Protest Movement in Iran Fighting the Arrogance of Power

In Iran the talk is no longer simply of election fraud. The issue has long since become the regime's ignorance of the population and its contempt for their intelligence, writes the Iranian cultural journalist Parandis Ahmadi*

| Bild: Protests in Iran (photo: AP)
Bild vergrössern "Enough is enough!" It is above all women who have led the peaceful protests against the suspected election fraud and re-election of president Ahmadinejad | Initially the Iranians had not seen the presidential elections as worth wasting their breath on, never mind protesting about them. The debates in the run-up to the elections centred around the fact that it was clear the winner had been chosen already. Many Iranians said that the people who endorsed this system had always been murderers or thieves anyway.

Such comments and curses were always uttered in the safety of people's own homes however. Everyone was waiting for someone to come along, who would spark a new revolution. But as the Persian poet Akhavan-e Thaleth wrote:

"If there is no hope any more that a saviour such Nader Shah will come, then it is better that a destroyer such as Alexander the Great should come…" (An ironic reference to the Iranian king and successful conqueror, Nader Schah, who extended Iran's boundaries, and to Alexander, who razed Persepolis to the ground and caused the Achaemenid Persian Empire to fall.)

"Let the people starve, then they will obey!"

Iranians felt they had lost their courage, pride, the desire for freedom and even for revenge. The Iranian government had done something which Agha Mohammad Khan, a despotic Iranian king and founder of the Qajaren Dynasty, had described as the only way to control the Iranian population: "Let the people starve, then they will always obey!"

| Bild: Battle during the Iran-Iraq War (photo: AP)
Bild vergrössern During the First Gulf War, which lasted eight years in total, the Iranian civil population was mainly concerned with ensuring their personal economic survival | What has happened in the thirty years of the Islamic Republic?

Straight after the revolution countless women and men were killed, their crimes unknown, and many political leaders and opposition supporters were executed or forced into exile. Scores of young people were killed in the Iran-Iraq War; the population had to fight for its economic survival, and were mainly concerned with protecting their own families in this critical phase.

In the 1980s the Basij militias and the vice squad were not excessively concerned if people were married or not, but they did check carefully whether people had consumed any alcohol and searched their cars. If they discovered alcohol, video players, films or forbidden music cassettes they exploited their power to the full: people were imprisoned and flogged in the cells.

The "greatest sin" was for young men and women to take a walk together on the street. There was a period in which any unmarried couples they picked up were actually forced to marry.

A whole population in black

At that time our people's colours were black, grey and brown. Right from infant school children were forbidden even from wearing colourful socks.

| Bild: photo: AP
Bild vergrössern Iran's schoolchildren dressed as if in mourning: "At that time our people's colours were black, grey and brown," writes Parandis Ahmadi | At the beginning of the 1990s, with the spread of computers and the internet, the colours in people's lives changed a little. In Iran you cannot easily see people as they really are: at home they are free and colourful, but on the streets they wear black and the colours of mourning.

The cheerful colours of the different stations and sounds of diverse music eventually caused a change in society. Although satellite television is still banned in Iran, and Iranians are constantly forced to endure controls, where their homes are invaded and their satellite receivers confiscated, they soon find a way to watch the programmes again.

Step by step the people's desire for change also became visible in the clothes women chose to wear. And people wanted finally to be able to listen to whatever music they liked, not just classical, traditional Iranian music. First the state TV and radio company caved in, then the ministries for culture and Islamic leadership ("Ershad").

The bleached-out colour of war

In the Khatami era rock and pop music was heard alongside classical and traditional music. Theatre and cinema took new paths, with more contemporary subjects. The colour of war slowly receded beneath the colours of life. At the same time political and legal demands smouldered like glowing embers beneath the ashes.

| Bild: Mohammed Khatami during a speech given at the University of Tehran in 2004 (photo: AP)
Bild vergrössern A democratic beacon of hope turned disappointment to many reformist Iranians: during Khatami's period in office the chain murders of intellectuals and the suppression of the student protests of 1999 occurred | Because they saw a chance for reform within the existing political framework, people who were satisfied with the changes offered said "yes" to Khatami.

Freedom is a right which you have to take, and the people wanted to achieve this freedom, gently, step by step. Khatami's eight year period in office, which was more of a fight within the system than a fight for the wishes of the people, ended with imprisonments and attacks: the "chain murders" of countless opposition supporters and writers and the bloody suppression of the student protests on 9 July 1999, the "Eighteenth of Tir", in which many people were killed or incarcerated.

Black uniformed special police units were deployed to lock up anyone letting loud music be heard from their cars, along with any unmarried young people driving around the city. The presence of so much black spread fear and terror among the people.

Presidential elections with serious consequences

Then came the elections of 2005 when, thanks to low voter turnout, Mahmud Ahmadinejad was able to gain power. Till then few people even knew his name. Other presidential candidates spoke of fraud, but no significant protest took place.

Four years later and the people now knew how serious the consequences of the choice between bad and worse really can be. Many Iranians had been subjected to insults and incarceration from the vice squad, who clearly wanted to suppress the protests of the women's movement in its infancy. "We are the people who call the shots", was their message.

Together with the special units who, according to their own statements, were intended to drive the riffraff out of Tehran, this was the beginning of a military regime. The people were supposed to learn to conform and keep their mouths shut.

The slogan "Drug addiction is bad!" was plastered all over billboards and hoardings throughout the city. But where did all those illegal substances come from? Addiction and prostitution – and the health problems associated with them – increased rapidly over these four years.

"Down with Ahmadinejad!"

| Bild: photo: AP
Bild vergrössern After Ahmadinejad's election in 2005 the reform process begun under Khatami came to an abrupt end. The political pressure from civilian society has increased steadily since then | Most people therefore decided to participate in the next elections and give one of the other three candidates their vote, none of them could be a worse president than Ahmadinejad. People in Iran were becoming visibly poorer each day, yet luxury vehicles could be seen on the streets of Tehran, cars which were more expensive on the Iranian market than anywhere else in the world. In short: the president was subject to enormous criticism by this point.

During the election campaign the people raised the courage to go out onto the streets and support their candidates. This had never occurred once in the previous thirty years. The announcement of the election results finally pushed people over the edge.

A group of young women and men took on the organisation of the protest marches. They asked people to stay calm and simply raise their hands as a sign of protest. With their mere presence millions of Iranians showed their opposition to the regime. Khamenei's pronouncements caused the people's anger and determination to keep growing, leading to violence and death.

Slogans aimed at the entire political system

Up until Khamenei's speech at Friday prayers the people had simply been demanding an investigation into election fraud. After this their slogans were aimed at the entire political system. Now there is no more talk of election fraud. The issue is now the regime's ignorance of the people and its apparent contempt for their intelligence. Religious reformers have been imprisoned, in order to show that even people from the system's own ranks cannot expect to be treated tolerantly.

During all these events, one issue has been forgotten. Over the last thirty years Iranians have never known their government to reveal its cards. Given the powers the constitution allows the president, if Mir Hussein Mussawi were to be elected there might still be no change.

The most that could be hoped for would be a repeat of the Khatami era. Who has actually benefited from all this unrest?

Parandis Ahmadi
*The author's name changed by the editor for security reasons.

The Most Elegant Scene: Mass Protest in Tehran

An eyewitness writes from Tehran an account of Monday's massive demonstration for Mousavi. I am not including his name because we don't know how this will turn out and as a historian I have a duty to protect my interviewees, but it is not anonymous.

I left my home in Tajrish along with my family at 3 p.m. We went down Valiast Street which is the main northern-southern avenue in Tehran and entered the Evin Exp'way which leads to Enghelab Street. We knew that people are supposed to gather in Enghelab Sq. (Revolution Sq.) at 4 and march toward Azadi Sq. (Freedom Sq.). From Gisha Bridge onwards, we saw people walking down. Cars were blowing their horns and people were showing victory sign. We went to Navvab Street and parked our car at the end of the street. Then we took a taxi to bring us back to the Enghelab Street. On our way, near Jomhouri Sq. (Republic Sq.), I saw a group of about 20 militia with long beards and batons on motorbikes.

My hand was out of the car window with a little green ribbon (the sign of reformists) around my finger. One of the militia told me to throw that ribbon away. I showed him a finger.

All of a sudden, about 15 people attacked me inside the car. They beat me with their batons and wanted to pull me out. My wife and my daughter who were sitting in the back seat cried and hold me tight. I also hold myself tight on the chair. They wanted to shatter the car windows. The driver went out and explained that he is a taxi and we are his passengers and he has no fault. After about 5 minutes,they left. My elbow hurts severely.

Then, a young man from their group came and kissed my elbow! I told him: You know, I don't hate you. I am like you with the only difference that I know more and you are ignorant. He apologized and left.

We joined the crowd in Enghelab Street.

Read carefully:

What I saw today was the most elegant scene I had ever witnessed in my life. The huge number of people were marching hand in hand in full peace. Silence. Silence was everywhere. There was no slogan. No violence. Hands were up in victory sign with green ribbons. People carried placards which read: Silence. Old and young, man and woman of all social groups were marching cheerfully. This was a magnificent show of solidarity. Enghelab Street which is the widest avenue in Tehran was full of people. I was told that the march has begun in Ferdowsi Sq. and the end of the march was now in Imam Hossein Sq. to the further east of Tehran while on the other end people had already gathered in Azadi Sq.

The length of this street is about 6 kilometers. The estimate is about 2 million people [Cole: Western press reporting was up to 500,000 people]. On the way, we passed a police department and a militia (Baseej) base. In both places, the doors were closed and we could see fully-armed riot police and militia watching the people from behind the fences. Near Sharif University of Technology where the students had chased away Ahmadinejad a few days ago, Mirhossein Mousavi (the reformist elect president) and Karrubi (the other reformist candidate spoke to people for a few minutes which was received by cries of praise and applause.

I felt proud to find myself among such a huge number of passionate people who were showing the most reasonable act of protest. Frankly, I didn't expect such a political maturity from emotional Iranians who easily get excited. My family and I had put stickers on our mouths to represent the suppression. Placards that people carried were different; from poems by the national poet Ahmad Shamlu to light-hearted slogans against Ahmadinejad.

Examples include: " To slaughter us/ why did you need to invite us / to such an elegant party" (Poem by Shamlu). " Hello! Hello! 999? / Our votes were stolen" or " The Miracle of the Third Millenium: 2 x 2 = 24 millions" (alluding to the claim by Government that Ahmadinejad obtained 24 million votes) , "Where is my vote?" , " Give me back my vote" and many other.

We arrived in Azadi Square where the entire square was full of population. It is said that around 500,000 people can be accommodated in this huge square and it was full. Suddenly we saw smoke from Jenah Freeway and heard the gunshot. People were scared at first but then went forward.

I just heard the gunshots but my sister who had been on the scene at that part told me later that she saw 4 militia came out from a house and shot a girl. Then they shot a young boy in his eye and the bullet came out of his ear. She said that 4 people were shot. At least one person dead has been confirmed. People arrested one of the Baseeji militia but the three others ran away when they ran out of bullet. At around 8 we went back on foot.

On the way back people were still in the street and were chanting Allah Akbar (God is Great).

I was coming home at around 2 a.m. In parkway, I saw about ten buses full of armed riot police parked on the side of the street. Then I saw scattered militia in civil clothes with clubs in hand patroling the empty streets. In Tajrish Square, I saw a very young boy (around 16) with a club who was looking at the cars to see if he can find something to attack. I don't know how and under what teachings can young boys change into militia.

I came home. Tomorrow [Tuesday June 16], people will gather again in Valiasr Square for another peaceful march toward the IRIB building which controls all the media and which spreads filthy lies. The day before Yesterday, Ahmadinejad had hold his victory ceremony. Government buses had transported all his supporters from nearby cities. There was full coverage of that ceremony where fruit juice and cake was plenty. A maximum of 100,000 had gathered to hear his speech. These included all the militia and the soldiers and all supporters he could gather by the use of free TV publicity. Today, at least 2 million came only relying on word of mouth while reformists have no newspaper, no radio, no TV.

All their internet sites are filtered as well as social networks such as facebook. Text messaging and mobile communication was also cut off during the demonstration. Since yesterday, the Iranian TV was announcing that there is no license for any gathering and riot police will severely punish anybody who may demonstrates. Ahmadinejad called the opposition as a bunch of insignificant dirt who try to make the taste of victory bitter to the nation. He also called the western leaders as a bunch of "filthy homosexuals". All these disgusting remarks was today answered by that largest demonstration ever. Older people compared the demonstration of today with the Ashura Demonstration of 1979 which marks the downfall of the Shah regime and even said that it outnumbered that event.

The militia burnt a house themselves to find the excuse to commit violence. People neutralized their tactic to a large degree by their solidarity, their wisdom and their denial to enage in any violent act.

I feel sad for the loss of those young girls and boys. It is said that they also killed 3 students last night in their attack at Tehran University residence halls. I heard that a number of professors of Sharif University and AmirKabir University (Tehran Polytechnic) have resigned.

Democracy is a long way ahead. I may not be alive to see that day. With eyes full of tear in these early hours of Tuesday 16th June 2009, I glorify the courage and bravery of those martyrs and I hope that their blood will make every one of us more committed to freedom, to democracy and to human rights.

Viva Freedom, Viva Democracy, Viva Iran

1984

I was born in 1984, amid a devastating war that had laid waste and destruction to my country. I was born between two subsequent nights of bombing raids. I was born into rationing, despair and hardship. I was born when young lives perished at the fronts. My father later told me that when I was born 1984 sounded so much like the 1984 predicted by Orwell. But my birth had turned over the glum outlook for my parents and 1984 had become a sign of hope, a hope for a future to come, or as my father put it, “a better future for my child to live.”

My parents were not alone in this. During the baby boom of 1983 to 1986, millions of us came into this world, mouths to feed and miracles to be cherished. There and then a new generation was born, a generation who would bear witness to the legacy of generations of their parents, a legacy that was mainly composed of one thing, “the Islamic Republic.”

In later years, in our schools, on TV, in books and newspapers they told us that before our time lived a tyrant who held a firm grip on our country, and that the defiant and valiant nation of Iran had risen up and overthrown him to establish three things, “Esteghlal, Azadi, Jomhouri Eslami.”

Independence.

Freedom.

Islamic Republic.

We were fascinated by the epic tales of young students, some as young as thirteen who during the war had sacrificed themselves for the greater good of the society. We were made to believe that we were living in Utopia, but the delusion only lasted a few years. Before long, that once naïve and innocent generation of 1984 had grown to be the young men and women of Iran, the so called third generation of the revolution.

Faced with harsh realities of life we quickly came to realize that our world was far from the Utopia painted for us. It was more like a Dystopia where we had to fight for every single right, every single freedom.You have denied us so much.

Out of this dark age one day emerged a man with qualities of a hero who would lead this generation out of this Dystopia and into that promised paradise. His name was Mohammad Khatami. Yet it turned out that he was neither the hero everyone expected him to be, nor did he have the capacity or desire to lead them out. To be fair things started crawling toward progress and modernization; there was a smaller degree of social rights and freedom, but it did not come at the pace that this restless third generation wanted.

Thus a hero fell, and four years of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad started.

By the end of the four years, we were desperate for change. Hope materialized in the shape of Mir Hossein Mousavi, who happened to be the prime minister that now long gone 1984. But the totalitarians ruling the Dystopia swooped in and crushed that last bit of hope.

In Brecht’s “Life of Galileo,” Galileo’s students condemn him at the end of the court proceedings with these words: “Pity the nation that doesn’t have a hero.”

“Pity the nation that needs a hero,” he responds wisely.

My generation is tired of being disillusioned. We refuse to accept the status quo and we have risen up in defiance. I am not sure how long it will take for the totalitarians to crush our resistance. For now though, we’re holding up just fine. We’re holding up fine even though our brothers at Basij and the police are murdering their dear fellow Iranians. We’re holding up even though you bash us with clubs and batons and try to suffocate us with your tear gas.

A nation stands tall refusing to succumb that easily.

Yesterday among the crowds who were just back from the warzone with their wounds and anger and sadness, I spotted an old friend of mine.

“Welcome to 1984, my friend,” he said in great anguish.

I nodded in agreement; we’d come full circle.

He went on, “There we were facing the bloodthirsty riot police, hand in hand, like that ‘Brothers in Arms’ song from Dire Straits.”

It was in that moment that I realized why the French Revolutionaries added “Fraternity” to their revolutionary slogan.

Cosi fan Kiarostami

The Iranian director Abbas Kiarostami’s production of Mozart’s Cosi fan Tutte has read like a film script. First seen at Aix-en-Provence last year, the production, which opens this month as part of the English National Opera’s (ENO) summer season, has been directed long-distance by Kiarostami from Tehran.

Having encountered frustrating treatment at the hands of the British embassy in Iran while attempting to arrange a visa, the director took the decision not to travel to London. Instead, the reins were passed to the assistant director Elaine Tyler-Hall, and Kiarostami remained director in absentia, guiding the cast through e-mails and telephone calls.

His involvement marks the film world’s latest foray into the world of opera, but the idea of film directors taking on the genre of opera is nothing new. In 1940, the Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow invited Sergei Eisenstein to stage Richard Wagner’s Die Walkure. Since then, Ingmar Bergman, Andrei Tarkovsky, Baz Luhrmann, Luchino Visconti, Roman Polanski, Francis Ford Coppola, William Friedkin and Woody Allen have all turned their considerable talents to opera. Later this month, Anthony Minghella’s Madame Butterfly will return to London after a successful spell in New York. The Chinese film director Zhang Yimou will stage a production of the opera Turandot at the Bird’s Nest Olympic Stadium in Beijing this autumn. Since the Olympics ended last summer, organisers have struggled to make use of the space afforded by the building or to draw visitors. It is hoped that this large-scale production will help to transform the Bird’s Nest into an arts venue.

Despite this long and successful association between film and opera, Kiarostami was initially concerned about taking on the commission. He frequently scores his films with classical music, but Cosi fan Tutte marks his first opera. Having been approached by Bernard Foccroulle, the general director of the Aix-en-Provence festival, to direct the work, the Iranian said yes, despite harbouring reservations about cultural differences and a lack of operatic knowledge.
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But on reading the libretto, he realised that the themes of the opera were both universal and timeless, and therefore would potentially appeal to a wider audience. He also recognised that the theatrical intimacy of the opera, which revolves around the dealings of six main characters, was not dissimilar to the intimacy promoted in much of his screen work.

Such works include The Wind Will Carry Us, the story of a city engineer who journeys to rural Iran and discovers new social values; Ten, which details a female driver’s conversations with passengers, and A Taste of Cherry, a contemplative tale of a middle-aged man who has resolved to commit suicide for which Kiarostami won the Palme d’Or at Cannes in 1997.

The opera begins with an elderly gentleman known as Don Alfonso suggesting to two lovers that their fiancées are not to be trusted. The men, however, maintain that their women are loyal and faithful. A cash bet ensues and a plan is concocted by Alfonso to prove that all women are the same, the suggested meaning of “cosi fan tutte”.

The plot involves the men pretending that they have been called up for obligatory military service, but secretly disguising themselves and testing the honesty of the other’s female companion. What starts out as harmless fun degenerates into something more sinister as the women become receptive to their new partners. Billed as an opera buffa, or comedy, Cosi fan Tutte is a revealing and at times disturbing portrait of fickleness, self-deception and the duplicity and arbitrariness of love.

For Kiarostami, a director concerned with human interaction and notions of selfhood, the opera’s interrogation of morality and interest in the competing notions of ruthless pragmatism and naive idealism, was an attractive formula.

Kiarostami’s film roots are clear in the ENO production and scenes are played against pre-recorded backdrops. In the opening act, Don Alfonso, Ferrando and Guglielmo argue about the nature of women in front of shocked customers at a Neapolitan café. The filmed crowd reacts to the protagonists, amplifying and increasing the resonance of the three performers on stage. There are parallels in this technique with his recent film, Shirin, in which the faces and emotional reactions of 100 women are recorded as they watch a film.

In many of Cosi fan Tutte’s later scenes, Kiarostami uses a series of shots of the Italian coast. Boats are shown arriving and departing, helping to disguise the men’s plot and heightening the emotional response of the women as they watch their lovers helplessly from the shore. In the final scenes, film of ENO’s orchestra and the director Stefan Klingele accompanies the mock wedding; Klingele’s celluloid figure takes a bow as the final chords die away.

The effect of these backdrops is to transform the often static and remote world of the opera into something living, breathing and believable. The backdrops never distract from the central action on stage, but instead enhance its presence. Kiarostami combines his filmmaking abilities with a passion for photography, graphic art and set design to produce a multilayered, dimensional setting. Images of the vast sea seem to open up the walls of London’s Coliseum theatre, disintegrating the barrier between real and imagined, while the inclusion of the orchestral footage paradoxically – and quite deliberately – reminds the audience that it is exactly that; a spectator in a staged drama.

“Film, music and theatre are currently so linked that it is difficult to separate them,” says Tyler-Hall. “The different media are so mixed nowadays that people from different backgrounds and with different approaches are able to bring something new to fields beyond that of their own expertise. It isn’t that opera was stuck in a rut before film directors turned to the genre, but that we now have an overarching and detailed view of the opera, from different angles. Film directors often have unique vision and imagination.”

“It is a very different way of working,” she continues. “But once they appreciate the different demands of the genre, they are able to fully explore their vision. When you are using new techniques and rehearsing and rehearsing sometimes it is easy for film directors to become frightened of losing the freshness. On screen, they strive to capture that freshness. If they lose that freshness, they need to find a way of rediscovering and recapturing it for each audience, so that it remains tangible over and over again.

“The presence of film directors in the world of opera is a positive thing. They are making productions accessible to a whole new audience and that is something that the ENO is passionate about. The joys of opera should not be locked away or reserved for a select audience. Directors like Kiarostami are helping to bring a new audience to opera and opera to a new audience.”

Leaping across the fire to embrace Nevruz

ISTANBUL - Few days of the year have more historical significance than the current turning point on Earth’s orbit: spring equinox. For many people in Turkey and its near abroad, the day is celebrated as a new year holiday and is recognized as the official birth of spring.

Leaping across the fire to embrace Nevruz Turks call it Nevruz, which this year will fall on Monday, March 23, but it is also known as Newruz to the Kurds and many people across the Middle East. It is an ancient holiday based on astronomical calculations. Ancient night-sky observers were experts because it was essential to calculate when plants would appear, when a crop should be sewn and when the ceremonies customarily held on special dates such as the spring equinox should be carried out.

Very little is known about the origins of the celebrations. The first time they appear in historical records is in regard to celebrations in ancient Persia. Even then the roots cannot be determined with any certainty because of earlier civilizations that arose in China and India. It is also known that Incas in ancient Peru celebrated the spring equinox.

Western historians believe that the festival originated with the Zoroastrians who followed a religion and philosophy. The dates for the appearance of this monotheistic religion vary widely from after 330 BC to 6000 BC. However there was a belief among the Persians that this day was the first day of the New Year, hence NawRuz (naw, new; ruz, year) and the belief continues.

One cannot underestimate that significance of this because this seems to be a time of celebration that spread to many other countries in the vicinity of Persia. Nowruz is celebrated in Greater Iran, Caucasus, Central Asia and by Iranians worldwide. It is a public holiday in Iran, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kashmir and Kyrgyzstan. Iran also celebrates it as their New Year’s Day.


Additionally the Nowruz is also celebrated by Kurds in Iraq and Turkey and among some of the Alevi groups.

The Turks believe Nevruz originated at the time when their ancestors finally escaped from the mountains of Central Asia. Ergenekon is a legendary place located in the inaccessible valleys of the Altay Mountains where the Turkic peoples were first gathered. [Today it has a far different connotation as it has been applied to an alleged conspiracy of prominent people in Turkey to destabilize the country.] The Kurds consider Nevruz their day of liberation from oppression as expressed in a legend about the evil king Dehaq being overcome by the Blacksmith Kawa who subsequently led the people through Ergenekon Mountain to freedom.

Practices and beliefs

One of the main concepts of Nevruz is the importance of light. It is a victory of a god of light over the powers of darkness, a basic tenet in Zoroastrianism. We see a similar belief in Greek mythology when a god or goddess descends into Hades for three days. Persephone comes to mind, the Greek girl who marries the god of darkness and can leave to return to the surface of the Earth but she mustn’t eat anything. Finally she can’t bear it and eats six pomegranate seeds. From then on she can only stay on the surface for six months and the rest are spent underground.

Zoroaster is supposed to have preached in the royal court of Bactria. He preached that there were two forces in the world, good and evil, and that they were in combat with each other. There was no life at that time but eventually there was and when the cycle of life began it was termed the new day or Nevruz. It is the ceremonial rituals and traditions surrounding this cosmology that form the roots of Nevruz.

How the celebrations were held in the first days is unknown with the exception of lighting bonfires. Leaping across them would be part of a purification ritual in which everyone would be rid of their illnesses or bad luck. They would also demonstrate their bravery and agility at the same time. In addition to that, eggs formed an important part of the rituals with eggs being dyed yellow, green and red. These are the three colors associated with today’s Kurds.

Today lighting bonfires is usually done outside of urban areas to prevent any serious fires breaking out. The festivities might continue over several days starting from the time of the equinox but usually between the 20th and 24th of March. In Iran this occurs over 12 days and in Azerbaijan over four weeks. Since it was related to purification, people would bathe and then put on new clothes; over time bathing as part of the tradition was eliminated but the donning of new clothes continues as it represents freshness and the new.

The cleansing ritual became a serious spring-cleaning as well with almost every household in Persia participating. Then on Nevruz Day, people would put on their new clothes and visit elder members of their families and friends.

Coming to Islam, these celebrations have nothing to do with the Muslim religion but rather are connected with folk traditions. That doesn’t mean there weren’t any thoughts on the issue. Since at the equinox day and night are of equal length, Islamic belief is that was the way the Earth was created and so celebrating the equinox is to celebrate the creation of the Earth. Similarly when Allah started the stars turning, that is considered the New Year and celebrated as such.

Another belief is Nevruz was the day when the Prophet Moses was leading his people out of Egypt

Iran: the day the revolution lost its way

The CIA under US President Dwight Eisenhower orchestrated a coup d’etat in 1953 against the Iranian prime minister Mohammed Mosaddeq, one of the first democratically elected leaders in the region. It took the US government half a century to admit any wrongdoing and offer a tepid apology to the Iranian people for meddling in their affairs. Madeleine Albright, the former US Secretary of State, announced in the twilight of the Clinton administration that “it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs”. Too little, too late.

Mr Mossadegh had irked Britain and the US when he nationalised the Iranian oil industry. The Iranian people never forgave the US for his removal and 30 years ago this month they expelled the Shah after months of riots and rallies in the street, replacing him with the Ayatollah Khomeini as their unquestionable leader. Ironically, the revolution of 1979 included not only religious leaning conservatives but also communists, nationalists as well as liberals. People from all walks of life resented what the American government had done in 1953 as well as the wide spread corruption in the Iranian government, and the Shah as its embodiment. Similarly, Khomeini, consciously or not, came to embody a way forward. He was the anti-Shah who called for the outright ousting of the former emperor and won the support of Iranians across the board.

Initially, Khomeini appointed a western educated liberal by the name of Mehdi Bazargan who had volunteered for the French army to fight against Nazi Germany. Mr Bazargan campaigned for human rights and democracy during the rule of the Shah and continued to appeal for calm and reason throughout the revolution.

On November 4 1979, upon hearing the news of the US embassy’s takeover by Iranian youth, and the Ayatollah’s condoning of it, prime minister Bazargan resigned in protest as he had previously given American diplomats assurance of their safety. That is the day the revolution lost its way. Iran has gone from crisis to crisis ever since.

First Iran tried so called “collaborators” within the previous regime in makeshift overnight courts and went as far as executing some of them. Then the hostage crisis emerged, lasting 444 days, and when it concluded, Iran entered into a futile war with the former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein that lasted eight long years.

Iran paradoxically seemed to be more occupied with issues further afield and neglect matters in its immediate surroundings. Backing Hizbollah, Hamas, Venezuela and Syria would be less odd if Iran had spent some time tackling issues in its immediate vicinity and within its own borders. For example, Iran reinforced its occupation of three of the UAE’s islands, refusing to enter into any talks with the UAE Government toward a settlement, contributing to tensions with its Arab Gulf neighbours.

On its north-western border, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has yet to be resolved. The re-emergence of the Taliban, an ultra conservative rival to Iran’s Shia regime to its north-east seems to have escaped the Iranian government’s attention. And to its west, Iran has neglected the Kurdish question. Kurds comprise 15 per cent of the population and share sympathies with their brethren in Iraq and Turkey. News reports have even claimed that Osman Ocalan, the brother of the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan sought refuge in Iran’s Kurdish territory in 2007.

On Iran’s south-west border with Pakistan, the Jundollah, or God’s Soldiers, made up of disenfranchised Sunni militants from Iran’s neglected Baluchi minority, have taken up an armed struggle against the government. In 2007 they kidnapped 30 people and killed 11 Iranian Revolutionary Guards. In 2008 they abducted and killed 16 policemen.

And most importantly, within its borders Iran has to deal with an unemployment rate of 20 per cent and a staggering rate of inflation at 26 per cent, as well as dwindling oil revenues.

This is not an exercise in bashing Iran, a country for which I have a lot of respect. It is however an exercise to point to the challenges that are facing the country on its immediate borders and within.

Thankfully, the UAE Government has taken the right path in its dealings with Iran by continuing to emphasise good neighbourly relations as well as trade links. A revealing example of how importantly Iran regards its trade with the UAE emerged when it described the US pressure to limit the UAE’s trade with Iran as “illegal”, saying it would jeopardise the region’s economy.

Finally, maybe Iran should consider concentrating on its immediate challenges such as tackling unemployment and cross border terrorism rather than waste time with Hugo Chavez’s deliriums, Hassan Nasrallah and Khaled Meshaal’s empty rhetoric and the Holocaust denial conferences.

Maybe then, just maybe, the Iranian revolution would once again find its way.

Fear, fascination, delusion: the legacies of Iran’s revolution

Thirty years ago this week, a frail 77-year old cleric landed in Tehran, where he was welcomed by millions of enthusiastic Iranians. His revolutionary ideas about Islam’s place in political life and role in the world would soon transform his country into a bastion of Islamic radicalism.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini sits today in the pantheon of revolutionary leaders of the 20th century, a man who inspired and guided from exile a revolution that brought down one of the Middle East’s strongest autocrats and who then returned to install a brutal theocratic system, the survival, workings and ambitions of which still confound many.

Iran’s revolution, like all others, is a tale of idealism mugged by the reality of power. And like all revolutions it has its share of glory, lies, myths, heroes, villains, and victims. Mohamed Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, a weak character torn between modernist and autocratic instincts, was its first victim: with him went any chance of a return to monarchy. The real victims, though, were the liberal, leftist and nationalist factions that allied with the religious fundamentalists against the Shah, only to be consumed by them. In the ruthless battle for legitimacy and power during the first years, the fundamentalists proved better at using the mob and manipulating events.

What made Iran’s revolution so special was its blend of religion and populism. Popular uprisings elsewhere were all about reducing the power of the church. In reaction to decades of frenetic modernisation, Islam became the rallying cry of diverse factions in Iran, despite meaning different things to each. The most radical version of the mosque prevailed. Power was concentrated at the top through the velayet al-faqih, or rule of jurisprudence: the Supreme Guide has overriding authority over affairs of church and state, and oversees a system purposely fragmented to prevent the rise of powerful competitors.

Iran also became the best illustration of the “king’s dilemma”: when a leader shows vision and implements political, economic and social reforms, he can unleash the very forces that threaten his legitimacy and hold on power. So the memory of the Shah’s fate continues to impede reform elsewhere in the Middle East.

An anniversary is always a good time to reflect on achievements. By one measure at least, the Islamic revolution has been a success: the system it engendered has survived 30 years of war, isolation, internal intrigue, economic mismanagement and popular disenchantment. Some of those in power in today’s Iran belong to the first generation of revolutionaries, but the system has trained and empowered others, among whom the most famous is President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Iran has also emerged as the primary beneficiary of Middle East dynamics and the failure of US policies.

But contrary to the perception of an all-powerful Iran, the revolution has not given birth to a geopolitical or economic giant. You do not see people queuing outside Iranian embassies to relocate to Tehran. Instead, Iranians travel to Damascus, Dubai and other places to obtain visas for Europe or America. For the many Iranians needing time away from revolutionary rigour, Dubai has become a second, vibrant home. For a people of such pride and grandeur, there is a bitter realisation that other models have worked better.

Then there is the paradox of dropping religiosity in a theocratic state. The corruption and sordid episodes in which the clergy has been implicated have done enormous damage to clerical rule. Much of Iran’s economy is informal, with many government entities operating outside the purview of the state. Iran’s economic dislocation is massive, and its best measure is the inability to properly manage and capitalise on the windfall from recent high oil prices.

On the international level there is much talk about Iran’s resurgence. But while the alliances with Syria and Venezuela may be solid, they have no societal texture and are unworthy of a country that pitches itself as a regional power. Even in Iraq, where Iranian influence is certainly pervasive, there is no rush to adopt Islamic revolutionary tenets, especially the velayet al-faqih.

Hizbollah is probably Iran’s most tangible foreign policy success, an ideological ally that has made Tehran a power in the eastern Mediterranean and the Levant. But many Iranians are uncomfortable with an alliance with a tiny and troublesome partner that costs so much, alienates so many and tarnishes Iran’s image.

Many achievements of the revolution are also uncertain. Take velayet al-faqih. It is challenged from within (there is talk of transferring its powers to a Council after the death of Ali Khamenei) and without (Grand Ayatollahs Ali Sistani of Iraq and Mohammed Hussain Fadlallah of Lebanon dispute its religious basis).

Do not be fooled by Iran’s tub-thumping and Ahmadinejad’s bombast. Iran’s power is shackled by its internal weaknesses. Abroad, its appeal is limited because it is Persian and Sh’ite in a region dominated by Arabs and Sunnis, and its influence is checked by regional powerhouses such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

Oddly, the US and others routinely inflate Iranian power. For the US it is routine to portray Iran as an existential threat to drum up support for its policies. For the rest of the world, it is part fascination (those who fall for the revolutionary romance), part fear (mainly Iran’s Arab neighbours) and part delusion (think of Hugo Chavez and Fidel Castro).

If anything the revolution has demonstrated the resilience of Iranian society. It has survived and adapted to many calamities, but remains vibrant and creative.

Henry Kissinger once said that Iran had a choice between being a nation or a cause. Clinging to the latter is doing enormous damage to the former. A nation is not built on slogans such as “Death to America” and “Death to Israel”, but on national cohesion and purpose. So for all the confidence and pride on display this month, from the launch of a satellite to the inevitable military parades, the revolution is far from settled and victorious.

Stolen Kisses: Iran's Sexual Revolutions

A few years ago, in the course of researching her dissertation on changing sexual mores in the Islamic Republic of Iran, a young Iranian-American anthropologist named Pardis Mahdavi stopped by the Ministry of Education in Tehran to inquire about the country's sex education curriculum. Another visitor happened to be there. An older woman named Mrs. Erami, she was covered head to toe in the most conservative form of Iranian hijab: the tentlike black chador, held in place by the wearer's teeth such that it obscures half the face. Under her chador, Mrs. Erami wore another voluminous layer of hijab, including a hoodlike head scarf and a long, loose coat. Hers was the uniform of the government faithful, the traditional-minded and the sexually puritanical--the very image of the older generation that Mahdavi's main research subjects, Tehrani youth, rebuffed with their outsized vanity and sexual libertinism.

But Mrs. Erami had come to the ministry on a mission related to Mahdavi's. She taught courses on health, puberty and relationships at a Tehran high school, and she had come to talk to the minister about her frustration with her students' unwillingness to discuss sexual matters frankly with her. In a country where premarital sex with multiple partners is increasingly common but remains culturally taboo and punishable under the law, this severe-looking, chador-clad woman was, at a glance, hardly the person in whom one might feel comfortable confiding one's illicit activities or seeking intimate advice. Mahdavi didn't even feel comfortable letting the older woman see her nail polish, which is illegal but commonplace in Iran. Nonetheless, Mrs. Erami could not understand her students' reticence. "They are so difficult," she told Mahdavi. "I can't get them to talk to me, but I know what they are doing and what they are not doing. I had a teenage daughter myself, and I know that they are having a lot of sex, but not doing it right. I just can't get them to talk to me about it."
Mrs. Erami, it turns out, is one of the more dramatic products of the generational upheaval in Iranian attitudes toward sex. A conservative Muslim, she was not sympathetic, some years before her encounter with Mahdavi, when her gay son came out of the closet. Her husband threw him out of the house. When their unmarried daughter announced that she had a boyfriend, Mrs. Erami slapped her and called her a prostitute. The daughter left home that day, never to return. And so the Eramis lost both of their children over their unwillingness to accept sexual behavior that had become the norm not only globally but even within many circles inside Iran. A year later Mrs. Erami's husband died, leaving his wife entirely alone and flooded with regret. That was when she devoted herself to sex education reform, both as a teacher and as a campaigner within Iran's education ministry.

This story is one of the gems buried in Mahdavi's new book, Passionate Uprisings: Iran's Sexual Revolution. Mrs. Erami's tale encapsulates the wrenching transformation of a society that, thirty years ago, attempted to resolve its divisions and ambivalences by legally and ideologically committing itself to tradition over modernity, even at the price of denial, repression and loss. Today's Iranian youth, especially those from the urban middle and upper classes, are no longer willing to accept that bargain, and the older generation is beginning to allow itself to be moved by the young. Mahdavi's best and most groundbreaking material has to do with the public health implications of this rift between generations and between acknowledged and unacknowledged behaviors, as well as the society's slow and patchy but often ingenious educational response.

In a country where run-of-the-mill dating and fashion are illegal, extreme practices have emerged in the private spaces occupied particularly by well-off, heterosexual Tehrani youth. Mahdavi shows up at a party, thrown by a mullah's daughter whose parents are out of town, that turns out to be a giant orgy. Smaller parties, too, frequently become occasions for group sex. Out on the heavily policed city streets, young people cruise for anonymous sex partners by passing notes into the windows of neighboring cars when they are stuck in traffic, or by driving to poor neighborhoods where nobody will recognize them as they scour the sidewalks for partners they hope never to see again. Adultery, for women, is punishable by stoning in Iran, but fully half of Mahdavi's married, female research subjects are unfaithful to their husbands; for many of them, picking up lovers is a regular form of recreation. And despite the legal requirement that women in Iran cover their hair and hide the curves of their bodies, fashion obsesses the women in Mahdavi's study. They apply layer after layer of makeup, and they find ways to make the hijab as sexy as the skimpy summer attire of Western women.

While this portrait of Iranian sexual experimentation may be shocking on its surface, it has grown familiar to most people who have visited Iran or followed cultural developments there in the past decade. Less well known is that, for all their promiscuity and seeming sophistication, many of these young Iranians suffer from a lack of sexual education and resources that fits the official culture of pious abstinence rather than the actual one of looseness and risk. The birth control method of choice among Mahdavi's informants is withdrawal. Women who take the pill frequently lack the most basic information and take it only erratically, depriving themselves of almost all of its effect. Condoms are considered so filthy and embarrassing that even people who share florid details about their sex lives with Mahdavi blush at their mention, and no one wants to be seen requesting them at a pharmacy. AIDS, educated young Iranians tell Mahdavi, is transmitted through visits to the dentist or hairdresser, and other STDs come only from a certain unsavory sort of woman. While wealthy women can obtain abortions--illegal in most cases but common, thanks to poor contraception--from sympathetic doctors at vast expense, poorer women acquire on the black market pills or injections meant for animals. Mahdavi went to a back street where dealers sell these medications, just to see how easily they could be acquired. A dealer sold her a vial of pills without the least instruction on what to do with them. Physicians she interviewed told her that they see a great many women seriously injured or rendered infertile by self-administered abortions meant for animals.

On its face, Iranian state ideology conflicts with the requirements of public health, given the sea change in public attitudes toward sex. Yet there is good news in Mahdavi's study. Close to the ground, where it counts, Iranian doctors, parents, educators and even institutions are bending to the forces of change. For example, since 2000 the Islamic Republic has required Iranians who seek marriage licenses to attend state-administered classes on family planning. One that Mahdavi attended in Tehran's central business district sounds perfectly appalling. A chador-clad woman shrilly lectures a room of gum-snapping, nail-filing, indifferent young women, offering the following counsel: "You must always be ready for your husband's sexual needs. If perchance he is watching a football game on television, you should be resting to prepare yourself, or else preparing your bed for the evening. If you should feel overcome by fatigue yourself, make sure always to ask your husband, 'Is there anything else you need from me?' or 'Would you like to have me later?' before retiring."

But then Mahdavi attends another such class, this time in the city's north, in the upscale shopping district near the Tajrish bazaar. This class covers disease transmission, contraception, fertility, mental health, marital relations and even female sexual pleasure. The teachers wear the less forbidding hijab--head scarf and fitted thigh-length coat--common among their students, and the women attending these classes, Mahdavi reports, confide freely to the teachers about their relationships and their sex lives. Here, and in her chapter about the older generation's response to the sexual revolution, Mahdavi shows us a society beginning to shake off its denial and rigidity out of the sheer necessity of serving the burgeoning needs of its young--a generation of adults who have either grown sympathetic to young people's yearnings or, like Mrs. Erami, recognize that they risk greater losses than they can bear.

Something major is happening--a generational shift, a process of social change on which Islamic law has only limited effect. But how deeply does it penetrate Iranian society, divided as Iranians are by geography and class? And how political is this movement in a country where politics is a live wire?

Mahdavi cannot be everywhere at once, and her study does not purport to explain the sexual behavior of everyone in Iran. Rather, it focuses on upper-middle-class, heterosexual Tehrani youth. This is a subculture worth studying--Tehran is a city of 14 million and a trendsetter for smaller Iranian cities--but Mahdavi is also aware of the study's limitations. Most significant, it excludes the social base of the ruling regime, which is rural Iran, where village life is the norm and values may be changing but where they remain, by all accounts, more traditional than in the bigger cities. Although she includes a few lower-class urban young people in Passionate Uprisings, we don't get to know them as well as we do the better-off informants. These omissions become significant mainly because Mahdavi makes big claims for her Tehrani revelers: their actions are not only political, in her view, but revolutionary; they are intended, finally, to bring about regime change.

In a narrow sense, this claim is obviously true. Insofar as the Iranian regime mandates Islamic dress and abstinence until marriage, young people who force the government to loosen these restrictions by defying them are engaged in a political act--one that is effectively changing an aspect of the regime. But there is something tautological about this observation, and Mahdavi does not draw out any deeper links between the political movements, like the one for secular democracy, roiling Iran and the changing sexual mores she observed.

What she does document is a groundswell of young people who reject Islamic sexual morality, feel they should have the right to associate with whomever they wish and to do what they please with their bodies, and who are willing to risk brief, but plenty unpleasant, run-ins with the morality police in the name of fashion, partying, dating and sex. Some of Mahdavi's subjects describe a night or two spent in a jail cell; others are whipped, and one couple is forced to marry. (Mahdavi doesn't say whether class differences among offenders figure in the ways the morality police mete out punishment.) Does Mahdavi imagine that these young people, if granted a modicum of personal, sartorial and social freedom, would fight on--for freedom of expression, freedom of religion, prison reform, representative government, an independent judiciary that respects the rights of the individual? For the rights and freedoms, in the end, of others?

Those who would choose to fight such battles, and to make the sacrifices that such a fight would entail, are few in any society, and Mahdavi's subjects are not to be faulted for choosing the already uphill battle to enjoy their youth. But the distinction is worth noting, mainly because it is not lost on the Iranian regime, which has shown a willingness to cut deals with its populace--loosening social restrictions, or turning a blind eye toward parties or translucent head scarves in upscale neighborhoods, precisely while tightening the screws on political activism and the independent press. Hence, Mahdavi is optimistic for the future of reform and brushes off the crackdown under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, which has had only limited effect on fashion and sexual practices. But she does not mention the wholesale exclusion of reformers from government, or the imprisonment and torture of dozens of feminist activists, starting in 2006, for the crime of circulating a petition calling for the amendment of laws that classify women as second-class citizens. (Among other things, the petition calls for equal rights for women in marriage, inheritance and divorce; an increase in the age of criminal responsibility from 9 to 18 for girls and from 15 to 18 for boys; the prosecution of honor killings; equal consideration of a woman's testimony in court to that of a man; and an end to the capital punishment of female adulterers.) The political claims Mahdavi makes for Tehran's sexual revolution are, or should be, complicated by these developments.

Somehow, one suspects that the grassroots push to change sexual mores cannot be totally divorced from the effort, on the part of feminist activists but also some reformist parliamentarians and even liberal-minded clerics, to improve the status of Iranian women under the law. But the women in Mahdavi's study seem to occupy a wholly perplexing historical moment, or a palimpsest of historical moments. They live in a theocracy with a premodern, religious legal code, and they are undergoing, all at once, what we in the West would recognize as a 1960s-style sexual revolution, 1970s-style second-wave feminism and the contemporary postfeminist embrace of female sexuality, with all its complexities. The messages these women receive are mixed, to say the least. Mahdavi describes some of her married subjects as spending literally hours every day on their makeup and clothes and the rest of their time cruising the city for lovers. In a society that tells these women they should be chaste, domestic slaves to their husbands, who in turn have the freedom to acquire up to four wives and as many as 99 "temporary" wives, this could be seen as a kind of female empowerment. But there is something undeniably sterile about it as well.

The lives Mahdavi describes are rich in fleeting pleasures and bereft of deep engagement, whether personal, political or professional. It is a dissolution one feels at the heart of contemporary Iranian middle-class culture, and it has to do with the structure of the postrevolutionary state, which has written off huge swaths of its population in its economy, culture and politics. Unemployment is highest among educated young people, who traditionally live with their parents until marriage. Many twentysomething Tehranis--bored, sexually frustrated, infantilized by the state and their families--live like teenagers in small-town America. They spend a lot of time in cars, getting high on ingeniously obtained or concocted substances, and looking for sex. Is this a sign of political ferment or of a disused demographic--unmoored and decadent, dissipating its energies--for which its country has no use?

Mahdavi does not press such inquiries. Nor, notably, does she ask her subjects about religion. By engaging in sexual behavior the state deems "un-Islamic," do Iranian young people feel they are questioning the state's monopoly on Islam, or are they questioning Islamic sexual morality itself? Are her subjects evidence of a secularizing culture, or have they found a way to absorb Islamic spirituality while flouting Sharia law? The absence of searching analysis along any of these lines is striking, and it prevents Mahdavi's extensive collection of anecdotes and informants from rising above the level of observation.

In fact, what she calls ethnography often feels more like a thinly academicized memoir of the Iranian party scene. Mahdavi, who grew up in California and spent extensive time doing research in Iran, gets in the way of her subject by compulsively inserting herself, often in self-flattering terms, into the frame. We never hear her subjects speak without also seeing Mahdavi nod and smile. She includes her diary entries verbatim and emphasizes her feelings about the parties she attends. "My smart, beautiful friend from America. Knowing you makes me so cool," she quotes one of her informants as telling her. She quotes others saying that only she can help them with their problems, or that maybe the women in the beauty parlor are asking her why she isn't married because they feel threatened that Mahdavi appears to "have it all."

Although Mahdavi writes that she did research among poor youth as well as the middle and upper classes, in the one extended account of an outdoor party on the wrong side of the tracks, we hear next to nothing from the poor urban youth in attendance. Instead we get a scene in which a young woman admires Mahdavi's shoes and Mahdavi generously offers to trade her fashionable footwear for the girl's tattered sandals, to the girl's gratitude and delight. "I've never met a rich girl like you," Mahdavi quotes her as saying. "Who are you, anyways?" These authorial intrusions make the first five chapters of Passionate Uprisings feel aimless and amateurish. Fortunately, when we get into the material about public health and sex education, about which Mahdavi has done truly original and far-reaching research, the author steps aside and allows her material to order itself before the reader in all its richness.

After all, at the level of observation, there is still something about these cultural currents at which to marvel. It is not hard to see why Mahdavi felt that her young subjects were the leading edge of something significant, even if we don't come away quite knowing of what. Nearly thirty years into its Islamic Republic, Iran has become a country its revolutionaries never imagined, let alone desired. Its population has doubled; its countryside has modernized; its cities have burgeoned. Heavy-handed religious rule has produced a profound ambivalence about organized religion even among Iranians who cleave strongly to their private faith. Young Iranians, born after the revolution, burrow tunnels under the walls the regime has erected to isolate them from the West. And no amount of repression has succeeded in smothering the seemingly trivial but inextinguishable human impulse toward beauty, the playfulness of fashion or the electricity of sex. Maybe this is a story about Iran, with its restive political culture and loss of faith in institutionalized religion; maybe it's a story about Islam and the return of its repressed; or maybe it's just a story about the human spirit and the things it is not prepared to live without.

About Laura Secor
Laura Secor is a 2008-09 fellow at the Dorothy and Lewis B. Cullman Center for Scholars and Writers, at the New York Public Library

Iranians go under BAT scan at Iraq border

ZURBATIYA, IRAQ // Thousands of Iranians entering Iraq are being scanned and catalogued by US intelligence agencies, in an effort to stop suspected infiltration by Iran’s elite military units.

Officials from the US army and the department of homeland security are stationed on the Iran-Iraq border, where they collect retinal scans, fingerprints and photos of all males aged between 16 and 65 years coming into the country.

These details are held in a massive computer database and crosschecked against records held in the United States by the security services. Anyone on a US wanted list is automatically identified and then detained by troops at the border.

Iran is accused by the United States, and many Iraqis, of supporting insurgents, providing them with cash and modern weaponry to use in attacks on US forces. Iran is also widely suspected here of interfering in politics and of stoking sectarian discord, all allegations it denies.

US officials say they have found newly manufactured Iranian munitions in the hands of Iraqi insurgents. Anti-US Shiite militants, including some interviewed by The National, have also claimed to have received training in Iran in advanced guerrilla warfare tactics.

With Sunni extremist groups considered to be under some kind of control – at least for the moment – US and Iraqi government forces have been focusing more on dissident Shiites, known in US military slang as “special groups”.

US controls on the Iraqi border depend on a system known as Bat, the biometric automated tool. It is currently in place at the Zurbatiya crossing point and is to be installed at other points of entry. Males of all nationalities passing into Iraq go through the US-run system before entering the usual immigration process carried out by Iraqi officers.

“We are BAT-sing 100 per cent of military-aged males,” Col Grant Webb said in an interview at his headquarters, close to Zurbatiya. “If you come across that border you are going to be enrolled in the system. It has a very large database and the information is sent back to the US.

“A person’s information is compared to that and you can catch people as they come in. We have detained a number of people, high-value individuals we’ve been looking for.”

Col Webb, the 47 year-old commander of Task Force Tusken, the US and Iraqi border force in Wasit province, said six “high-value” suspects had been captured in the past year.

“We get hits all the time,” he said. “It’ll say: ‘Hold this person questioning’ or something like that. When someone is a hit we’ll call up to Baghdad to an intelligence section and we’ll say: ‘We have this person, what do you want us to do?’ They’ll generally say he’s not a threat, but there have been a few occasions where they’ll say: ‘We’ll send an aircraft out there tonight to pick this guy up’.

“They’ve been Iranians and Iraqis. We caught an Iranian general, trying to transit. This guy is trying to go through as Joe Pedestrian.”

The United States is pumping millions of dollars into policing Iraq’s borders. At Zurbatiya, where up to 5,000 people cross a day, a transfer centre is being built at a cost of US$5.2 million (Dh19m) in an attempt to prevent weapons trafficking and import tax evasion. Since the new measures were introduced, customs duties collected by Iraq at the site have soared from a few million dollars annually to more than $12m.

Only lorries carrying refined oil products are allowed to cross the border. All other goods have to be unloaded from Iranian lorries and put into Iraqi vehicles, a process that happens on the Iranian side of the border. Iraqis and the US forces can only observe the process from a watchtower, hundreds of metres away.

“There have been claims that accelerants have come though in the cargo,” Col Webb said. “We’ve done a number of things to disrupt that. We have people watching the transfer of goods … but it’s a madhouse and you can’t see what’s happening, you can’t tell if something is buried in the cargo.”

All lorries must pass an X-ray machine on the Iraqi side of the border that scans for hidden cargo. Similar machines are used on the US-Mexico border, where only 30 per cent of lorries are scanned. The final check involves manual search of random lorries.

“This is no panacea,” Col Webb said. “We know it’s a deterrent, but we are in no way convinced we have prevented it.”

He admitted that no smuggled weapons had ever been intercepted, but said opium and hashish had been found. “We haven’t caught anything the whole time we’ve been here, the whole time my predecessor was here” – about 24 months in total.

“When I say we’ve never caught anything, I mean we’re never caught any accelerants. There are certain times of the year when tomatoes are illegal. We’ve caught them putting tomatoes in a lorry and covering it with onions, that kind of thing.”

The US military remains convinced that Iranian weapons and personnel – Col Webb referred to them as “bad actors” – continue to cross into Iraq. Because the area around Zurbatiya is now relatively secure, they believe traffickers have simply moved their operations south to Maysan province, a marshy area notorious for smuggling. The British army used to be responsible for that border zone, but their pull back to Basra airport left it exposed according to the US army.

“Iraqi intelligence, supported by our intelligence indicates a lot of that [smuggling] was going on in Maysan, south of us,” Col Webb said. “They could see that we were partnered up with the Iraqis here. Down in the south the British pulled out, so all indications are that that area became the hole in the sink where everything was coming through.”

US forces are going to deploy to the Maysan border next month – more than two years after the British pulled out and handed security responsibilities over to the Iraqis. A force similar to that now operating in Wasit and Diyala will be set up there, with US units supporting Iraqi border patrols, and processing incoming males.

In the meantime US troops have set up checkpoints on key routes running north from Maysan to Baghdad, in the hope of intercepting weapons en route to the Iraqi capital. Those too have turned up little so far, according to soldiers stationed on the isolated posts; to date a single consignment of untaxed fish is all the contraband that has been found.

“I would never say we have shut this border off,” Col Webb said. “I would not say that and I don’t want to imply that at all. We have significantly disrupted smuggling and bad actors crossing the border, especially relative to Maysan. Now that’s picking up. And I think that area is soon going to get plugged up as well.”

Heart of Arabia

The Khoda Khane, or House of Qurans, stands in the courtyard of Friday Mosque. Roger Wood / Corbis

Why go?

As one might expect from a city which name translates as “house of learning”, Shiraz – Iran’s fifth most populated metropolis – is a treasure trove of historical delights. The prefect destination for culture vultures and history lovers alike, this magical destination boasts an array of tempting attractions for the more pensive tourist. From the exquisite mosques and mausoleums to the restful gardens and stunning mountain views, Shiraz is full of cultural attractions.

According to Islamic historians, Shiraz came into existence after the Arab takeover of Iran. The invasion, in fact, contributed to the city’s importance, and by the 13th century it had grown into one of the largest and most popular Islamic areas of the era. Since then it has become a hub for art and literature due to the many scholars and artists who have lived and died there. Consequently, a slew of stunning tombs and monuments erected in honour of these talented souls dot Shiraz, showing that although gone, they are far from forgotten.

One of the city’s most famous sights is the Tomb of Hafez, a homage to Hafez-e Shirazi, an eminent 14th century poet, mystic and scholar renowned for his lyrical poems, which are said to have possessed a modern surrealism. Hafez’s resting place has become a hot spot for literature lovers. A short walk from the town centre, the mausoleum, which is housed in an open pavilion, is marked by a marble tombstone, engraved with the poet’s work.

Shoppers will also be in their element, as Shiraz is home to Bazar-e Vakil, a colourful and atmospheric market. The best way to explore this buzzing bazaar is on foot, without concern for time or direction. Simply try to soak up the ambience in the maze of lanes before putting your bartering skills to the test in any of the 200 stores. Serai Mushir at the southern end of the main bazaar lane is a quaint two-story caravanserai and the perfect place to take a breather or do a bit of souvenir shopping. It’s customary to haggle throughout Iran.

If you’re keen to escape Shiraz’s busy town centre, relax in one of the many hidden corners of Bagh-e Eram, one of the most picturesque gardens in Shiraz. Best known for their tall cypress trees, the gardens are centred around a Qajar-era palace, the Kakh-e Eram (Eram Palace). The bad news is that the management currently chooses to charge foreigners entry fees up to ten times the local price.
Where to stay

Budget
The Apadana Hotel (+98 711 233 1106) is widely recognised as one of the most affordable hotels in Shiraz. Although basic, the rooms are clean, comfortable and air-conditioned. Rooms start at Dh80.

Mid-range
Comfortable and cosy, Park Hotel (+98 711 331000) is conveniently located on Zand Avenue and within walking distance of shops, markets and close to the city’s banking district. Rooms start at Dh175.

Luxury

Shiraz Homa Hotel (www.homahotels.com) on Meshkinfam Street is located in the heart of the city and perfect for guests seeking to combine convenience with luxury. Rooms start at Dh245 per night.
Where to eat

For Iranian food at its best, book a table at Shater Abbas Restaurant (+98 711 229 1440), on Khakshenasi Street. This trendy spot is known for its contemporary menu, which fuses traditional favourites with less familiar dishes, such as turkey kebab and mushroom steak. The menu is a little on the steep side, but well worth it the extra expense.

"Iran in World Politics" Interpreting the Islamic Republic of Iran

The Iranian-born political scientist Arshin Adib-Moghaddam describes the various interpretations and representations of the Islamic Republic of Iran in his book – from the Islamic utopianism of the early revolution via the first Gulf War to the current confrontation with American neo-conservatives and domestic reform debates. André Bank comments on the work

Iran is perhaps the greatest challenge currently facing western foreign and security policy. Paradoxically, it is the American and European wars in neighbouring Iraq and Afghanistan that have helped strengthen the Islamic Republic's status in its third decade. And although US President Bush, whose presidency saw a loser focus on Iran, is nearing the end of his term in office, the importance of Iran for global and regional policy does not look set to wane in the near future.

Against Iranian pop studies

The issue of the Islamic Republic – the various different ways in which Iran is interpreted and represented – thus remains politically relevant and influential. Arshin Adib-Moghaddam's study addresses these differing readings of the Islamic Republic.

The author, who studied in Hamburg, gained his PhD in Cambridge and now lectures at the prestigious School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London, takes a cultural-genealogical approach. He uses four case studies, on foreign policy culture in Iran, the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, Iranian-American relations, and domestic debates about reform, to develop and contrast different interpretations of Iranian politics.

Throughout the book, Adib-Moghaddam clearly rejects the "market for Iranian pop studies" and the positivist idea on which they are based, that "Iran is simply there". Instead, the study's fundamental objective is to give us a more pluralistic understanding of post-revolutionary Iran and thereby work towards establishing "critical Iran Studies" as a academic field. He cites a long series of mainly western social theorists from various schools of thought, such as Dilthey, Foucault, Gadamer and Habermas, to justify his analytical focus on the diversity of interpretations and meanings of Iran.

Islamic, Persian or pragmatic?

In the chapter on Iranian foreign policy, Adib-Moghaddam emphasises the after-effects of fundamental Islamic revolutionary ideas, a "utopian-romantic meta-narrative" dating from the 1960s and 1970s but which still influence the strategic thinking of key decision-makers. He thus opposes the view that Iran's foreign policy – current examples being the nuclear issue or policy on Iraq and Afghanistan – is primarily of a pragmatic nature and guided by national interests. In this context, it is surprising to find no references to the current President Ahmadinejad, whose speeches certainly contain elements of this Islamic utopianism.

This omission may be partly due to the fact that the separate case studies were previously published as articles in journals | Bild: Arshin Adib-Moghaddam; private photo
Arshin Adib-Moghaddam was born in Iran, educated in Germany and currently teaches at SOAS in London | such as Critique and Third World Quarterly. The subsequent chapter on the first Gulf War of 1980-88 focuses on Iraqi attempts to construct Persian-Arab hostility and the resulting almost natural conclusion of alliances with the Arab states of the Near and Middle East, based on identity politics.

Adib-Moghaddam's third case study describes a third reading of the Islamic Republic- a reading which has been widely discussed: the emergence of the American neoconservative idea of a fundamentally uncompromising, aggressive Mullah regime in Iran, with diverse alleged parallels to the Nazis. The fourth case study takes a look at domestic policy in Iran, tracing the successive decline of the internal reform movement under President Khatami up to 2003. The author particularly focuses on the pluralist dynamic and the question of a possible democratic future in Iran.

Critical Iran Studies?

Arshin Adib-Moghaddam's study of Iran attempts to sketch the diverse interpretations of the Islamic Republic – from outside as well as inside the country – on a broad social theory basis. One very positive aspect is the attempt to take Iran out of its isolated position as a political and cultural special case, by throwing a light on how ideological positions on Iran were constructed, and thus putting them in a historical context.

However, the question arises as to the benefit of the author's strong social theory pluralism, particularly in comparison to other studies of Iran, such as that of Charles Kurzman on various interpretations of the 1979 revolution or Trita Parsi's study on the relations between Iran, Israel and the USA.

Like every perspective, Adib-Moghaddam's continuous emphasis on pluralism of readings of Iran also produces its own blind spots. Certain techniques of power, such as non-discursive forms of repression, and the political economy and strategic dimension of Iranian and Middle Eastern policy thus remain essentially untouched. The book's ambitious goal of working towards "critical Iran Studies", as the author again emphasises in the closing chapter, has thus not been fully achieved.

André Bank

Iran: Iranian, Turkmen Officials Meet on Cultural-Literary Issues

Section: General News - The Culture and Islamic Guidance Office of the northeastern Golestan province sponsored a meeting in the city of Gonbad Monday in a bid to increase interactions and boost ties between Iranian and Turkmen cultural and literary figures.

The meeting was held at Red Crescent Hall of Gonbad-e-Kavous, where some of the participants from both countries stressed the need for more ties and interactions in cultural and artistic fields, the Islamic republic news agency reported.

The participants meanwhile typically referred to lots of cultural and literary commonalities between the two nations and reiterated that visits of the two countries' cultural delegations is a measure at the service of increasing the unity and expanding cultural ties.

Cultural-Political Affairs Deputy of Gonbad-e-Kavous Township welcomed the audience of the meeting, particularly its foreign guests and referred to the peaceful coexistence of various ethnic groups and followers of different faiths in Golestan Province.

Abbas Ali Mir-Hosseini added, "The peoples of this land have always lived unified and amicably side by side of one another."

He said, "The Iranian and Turkmen Muslim nations and governments are friends of one another, with lots of commonalities, that serve as factors assisting their unity and solidarity."

Mir-Hosseini considered the existence of hundreds of kilometers of shared borders as well as the great, renowned Gnostic poet, Makhtoum Gholi Faraqi, among the commonalities of the two nations, adding, "This great Turkmen poet is among the most revered prides of the two nations."

Head of Gonbad Culture and Islamic Guidance Office, too, in the meeting considered Islam as the greatest shared point of the two nations, arguing, "Our sacred religion breaks time and place barriers in order to boost friendship bonds, unity and solidarity among various Islamic nations."

Mohammad Reza Davarzani pointed out that arts and cultures are among the shared heritage wealth of the entire world nations, adding, "The most significant outcome of such meeting and visits is strengthening the bonds of friendship, increasing interactions, and boosting unity between the two friendly countries of Iran and Turkmenistan."

In addition to lectures and addresses by the two countries' literary and cultural figures, the audience enjoyed the performance of some artistic troupes of the two countries, particularly a traditional Turkmen music troupe and Gonbad-e-Kavous Township's Moshtaq music troupe.

The 14 member Turkmen cultural, literary and artistic delegation attending the meeting arrived in Iran on August 10th and have so far in addition to pilgrimage of Imam Reza's Holy Shrine in Mashhad visited the tombs of such great Iranian poets and thinkers as Bayazid Bastami, Attar Neyshabouri, Hakim Omar Khayyam, Khajeh Hafez Shirazi, Sheikh Mosleheddin Sa'di,... as well as some famous cultural and historical monuments throughout Iran.

Gonbad-e-Kavous Township with its 290,000 population is located at the east side of Iran's northeastern Golestan Province. - FNA

Iran: 17th Carpet Exhibit to Open on August 22

Section: General News - The 17th Hand-woven Persian Carpet Exhibition will be held in Tehran's Permanent International Fairground from August 22-28.

According to the exhibition's public relations office, 414 foreign and domestic companies will showcase their products including carpets, kilim and gabeh in an area of 35,000 square meters.

The event is a best venue for introducing the Iranian carpet industry to the world, the public relations office said.

Earlier, the Islamic republic news agency quoted deputy head of Iran Carpet Company as saying that the government will grant special facilities for establishment of carpet-weaving factories in a bid to make carpet production target-oriented and promote the quality of Persian carpets.

"So far a total of 200 carpet-weaving factories have become operational using such facilities," Mohammad Abed said, underlining that with the implementation of the plan, orders for Persian carpet as well as supervision over the quality of production will increase.

Commenting on the specifications of the plan, Abed also said that under the plan, raw materials used in the factories will also be overseen by technical inspectors.

He also said that Commerce Ministry has proposed the government to set aside 500 billion rials so as to procure quality raw materials for the purpose. - FNA

Iranian general accuses USA, UK of funding insurgents - fuller version

A general of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corp has accused the USA and UK of inciting insurgents in the Iranian provinces of Sistan-Baluchestan and Khuzestan.

Financial rewards have been promised in exchange for opposing the government, Gen Sha'bani, the deputy head of the Staff Commander University of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corp, said in a programme entitled "In the Name of Martyrs' Lord" broadcast on Iranian state television in West Azarbayjan Province on 21 August.

Gen Sha'bani, a veteran of the Iran-Iraq war, addressed war veterans and local clerics at a gathering in a mosque to commemorate martyrs of Naqadeh District of West Azarbayjan Province.

In his speech he touched on the New Middle East Plan, attacks in Sistan-Baluchestan and Khuzestan provinces, Iran's activities in the sphere of nuclear energy and other spheres of science, and the 33-day Israel-Lebanon war.

Speaking about the New Middle East Plan, Gen Sha'bani said that this plan was prepared by the Israeli president, Shimon Peres, and raised by American President George Bush and State Secretary Condoleezza Rice.

"The activity of ethnic separatists is one of the most important goals of the New Middle East Plan. One person will be told that his is a Turk, another one will be told that his is a Kurd, another one that he is a Persian and another one that he is a Baluch," he added.

The general explained that according to this plan, states must not be involved in ideological activities, but only provide services. According to the plan, the cities of Mecca and Medina will be separated from Saudi Arabia and a theocratic state like the Vatican will be established there, Sha'bani said.

"A united Iraq has no meaning in the New Middle East Plan: southern Iraq, midlands and northern Iraq," he said.

Noting that the enemy is preparing to attack Iran, Gen Sha'bani called for people to maintain their unity and avoid disagreements.

Sha'bani said that three US officers, two British officers and four Pakistani elements recently invited insurgents in the eastern areas of Iran to Pakistan's Mand [district]. "They were told that each of them would be paid 13,000 dollars for closing a road in Islamic Iran for half an hour, for abducting 10 people or for killing 10 others," he said.

Gen Sha'bani went on to speak about attacks in Khuzestan Province, saying that 23 people have been arrested in Ahvaz in this connection.

Sha'bani said the investigation showed that "most of them said they were told that those who blow up a government bank will be paid 100,000 dinars. We will pay 50,000 dinars to those who set fire to a state vehicle and 25,000 dinars to those who set fire to civilian vehicles."

Gen Sha'bani spoke about Iran's scientific achievements. "At some point we did not even have barbed wire. However, now we have gained access to peaceful nuclear power. The enemy is afraid. In the laser sphere, we have made such progress that most of it has not been disclosed yet. Iran takes 11th place in the world for its development of embryology," he added.

He quoted IAEA chief Al-Baradi'i as telling the Iranian president that "I am cannot hide my happiness about your profound progress on nuclear technology. Now you feel that you are one of the 10 nuclear powers in the world."

The general also praised Hezbollah leader Seyyid Hasan Nasrallah for preventing a split between the Lebanese, the Sunnis and the Shi'is. Sha'bani quoted a Christian girl as saying that Nasrallah returned honour to the Lebanese people.

At the end, he called on the Basij Resistance Force to take an active part in drills and exercises, adding that their attendance would influence events.

Source: Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran West Azarbayjan Provincial TV, Orumiyeh, in Persian 1520 gmt 21 Aug 08

Iran: Iran buys wheat from U.S. first time in 27 years

Section: Business News - Iran this summer resumed buying U.S. wheat after a 27-year hiatus, a sign of the limited options for importers seeking large quantities of high-quality grain, The Wall Street Journal reported on Thursday.

Since the 2008-09 marketing year began on June 1, Iran has bought more than 1 million tons of hard red winter wheat directly from the U.S., which is "a very large amount," the report quoted Bill Nelson, analyst for Wachovia Securities as saying.

The purchases mean at least 3 percent to 4 percent of domestic wheat exports for the marketing year will go to a country the U.S. hasn't done business with for more than a generation, said the report.

Government sanctions don't prohibit U.S. agricultural exporters from doing business with Iran.

Drought is expected to slash Iran's domestic production by one- third this year.

Iran is forecast to produce 10 million tons of wheat this year, down from 15 million tons in 2007-08, and to import 4.5 million tons, up from 200,000 tons last year, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture. - PNA

BLOGGERS OF THE WORLD, LET'S SHOP!

The young online tribe is more interested in discussing sex, drugs and rock'n'roll than political revolution, writes Antony Loewenstein

EARLY last month, some Iranian members of parliament voted to debate a draft bill that aimed to ``toughen punishment for disturbing mental security in society'' by adding to the list of offences punishable by execution crimes such as ``establishing websites and weblogs promoting corruption, prostitution and apostasy''.

Nikahang, a Canadian-based Iranian online cartoonist and blogger, was defiant: ``Only people who disturb people's mental security could support such a thing.''

During a visit to the Islamic Republic in 2007 to research the blogging community, I found this attitude was common. With a population of 70 million, most of them under 30, Iran is home to one of the Middle East's largest online communities, which is thriving despite onerous censorship and risk of imprisonment.

The more than 100,000 active Iranian bloggers, writing mainly in Farsi, include hardline Islamists battling with reformists over religious dress, anti-Semitism, the war in Iraq and dating rituals.

The rise of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, it seems, has only emboldened activists of all political persuasions.

I spent a day with the country's former vice-president Mohammad Ali Abtahi, a regular blogger. This chubby man, a frequent giggler, chastised me when I asked why it was impossible to criticise Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei publicly, just as Westerners routinely slam elected politicians. ``One of the misunderstandings is that you try and compare the institutions of countries, which are not similar to each other,'' he instructed.

I quickly discovered that in a country such as Iran, the divide between conservative and moderate is far narrower than generally presumed. Iranian reformers are Islamists in less fundamentalist garb and most citizens appear to want an Islamic nation with a modern face.

Across the world, young generations are challenging tired state media by writing online about politics, sex, drugs, relationships, religion, popular culture and especially Angelina Jolie. From Egyptian activists opposed to female circumcision to outspoken, pro-Western women in Cuba, people are being empowered by new technology to create spaces away from the prying eyes of meddling authorities.

The rise of the online community means the relationship between the state and its people is shifting radically. Individuality is emerging in societies that routinely shun such behaviour and repressive regimes are not pleased.

A recent University of Washington report reveals that 64 people have been arrested for blogging since 2003. Iran, China and Egypt are the main offenders.

In the West, blogging has become an essential part of the media, with millions of internet users cataloguing their daily lives. The US-based Co-operative Congressional Election Study has found that although political blogging is popular, only a minority of web users regularly engage with political bloggers. The study's report confirms that readers ``tend to visit blogs that share their viewpoint''.

The need for alternative sources of information, voices not processed through a Western journalist's filter, became pronounced after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC. I shared the frustration of many with the mainstream media's lack of insight into nations deemed Western enemies or allies.

Blogs offered a window into mainly middle-class segments of societies rarely examined in the West. What does a Saudi Arabian male think about his country's adherence to Wahhabism? How does the average China web user cope with multinational-assisted filtering? What is Cuba's likely future after Fidel Castro?

These are just a few of the issues that blogs have helped to elucidate.

My on-the-ground investigation of the blogging revolution and its influence on the relationship between the West and the rest took me to Iran, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Cuba and China. In these countries I met writers, bloggers, dissidents, politicians and journalists.

The subjects we discussed included the role of companies such as Google, Yahoo, Cisco and Microsoft in helping repressive regimes censor the internet.

The results were surprising. As one blogger told me in Tehran: ``Most of the people (I knoware) in favour of reform, not revolution, because people are too tired to experience another revolution.'' I found the same message echoed throughout the countries I visited: the desire to experience incremental change without foreign involvement.

Vocal activism was the exception, not the norm. Take China. A recent study by the Pew Internet & American Life Project found that the vast majority of China's web users -- who number more than 250 million, the largest online community in the world -- expressed support for Beijing managing or controlling the internet. A book editor in Shanghai explained to me that online filtering didn't bother many Chinese, given that 99 per cent of blogs discussed food and daily life. He thought that most citizens questioned the sincerity of leaders who talked about ``democracy with Chinese characteristics''. ``Is China ready for free elections?'' he asked sceptically.

Despite these realities, during the past decade there has been a steady increase in awareness about political rights, principally because of satellite television and the internet.

China's leading video-sharing site, Tudou (which means couch potato), is reportedly bigger than YouTube, with more than one petabyte of daily data transfers. Tudou founder Gary Wang explains that officials phone in several times a week to demand the removal from the site of films they consider suspect. Wang is philosophical. Change is coming but it will take time. Political reform isn't a priority for most citizens. Even though he spent years living in France and the US, Wang resents questions about ``oppressive censorship'' from Western reporters. ``They seem to pity us,'' he says.

Earlier this year, most Chinese bloggers reacted with outrage at what they perceived to be anti-Beijing coverage in the Western media of the pro-Tibet protests in Lhasa and the troubled Olympic torch relay. ``For a long time now,'' one of them wrote, ``certain Western media, best represented by CNN and BBC, in the name of press freedom, have been unscrupulously slandering and defaming developing nations.''

I heard repeatedly during my visit to China, usually after a tirade against foreign journalists who rarely travel beyond Beijing, that satisfaction with the Communist Party regime is strong and growing. This doesn't mean the Chinese endorse authoritarian methods. Rather, it means incremental change and battles against corruption are considered preferable to Western-style capitalism.

A separate global Pew Research Centre study conducted this year found 86 per cent of Chinese were happy with their country's direction, double the 2002 figure. In comparison, only 23 per cent of Americans surveyed thought their nation was heading the right way.

Blogger Mica Yushu told me in Shanghai that most of her middle-class friends didn't crave political change. ``We use the internet mostly for entertainment, sharing information, earning money or other fun,'' she said. The sight of darkened internet cafes across the country was something to behold, with thousands of users gaming, watching downloaded films and soft-core pornography, blogging and instant messaging. Politics seemed the furthest thing from these monitored minds.

China's economic boom has mostly silenced the internal critics and agitators who do speak up pay a high price for challenging Beijing's unelected clique.

Online culture is thriving in almost every country I visited. The exception is Cuba, although the elevation of Raul Castro to the presidency is slowly leading to economic and social perestroika, despite some politically tinged websites being blocked.

Most bloggers prefer to protest privately, anonymously or not at all. The fight against repression takes many forms, from drinking contraband vodka in Tehran to appropriating American hip-hop culture in Havana. The price of protesting in Egypt, one of the highest annual recipients of US aid, is likely to be imprisonment and torture.

Despite their relatively small numbers and the penalties they attract, dissenting bloggers are playing havoc with the established order. According to Human Rights Watch researcher Elijah Zarwan, ``bloggers have succeeded in doing something that years of standing on the street corner and shouting `No to torture' or `No to the interior ministry' has never managed to accomplish'': putting these issues on the public agenda.

The small size of online communities in Syria and Saudi Arabia has not stopped bloggers from challenging authoritarian rule.

Neither country employs harsh online filtering, but users learn quickly there are lines that cannot be crossed.

Saudi Arabian actor Mohammad al-Qass explains that in a fundamentalist nation such as his, internal reform -- for women's rights and broader legal and social rights -- needs space to develop. ``Fifty years ago, Saudi Bedouins were riding around on camels. Now they're using mobile phones and the best technology,'' Qass says. ``It will take time for society to catch up with this technology.''

Meanwhile, for the first time a more nuanced view of the West is being offered via the web, and it allows a woman in Damascus the freedom to admire Brad Pitt as well as pray five times a day at the local mosque. Cross-cultural pollination is occurring, no matter what the religiously pious may think about it.

The issue of online representation is central to this debate. I recently presented a paper in Budapest at the Harvard University and Google sponsored Global Voices Citizen Media Summit. While we heard countless tales of bloggers across the world using online tools to highlight police torture and corruption, many participants wondered about the voices we weren't hearing online: such as those of minorities, the poor and Luddites uncomfortable with technology.

US writer Clay Shirky explains in his book Here Comes Everybody: The Power of Organising Without Organisations that ``communications tools (such as YouTube, Twitter, Facebook and blogging) don't get socially interesting until they get technologically boring''. In other words, it's only now becoming possible to come across online the words of indigenous communities in Bolivia, dispossessed voters in Kenya or sex workers in India.

Letting people speak and write for themselves without a Western lens is one of the triumphs of blogging. The culture of blogging is unlike that of any previous social movement. Disjointed and disorganised, its aims are deliberately vague. While many want the right to be critical in the media, others simply crave the ability to date and listen to subversive music. That in itself is revolutionary for much of the world.

The Blogging Revolution by Antony Loewenstein (Melbourne University Press) is published next week.

Loewenstein will appear at the Melbourne Writers Festival, as well as at next month's Brisbane Writers Festival.