Turkey’s political openness holds lessons for the Arab world

Some may think that the intricacies of domestic Turkish politics are irrelevant to the fate of the Arab world. Not so, as made plainly evident by the sigh of relief throughout the region after the country’s Constitutional Court decided against banning the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).

The moderate Islamist AKP survived the secularist challenge, which alleged that the Islamist party was conducting anti-secular activities that contradicted the country’s constitution and very foundations.

That said, judging from the magistrate’s clearly uncomfortable expression and opening statement on television, nothing is settled yet. Far from creating a consensus on Turkey’s political future, the decision of the court may only prolong this transitional and turbulent phase in Turkish politics where the nature of the system is hotly debated but not necessarily transformed. The AKP will continue to promote its version of “democratic secularism”, a compromise between rising Islamic sentiments and the country’s secular legacy. The secularists from their bastions in the military, judiciary and business elite will continue to fight to preserve the heritage of Kemalism.

The ambiguous ruling against the AKP has changed something in the all-out confrontation of the past year, when the AKP government was challenged no less than three times by a powerful coalition of the military, the judiciary and the republican opposition. Lines may have been drawn but the bruising fight has weakened both camps. Unless they manage to mobilise massive popular support behind them, which is unlikely given how tired the general public has become, they are likely to battle with less fervour.

Indeed, AKP’s standing has taken a domestic hit. It was overwhelmingly found guilty of “anti-secular activities”. It would have taken only one more vote to close down the party. This close ruling is a clear warning shot to the Islamist leadership not to push the envelope.

The AKP leadership is also facing a challenge from within its ranks. prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been criticised for his divisive, almost authoritarian governing style. His lack of outreach to secular parties has fuelled mistrust of the AKP. A senior AKP official has already left the organisation to launch his own centrist Islamist party. The government’s performance since 2007, perhaps complicated by the volatile political situation, has been disappointing compared with its first term in office.

The secularists are also short on solutions. In 2007 the army stepped in to block the election as president of Abdullah Gul, a conservative AKP member, forcing the AKP government to call for early elections that it handily won. Gul was later elected president. Now that the Constitutional Court has refused to go ahead with a radical agenda, the limits of secular power have been defined. The secular leadership is also fighting the perception that it is motivated by the need to protect its position of privilege rather than upholding secular principles.

In this context, a transformation of Turkish politics could be in the cards with the rise of a moderate, technocratic centre less keen to indulge in identity politics. Another, probably more plausible scenario would have the AKP acknowledge that it too has hit a wall and needs to adopt a more inclusive approach that would associate the republican opposition to the government.

Indeed, there may not be much of a popular appetite for a protracted battle when Turkey’s gains need to be consolidated. Turkey is booming but reforms have been lagging in recent times and the economy is slowing down. The cold welcome given by some European countries to the idea of Turkish accession to the EU, domestic terrorism and tensions with Iraq have affected the Turkish drive to improve governance and advance public freedoms.

The significance to the Middle East of this struggle and, more generally, of Turkey’s state-building experiment since 1922, is hard to miss. Turkey’s vibrant democracy may have its limits, but such sophisticated politics and institutions are lacking in the Arab world. In the best of cases, Turkey can serve as a model for how Arab states, societies and ideologies can evolve to meet modernity. More realistically, Turkey will offer important lessons in political and economic change and serve as a benchmark for progress.

Consider the role of the military in politics. The Turkish military has unmistakably driven Turkish politics for decades, but withdrew after it had stabilised and modernised the state. Arab militaries too have seized power, but the experiment has been largely disappointing. Instead of bringing sustained modernisation to their societies and relinquishing power over time, military rulers in Syria, Egypt and Iraq focused on preserving their power at great expense to national development.

More relevant to our times perhaps is the interplay between Islam and modernity taking place in Turkey. Political Islam, sometimes seen as a looming threat by autocrats, liberals and the West, is now a defining feature of the Muslim world, and in Turkey as in Indonesia and elsewhere, a force for progress. While the AKP is at the vanguard of peaceful domestic change, Arab Islamist movements are struggling with their theological contradictions, pan-Arab agendas, and anti-imperialist ambitions.

Perhaps the way Turkey is working through these current political uncertainties can inspire the Arab world.