “further violence, indeed a lethal attack, had not only been possible but even foreseeable”. Rejecting Turkey’s argument that Mrs Opuz had withdrawn her complaints several times, the court said that given the husband’s history of violence, authorities should have made sure “that the prosecution continue in the public interest”.
In one of the most damning passages of the verdict, the court accused Turkish authorities of “passive” behaviour. Judicial decisions “had been ineffective and even disclosed a certain degree of tolerance” towards the violence against the two women, the court said. As a member of the Council of Europe, an organisation of 47-member countries founded in 1949 to develop and uphold democratic and human rights principles, Turkey is obliged to abide by the rulings from Strasbourg.
The verdict and the public humiliation for Turkey, a country that sees itself as a modern republic with equal rights for men and women but is plagued by high rates of domestic violence, made front-page news throughout the country. According to a government-sponsored study released this year, four out of 10 women in Turkey say they are victims of physical domestic violence.
The decision of the seven-judge panel in Strasbourg was like a “slap in the face” for Turkey, the Yeni Safak newspaper said. Canan Arin, a lawyer specialising in cases of domestic violence, said she was happy about the verdict, but felt ashamed at the same time. “I am ashamed because the Turkish republic is a country that does not attach great value to human life, to the life of women,” she told the NTV news channel.
Pinar Ilkkaracan, a founding member of the Association for Human Rights for Women – New Solutions, a pressure group, told NTV the verdict had the potential to change the way Turkish authorities deal with cases of domestic violence. “Women who experience such a [violent] behaviour and are confronted with indifference when they turn to the authorities now have a weapon in their hands.”
Remziye Tanrikulu, a women’s rights lawyer in Mrs Opuz’s hometown of Diyarbakir, also said the Strasbourg verdict was a “very important decision”. Speaking in a telephone interview, Mrs Tanrikulu said Turkey had improved its laws against domestic violence, but there were problems with the application of these laws. “After this decision, there is pressure from Strasbourg,” she said. The justice ministry in Ankara started an inquiry to establish what went wrong in the case of Mrs Opuz, newspapers reported yesterday.
But Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the prime minister, criticised the verdict. The decision was “shameful”, Mr Erdogan told NTV in a live interview yesterday. He said it was wrong for the court to condemn the whole of Turkey for a single case and that Turkey’s law enforcement agency was trying to fight domestic violence. “We have laws,” he said, adding that no country could guarantee the safety of its citizens “100 per cent”.
As the debate continued, Turkish media yesterday reported another suspected case of deadly domestic violence. Fadile Karatoprak, 23, from the capital Ankara, was found strangled in her house, the reports said. Mrs Karatoprak had divorced her husband shortly before her death. Her three-year-old son was reported to have told police that “my mum was killed by my dad”.
In the verdict, the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, France, ordered Turkey to pay a total of €36,500 (Dh187,748) in damages and expenses to Nahide Opuz, 37, from the city of Diyarbakir in Turkey’s south-east. The court ruled unanimously that Turkey’s judiciary and police had failed to protect Mrs Opuz from repeated assaults and threats by her former husband, Huseyin Opuz, despite numerous pleas for help by Mrs Opuz and despite the fact that Opuz killed her mother to prevent the two women from fleeing.
“I want to see an end to violence against women and I want the state, the judiciary and the police to take it seriously,” Mrs Opuz said through her lawyer, Mesut Bestas. Mrs Opuz still feels threatened by her former husband and does not want to speak to the media herself, Mr Bestas said in a telephone interview. She wants to lead a “free life, far away from worries”, the lawyer quoted her as saying. Mr Bestas said his client had not received police protection.
Click here to find out more!
According to a statement by the Strasbourg court, the couple got married in 1995. They had three children. Soon after the wedding, Mrs Opuz said she and her mother were beaten and threatened by her husband. Opuz was repeatedly remanded in custody, but always released. Charges against him were dropped when the two women withdrew their complaints, apparently under pressure from Opuz, the court said.
Although Mrs Opuz and her mother told the authorities their lives were in danger and although Opuz was repeatedly questioned over the years, he was never held in custody for a long period. In Oct 2001 he stabbed his wife seven times with a knife and in March 2002 he shot and killed his mother-in-law as the two women were preparing to run away. He told police “his honour had been at stake”, the court said. He was later convicted of murder, but he was again released pending an appeal. Mrs Opuz filed for divorce after the killing.
Seven years after Mrs Opuz first applied to Strasbourg, the court ruled that Turkey’s judiciary and police had ignored the fact that “further violence, indeed a lethal attack, had not only been possible but even foreseeable”. Rejecting Turkey’s argument that Mrs Opuz had withdrawn her complaints several times, the court said that given the husband’s history of violence, authorities should have made sure “that the prosecution continue in the public interest”.
In one of the most damning passages of the verdict, the court accused Turkish authorities of “passive” behaviour. Judicial decisions “had been ineffective and even disclosed a certain degree of tolerance” towards the violence against the two women, the court said. As a member of the Council of Europe, an organisation of 47-member countries founded in 1949 to develop and uphold democratic and human rights principles, Turkey is obliged to abide by the rulings from Strasbourg.
The verdict and the public humiliation for Turkey, a country that sees itself as a modern republic with equal rights for men and women but is plagued by high rates of domestic violence, made front-page news throughout the country. According to a government-sponsored study released this year, four out of 10 women in Turkey say they are victims of physical domestic violence.
The decision of the seven-judge panel in Strasbourg was like a “slap in the face” for Turkey, the Yeni Safak newspaper said. Canan Arin, a lawyer specialising in cases of domestic violence, said she was happy about the verdict, but felt ashamed at the same time. “I am ashamed because the Turkish republic is a country that does not attach great value to human life, to the life of women,” she told the NTV news channel.
Pinar Ilkkaracan, a founding member of the Association for Human Rights for Women – New Solutions, a pressure group, told NTV the verdict had the potential to change the way Turkish authorities deal with cases of domestic violence. “Women who experience such a [violent] behaviour and are confronted with indifference when they turn to the authorities now have a weapon in their hands.”
Remziye Tanrikulu, a women’s rights lawyer in Mrs Opuz’s hometown of Diyarbakir, also said the Strasbourg verdict was a “very important decision”. Speaking in a telephone interview, Mrs Tanrikulu said Turkey had improved its laws against domestic violence, but there were problems with the application of these laws. “After this decision, there is pressure from Strasbourg,” she said. The justice ministry in Ankara started an inquiry to establish what went wrong in the case of Mrs Opuz, newspapers reported yesterday.
But Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the prime minister, criticised the verdict. The decision was “shameful”, Mr Erdogan told NTV in a live interview yesterday. He said it was wrong for the court to condemn the whole of Turkey for a single case and that Turkey’s law enforcement agency was trying to fight domestic violence. “We have laws,” he said, adding that no country could guarantee the safety of its citizens “100 per cent”.
As the debate continued, Turkish media yesterday reported another suspected case of deadly domestic violence. Fadile Karatoprak, 23, from the capital Ankara, was found strangled in her house, the reports said. Mrs Karatoprak had divorced her husband shortly before her death. Her three-year-old son was reported to have told police that “my mum was killed by my dad”.
A hot summer of discontent
SANA’A // The suffering of many Yemeni citizens will increase this summer in direct proportion to the rising mercury in their thermometers, as daily power blackouts force them to endure blistering temperatures without the comfort of refrigeration, air conditioning or electric fans.
“Life is becoming hell for us in the summer; we cannot tolerate such hot weather,” said Hani Mohammed Ali, a 45-year-old civil servant living in Aden, adding that there were up to six power cuts a day.
“I take my wife and kid to the roof to sleep, but the mosquitoes do not leave us alone. It’s unbearable.”
Power shortages are endemic during the hotter months from May to October when demand spikes, leaving many Yemenis without electricity for six to eight hours a day.
The main factors contributing to the country’s electricity problem, experts say, is the insufficient, ageing power infrastructure and the theft of electricity by industry and wealthy Yemenis.
Yemen’s total production of power is 650 megawatts, and the electricity ministry purchases about 200 megawatts from international companies to address part of the shortfall, according to the ministry.
“The shortage in power supply ranges between 100-120 megawatts. Some of the power produced seeps out of the system because of a lack of proper maintenance, as well as the old power stations. They now [produce] only 75 per cent of their capacity,” Awadh al Suqatri, Yemen’s minister of electricity, recently told the state-run Almithaq weekly.
Click here to find out more!
According to a report by the Shoura council, a quasi-parliamentary governmental body, released last month, half of the country’s power stations are no longer functional or will cease to function soon and 43 per cent of the population has no access to electricity.
According to electricity ministry reports, leaked power reached 432 megawatts in 2007 compared to 231 megawatts in 2006. Leaked power has risen to 30 per cent of total output, and is due to outdated transmitting networks.
The power shortfall this summer is expected to soar to 220 megawatts, according to Mr al Suqatri, a problem the government cannot possibly tackle alone. Officials are considering involving the private sector to establish new power stations, he said.
Mr al Suqatri also blamed the increasing blackouts on rising demand during the summer.
“There is an increase in demand for power by 10 per cent due to the expansion of cities and the increase of electricity supply to the countryside. This demand increases significantly during summer. Therefore, we have to cover the power supply gap by instituting rolling power cuts across the country.
“It is one of the solutions though it costs us a lot. Constructing new power stations needs funding and takes between three to four years.”
Electricity theft is also a major problem as some owners of large workshops and factories siphon off electricity from public networks or alter their meters to squeeze extra power.
The General Electricity Corporation of the electricity ministry complains that 524 high-ranking government officials and influential tribal leaders have refused to pay their accumulated bills, which are estimated to be US$75 million (Dh275m), according to Abdulmumen Mutahar, the electricity corporation’s director.
Mr Mutahar said the ministry has contacted these individuals requesting payment but they have refused to comply. He said the ministry is thinking of publishing a blacklist of the offenders.
The net result is that Yemen’s electricity output is sufficient for only 57 per cent of the country’s 22 million people. Most of the available supply goes to the urban population, which consumes 92 per cent of total power. The majority of the population, who live in the countryside, use only eight per cent.
For several years, the government has been promising to end the power dilemma by building gas-fuelled power stations.
The first phase of the 341 megawatt Mareb station, the largest of the new power station projects, was supposed to begin production last year, but did not because the Iranian company contracted to build it, Parsian High Voltage Substations Development Company, had difficulty getting the necessary equipment from Europe as a result of sanctions against Iran, Mr al Suqatri said.
“We are doing our best to enter the Mareb station into service in July. We have established an operation unit to ensure it is on time. The work is almost completed. I believe this station will end blackouts,” he said.
The $268m station is set to generate more than 1,200 megawatts a year. Yemen is turning to gas-powered stations for generating electricity because it is a cheaper option for a country with gas reserves of 259 billion cubic metres.
Taher Hizam, an economist, said he is not optimistic that Mareb will start operating next month.
“Since 2005 and they have kept telling us they will address this headache of power shortages this or that year. The work started in 2003 but they had problems with the implementing company. I am not optimistic.”
Mr Hizam said the intermittent power supply is not only affecting citizens and their businesses, but remains one of the major challenges for attracting foreign investment.
“Power deficiency is one of the main problems that pushes foreign investors away from coming to Yemen. I know a lot of Gulf businessmen who have been reluctant to invest in Yemen due to the electricity problem,” he said.
“I think if the government succeeds in completing the Mareb gas stations … the problem will be controlled and this will encourage foreign investments.”
“Life is becoming hell for us in the summer; we cannot tolerate such hot weather,” said Hani Mohammed Ali, a 45-year-old civil servant living in Aden, adding that there were up to six power cuts a day.
“I take my wife and kid to the roof to sleep, but the mosquitoes do not leave us alone. It’s unbearable.”
Power shortages are endemic during the hotter months from May to October when demand spikes, leaving many Yemenis without electricity for six to eight hours a day.
The main factors contributing to the country’s electricity problem, experts say, is the insufficient, ageing power infrastructure and the theft of electricity by industry and wealthy Yemenis.
Yemen’s total production of power is 650 megawatts, and the electricity ministry purchases about 200 megawatts from international companies to address part of the shortfall, according to the ministry.
“The shortage in power supply ranges between 100-120 megawatts. Some of the power produced seeps out of the system because of a lack of proper maintenance, as well as the old power stations. They now [produce] only 75 per cent of their capacity,” Awadh al Suqatri, Yemen’s minister of electricity, recently told the state-run Almithaq weekly.
Click here to find out more!
According to a report by the Shoura council, a quasi-parliamentary governmental body, released last month, half of the country’s power stations are no longer functional or will cease to function soon and 43 per cent of the population has no access to electricity.
According to electricity ministry reports, leaked power reached 432 megawatts in 2007 compared to 231 megawatts in 2006. Leaked power has risen to 30 per cent of total output, and is due to outdated transmitting networks.
The power shortfall this summer is expected to soar to 220 megawatts, according to Mr al Suqatri, a problem the government cannot possibly tackle alone. Officials are considering involving the private sector to establish new power stations, he said.
Mr al Suqatri also blamed the increasing blackouts on rising demand during the summer.
“There is an increase in demand for power by 10 per cent due to the expansion of cities and the increase of electricity supply to the countryside. This demand increases significantly during summer. Therefore, we have to cover the power supply gap by instituting rolling power cuts across the country.
“It is one of the solutions though it costs us a lot. Constructing new power stations needs funding and takes between three to four years.”
Electricity theft is also a major problem as some owners of large workshops and factories siphon off electricity from public networks or alter their meters to squeeze extra power.
The General Electricity Corporation of the electricity ministry complains that 524 high-ranking government officials and influential tribal leaders have refused to pay their accumulated bills, which are estimated to be US$75 million (Dh275m), according to Abdulmumen Mutahar, the electricity corporation’s director.
Mr Mutahar said the ministry has contacted these individuals requesting payment but they have refused to comply. He said the ministry is thinking of publishing a blacklist of the offenders.
The net result is that Yemen’s electricity output is sufficient for only 57 per cent of the country’s 22 million people. Most of the available supply goes to the urban population, which consumes 92 per cent of total power. The majority of the population, who live in the countryside, use only eight per cent.
For several years, the government has been promising to end the power dilemma by building gas-fuelled power stations.
The first phase of the 341 megawatt Mareb station, the largest of the new power station projects, was supposed to begin production last year, but did not because the Iranian company contracted to build it, Parsian High Voltage Substations Development Company, had difficulty getting the necessary equipment from Europe as a result of sanctions against Iran, Mr al Suqatri said.
“We are doing our best to enter the Mareb station into service in July. We have established an operation unit to ensure it is on time. The work is almost completed. I believe this station will end blackouts,” he said.
The $268m station is set to generate more than 1,200 megawatts a year. Yemen is turning to gas-powered stations for generating electricity because it is a cheaper option for a country with gas reserves of 259 billion cubic metres.
Taher Hizam, an economist, said he is not optimistic that Mareb will start operating next month.
“Since 2005 and they have kept telling us they will address this headache of power shortages this or that year. The work started in 2003 but they had problems with the implementing company. I am not optimistic.”
Mr Hizam said the intermittent power supply is not only affecting citizens and their businesses, but remains one of the major challenges for attracting foreign investment.
“Power deficiency is one of the main problems that pushes foreign investors away from coming to Yemen. I know a lot of Gulf businessmen who have been reluctant to invest in Yemen due to the electricity problem,” he said.
“I think if the government succeeds in completing the Mareb gas stations … the problem will be controlled and this will encourage foreign investments.”
Monday, 8 June 2009
‘Loyalty oath’ to keep Arabs out of Galilee town
MISGAV, ISRAEL // A community in northern Israel has changed its bylaws to demand that new residents pledge support for “Zionism, Jewish heritage and settlement of the land” in a thinly veiled attempt to block Arab applicants from gaining admission.
Critics are calling the bylaw, adopted by Manof, home to 170 Jewish families in Galilee, a local “loyalty oath” similar to a national scheme recently proposed by the far-Right party of the government minister Avigdor Lieberman.
Other Jewish communities in the central Galilee – falling under the umbrella of a regional council known as Misgav – are preparing similar bylaws in response to a court petition filed by an Arab couple hoping to build a home in Misgav.
“It looks very much like this is being co-ordinated by the Misgav council in an attempt to pre-empt the court ruling,” said Ronin Ben Ari, resident of another Misgav community, Mikhmanim, and an opponent of the bylaw change.
Manof’s move comes in the wake of efforts by Ahmed and Fatina Zbeidat, who live in the neighbouring Arab town of Sakhnin, to win admission to the Misgav community of Rakafet.
Traditionally some 700 rural communities in Israel, including 30 in Misgav, have weeded out Arab applicants by issuing automatic rejections through special vetting committees. Arab citizens make up one-fifth of the country’s population.
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According to a legal rights group, rural communities, which are home to only five per cent of the population but have control over four-fifths of the countryside, are seen by the state as a bulwark against Arabs gaining access to what are called “national lands”.
However, the vetting system has been under threat since a court ruling in 2000 that required the committees to consider Arab applicants and justify their decisions.
In line with the ruling, the Zbeidats demanded the right to take a suitability test when their application was turned down in 2006. Examiners found Fatina too “individualistic” for life in a small community while her husband lacked “knowledge of sophisticated interpersonal relations”.
The Zbeidats then petitioned the courts against the use of vetting committees, saying they enforced “blatant discrimination” against Arab applicants.
Earlier this year, in an indication that the court was preparing to back them, it demanded that the attorney-general explain why the vetting committees should continue.
“There is little doubt that many residents of Misgav are panicking about the court case,” said Mr Ben Ari, who heads a small dissident group called Alternative Voice in the Galilee.
He added that Ron Shani, who was elected Misgav’s mayor late last year, made opposition to the Zbeidats’ bid to live in Rakafet a major platform in his campaign.
Mr Shani defended the bylaw change last week to the Israeli media. “The council’s position is that it is appropriate to strengthen the character of the community – a community in which Zionist values and Jewish heritage stand at the heart of its way of life. We don’t see this as racism in any way.”
Mr Ben Ari said: “There is a widely held feeling in Misgav that changing the bylaws is a legitimate way for the Jewish minority in the Galilee to defend itself against an Arab and Islamic danger.
“The residents here are not right-wing types like Lieberman. They see themselves as liberals and in fact are made very uncomfortable by the Lieberman comparison.”
A bill proposed by Mr Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu party that conditioned citizenship on declaring loyalty to a Jewish state was rejected by a ministerial committee last week.
The bylaw, accepted by an overwhelming majority in Manof, stipulates that applicants must share “the values of the Zionist movement, Jewish heritage, settlement of the Land of Israel ... and observance of Jewish holidays”.
It also proposes that local children be encouraged to join the Zionist youth movement and the Israeli army.
A similarly worded proposal will come before another Misgav community, Yuvalim, later this month.
One resident opposed to the change, Arik Kirschenbaum, told the liberal Haaretz newspaper last week: “It suddenly seems as if we adopted bylaws from the settlements.”
Residents of Manof have been quoted in the Israeli media decrying accusations of racism.
“It’s unpleasant and even offensive to wake up one morning and find that you’ve turned into Lieberman,” said Alon Mayer, pointing out that Yisrael Beiteinu won only 2.5 per cent of Manof’s vote in the February general election.
Several residents were reported to fear that living alongside Arabs might lead to ethnic tensions and sectarian violence.
Suhad Bishara, a lawyer with the Adalah legal rights group who is representing the Zbeidats, said: “There is nothing unique or special about the way of life in these communities to justify this kind of restriction on admission.
“Rather, the purpose of the selection system is to make sure 80 per cent of the territory inside Israel is not accessible to Arabs, that the control of public resources stays exclusively in Jewish hands.”
The Zbeidats’ application was submitted after they were unable to find a building plot in Sakhnin. The town’s young couples face increasing difficulties building homes after much of Sakhnin’s land was turned over to Misgav’s jurisdiction.
Sakhnin officials point out that its 25,000 inhabitants have only one-twentieth of the land available to the 20,000 residents of Misgav’s 30 communities. An appeal by Sakhnin that it be awarded some of Misgav’s land was rejected by a boundary commission in 2005.
Misgav promotes itself, in the words of its website, as a model of “ethnic pluralism” because it includes 5,000 Bedouin.
However, critics note that Misgav’s Bedouin live in a handful of separate communities deprived of the land available to the Jewish communities.
The Bedouin inhabitants are generally denied basic services such as water and electricity, as well as schools and medical clinics. In one, Arab al Naim, the inhabitants are forced to live in tin shacks because permanent structures are demolished by the state.
Last week, three members of the Israeli parliament introduced a bill stipulating that vetting committees should assess candidates’ “suitability to the community’s way of life and social fabric”. The legislators said the bill would help in “maintaining the Zionist vision”.
Critics are calling the bylaw, adopted by Manof, home to 170 Jewish families in Galilee, a local “loyalty oath” similar to a national scheme recently proposed by the far-Right party of the government minister Avigdor Lieberman.
Other Jewish communities in the central Galilee – falling under the umbrella of a regional council known as Misgav – are preparing similar bylaws in response to a court petition filed by an Arab couple hoping to build a home in Misgav.
“It looks very much like this is being co-ordinated by the Misgav council in an attempt to pre-empt the court ruling,” said Ronin Ben Ari, resident of another Misgav community, Mikhmanim, and an opponent of the bylaw change.
Manof’s move comes in the wake of efforts by Ahmed and Fatina Zbeidat, who live in the neighbouring Arab town of Sakhnin, to win admission to the Misgav community of Rakafet.
Traditionally some 700 rural communities in Israel, including 30 in Misgav, have weeded out Arab applicants by issuing automatic rejections through special vetting committees. Arab citizens make up one-fifth of the country’s population.
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According to a legal rights group, rural communities, which are home to only five per cent of the population but have control over four-fifths of the countryside, are seen by the state as a bulwark against Arabs gaining access to what are called “national lands”.
However, the vetting system has been under threat since a court ruling in 2000 that required the committees to consider Arab applicants and justify their decisions.
In line with the ruling, the Zbeidats demanded the right to take a suitability test when their application was turned down in 2006. Examiners found Fatina too “individualistic” for life in a small community while her husband lacked “knowledge of sophisticated interpersonal relations”.
The Zbeidats then petitioned the courts against the use of vetting committees, saying they enforced “blatant discrimination” against Arab applicants.
Earlier this year, in an indication that the court was preparing to back them, it demanded that the attorney-general explain why the vetting committees should continue.
“There is little doubt that many residents of Misgav are panicking about the court case,” said Mr Ben Ari, who heads a small dissident group called Alternative Voice in the Galilee.
He added that Ron Shani, who was elected Misgav’s mayor late last year, made opposition to the Zbeidats’ bid to live in Rakafet a major platform in his campaign.
Mr Shani defended the bylaw change last week to the Israeli media. “The council’s position is that it is appropriate to strengthen the character of the community – a community in which Zionist values and Jewish heritage stand at the heart of its way of life. We don’t see this as racism in any way.”
Mr Ben Ari said: “There is a widely held feeling in Misgav that changing the bylaws is a legitimate way for the Jewish minority in the Galilee to defend itself against an Arab and Islamic danger.
“The residents here are not right-wing types like Lieberman. They see themselves as liberals and in fact are made very uncomfortable by the Lieberman comparison.”
A bill proposed by Mr Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu party that conditioned citizenship on declaring loyalty to a Jewish state was rejected by a ministerial committee last week.
The bylaw, accepted by an overwhelming majority in Manof, stipulates that applicants must share “the values of the Zionist movement, Jewish heritage, settlement of the Land of Israel ... and observance of Jewish holidays”.
It also proposes that local children be encouraged to join the Zionist youth movement and the Israeli army.
A similarly worded proposal will come before another Misgav community, Yuvalim, later this month.
One resident opposed to the change, Arik Kirschenbaum, told the liberal Haaretz newspaper last week: “It suddenly seems as if we adopted bylaws from the settlements.”
Residents of Manof have been quoted in the Israeli media decrying accusations of racism.
“It’s unpleasant and even offensive to wake up one morning and find that you’ve turned into Lieberman,” said Alon Mayer, pointing out that Yisrael Beiteinu won only 2.5 per cent of Manof’s vote in the February general election.
Several residents were reported to fear that living alongside Arabs might lead to ethnic tensions and sectarian violence.
Suhad Bishara, a lawyer with the Adalah legal rights group who is representing the Zbeidats, said: “There is nothing unique or special about the way of life in these communities to justify this kind of restriction on admission.
“Rather, the purpose of the selection system is to make sure 80 per cent of the territory inside Israel is not accessible to Arabs, that the control of public resources stays exclusively in Jewish hands.”
The Zbeidats’ application was submitted after they were unable to find a building plot in Sakhnin. The town’s young couples face increasing difficulties building homes after much of Sakhnin’s land was turned over to Misgav’s jurisdiction.
Sakhnin officials point out that its 25,000 inhabitants have only one-twentieth of the land available to the 20,000 residents of Misgav’s 30 communities. An appeal by Sakhnin that it be awarded some of Misgav’s land was rejected by a boundary commission in 2005.
Misgav promotes itself, in the words of its website, as a model of “ethnic pluralism” because it includes 5,000 Bedouin.
However, critics note that Misgav’s Bedouin live in a handful of separate communities deprived of the land available to the Jewish communities.
The Bedouin inhabitants are generally denied basic services such as water and electricity, as well as schools and medical clinics. In one, Arab al Naim, the inhabitants are forced to live in tin shacks because permanent structures are demolished by the state.
Last week, three members of the Israeli parliament introduced a bill stipulating that vetting committees should assess candidates’ “suitability to the community’s way of life and social fabric”. The legislators said the bill would help in “maintaining the Zionist vision”.
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